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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is intended primarily as an attempt at 
clarifying some of the traditional theories and concepts 
connected with the concept of motivation. It has stemmed, 
naturally enough, from an initial interest in the topic for its 
own sake, but this interest has rapidly developed into a strong 
sense of dissatisfaction with those theories which claim to 
advance an exhaustive account of the topic, when they have 
really only touched on one or two (albeit important) aspects 
of the general problem. The result is a piece of work which 
may well give the impression of being essentially both 
negative and critical. I cannot accept that this is really so. 
Admittedly, there are places in what follows where I have not 
had the confidence to substitute for the particular theory 
which has been criticised a satisfactory alternative account; 
but then to demand that one should do so suggests the 
assumption that concepts in general - and perhaps the concept 
of motivation in particular - find their application within 
certain fairly narrowly defined boundaries. Wittgenstein 
convincingly showed, in connection with the concept of a game, 
that we need not suppose that an activity has any one defining 
characteristic in order to qualify for inclusion under a 
certain concept. The concept of motive is not quite in this 
category, but we ought, I think, to be led by Wittgenstein's 
example to be on our guard against any suggestion that the 
concept is easily locatable by reference to a few simple 
paradigms. 
But it is not only the case, with respect to the theories 
which have been considered, that I want to say 'But the 
meaning of motive is not exhausted in this account, for look 
at this situation.... ': I want further to make it obvious, by 
giving each chapter a fairly independent treatment, that it 
will often be inappropriate to describe a theory of 
motivation as wrong, or misleading, or even inadequate - even 
though on independent grounds it may be so. What one ma want 
to say is that the account satisfies an enquiry into human 
behaviour, either in the general or in the particular, at a 
certain level. Of course it is true, as we shall see in 
Chapter II for example, that many motives name a disposition, 
a propensity, or a tendency which will find expression in a 
law -like proposition. But to proffer such a proposition in an 
attempt to explain someone's action is not always either a 
welcome or a helpful gesture. We may be more anxious to 
discover the immediate reason why the agent did what he did, 
and perhaps why he did it at that moment and not at any other. 
There will be times when the answer to this kind of enquiry 
will be in the nature of a causal account, where such an account 
cannot be substituted for the statement of a man's motive. But 
not all 'immediate' reasons for action will fall into this 
class, as some of the examples of Chapters I, III, and V may 
help to demonstrate. 
Then again, I have argued in the latter part of Chapter III 
that motives or reasons for action must often be seen as 
derivable from the social context in which one finds oneself, 
that it is thus that they gain their explanatory value (a view 
which has been foreshadowed in the concluding sections of 
Chapter II); but it hardly needs stating that there is a 
distinction between this question and the question of what 
function a man is performing when he asserts his own or 
another's motive. These are just two ways of approaching the 
general topic, and one need not assume that they encroach upon 
one another. 
The notion of clarification often provokes, especially 
among antagonists of linguistic philosophy, accusations of 
presumption. I do not see myself called upon to defend my 
general approach: it already occupies a comfortable position 
well within the boundaries of philosophy. But one might say of 
the claim to clarify that this may be justified on the general 
ground that understanding a concept is not just a matter of 
knowing how to use a word correctly: for this purpose a 
dictionary would adequately suffice. It is rather a matter, from 
a philosophical point of view, of being able to draw out the 
implications of its use. It is one thing to be told that a 
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motive is the reason which an agent gives to explain his 
action, but it is philosophically more interesting to discuss, 
for example, whether acting from a motive is a criterion for 
saying that a person decided or chose to do what he did. This 
is a question with which Chapter I is primarily concerned, and 
it is further discussed in the earlier section of Chapter VI. 
Then again, are we to say that in acting from a motive a man 
is necessarily aware of what he is doing? And what are the 
differences between acting from a motive and acting from force 
of habit? These are questions which can be answered not by 
abstract examination of concepts (if this was ever a 
meaningful notion in any case) but by looking at situations in 
the concrete and considering the kind of statements a man makes 
in answer to enquiries of this or that kind. The second part 
of Chapter VI is an extended empirical investigation of this 
nature in which I have given a fairly detailed account of 
certain sections of Francois Mauriac's novel Therese in order 
to illustrate how the motivated and the intended gradually 
blurs into the unmotivated and the unintended. 
This, then, is primarily what a claim to clarification 
amounts to in this context. One might note in connection with 
it how Ryle expresses the position in the introduction to The 
Concept of Mind: 
"It is one thing to know how to apply such 
concepts, quite another to know how to 
correlate them with one another and with 
concepts of other sorts. Many people can 
talk sense with concepts but cannot talk 
sense about them; they know by practice 
how to operate with concepts, anyhow inside 
familiar fields, but they cannot state the 
logical regulations governing their use. 
They are like people who know their way 
about their own parish, but cannot 
construct or read a map of it, much less 
a map of the region or continent in which 
their parish lies." 
The charge of presumption cannot therefore be applicable 
here, simply because it is not the aim of this kind of 
philosophy to show how a particular concept ought to be 
employed: it is not, in other words, a list of instructions for 
its use - indeed, it could not constitute such, for the 
programme as a whole has to presuppose that the concept under 
discussion is already a working one. 
The more general charge, perhaps consequent upon this 
previous one, is that the conclusions, such as they are, are 
therefore of no practical value. This point really turns upon 
what one takes a process of clarification to be; whether it is 
always to be seen as a means to some further purpose which is 
in itself considered to be of practical value, or whether the 
process carries its own justification. But this whole issue 
ultimately reverts to the general defense of linguistic 
philosophy - of the techniques of which I take this present 
thesis to be representative - and it has already been implied 
that this is not the proper context in which to uphold its 
merits. 
G. 
It will be noted that the content of some of the chapters 
is not always obviously related to the discussion of 'motive', 
as such. There are three things which I want to say in 
connection/ with this. In the first place, there are certain 
cases where only by discussing at length some important features 
of a closely related concept can one hope to determine or draw 
attention to a certain characteristic either of motives or of 
motivated action. Thus Chapter I contains a lengthy pre -amble 
upon the concept of decision, and some later sections (some of 
which are partly speculative) upon the concept of action; and 
in both Chapters V and VI a good deal of space is devoted to 
the concept of intention. But secondly, I had never had it in 
mind that the work should centre exclusively upon the concept 
of motive proper. I have taken the concept of motivation (as 
opposed to the concept of motive) in a sufficiently wide sense 
to include such kindred topics as those of intention, decision, 
choice, habit, wanting, etc., all of which have this in 
common, that they may sometimes and in some contexts be invoked 
to explain human behaviour. They are in general the kind of 
things which (metaphorically) bring actions into being. To 
this extent, their inclusion is justified. And thirdly, it has 
to be admitted that, from a personal point of view, the 
discussion of motives proper somehow naturally led into a 
discussion of these further mentioned topics. This may or may 
not be a bad thing in itself; but it may be said in general of 
their inclusion that they serve to relieve the monotony which 
might otherwise have characterised a detailed linguistic 
analysis of motives alone. 
The parts of this thesis which have been accepted for 
publication are Chapters IV and V. The former is to appear in 
Mind under the title "Dr.Peters' 'Motives'" while the latter 
is shortly due to appear in The Philosophical Quarterly, its 
title unaltered. Both papers have been modified to some extent 
for presentation in artice form. 
MOTIVE ACTION, AND DECISION 
Philosophical literature, especially that which has 
appeared in the last decade or so, is riddled with attempts at 
providing a simple definition of, or criteria for, action, 
motivation, and related concepts. It will be one of the aims of 
this thesis to show that this is not easily achieved. But if it 
is thus a mistake to suppose, notwithstanding a fairly 
comprehensive account of the topics involved, that one can 
produce such a definition, it is perhaps a philosophical sin to 
arrive in the field holding certain unquestioned 
presuppositions about the subject. Nowell -Smith, it seems to me, 
has committed this kind of sin. I shall be dwelling at length 
in this chapter upon certain comments which he makes, not so 
much from a desire to criticise Nowell -Smith in particular 
but rather with a view to 'broadening out' the topic and 
preparing the ground for a discussion of further treatments of 
the topic in subsequent chapters. 
"A motiveless action ", Nowell -Smith maintains, "....is 
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logically impossible; for it is not something wh4.oh a man 
could be said to 'decide' or 'choose' to do and so would not 
-i 
count as an 'action' ". Two assumptions are involved here, 
both of which I shall want to challenge: (I) All actions are 
decided upon or chosen, and (2) a so- called motiveless action 
could not be said to be chosen or decided upon. I shall turn 
I 
'Ethics'. Penguin edition.p.I24. 
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to the second of these assumptions first. 
There is a large variety of actions which one may, under 
certain circumstances, wish to describe as motiveless. These 
range from those done put of force of habit (though these are 
not by definition motiveless) to those of the performance of 
which the agent is thoroughly aware. The former will be dealt 
with in detail in Chapter III. In the present chapter, I shall 
be more particularly concerned with the latter. These fall 
into that class of actions to which the appropriate reply to 
a request for explanation or justification is 'There was no 
reason', or 'I just felt like doing so', or 'I just wanted to'. 
These are common modes of reply, the effect of which is first 
of all to assert the agent's awareness of what he was doing, 
and secondly to deny that he had a reason, in the accepted 
sense, for doing it. It is this kind of action which Nowell - 
Smith relegates to the sphere of the logically impossible; and 
he does so not simply, it must be noted, as a result of a 
bland denial that a persofl may act with no reason but rather 
because an action which cannot be said to have a reason or 
motive cannot genuinely be classed as an action either. An 
action which has no reason could not have been decided upon, or 
chosen, and thus does not count as an action, for the notion 
of decision or choice requires to be linked with 'reasons for 
acting'. 
One may, under the guise of a very 'general' conception 
of motivation, regard as venial the statement that a motiveless 
action is logically impossible (an issue which will be 
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discussed below ); it is the explicit definition of action, 
upon which this statement is founded, which calls for immediate 
comment. From one point of view it is evident that candidates 
for motiveless actions can be decided upon or chosen. I may 
decide, for example, to take a walk in the park and in answer 
to a person who asks me why I decided to do do I may, in all 
seriousness, say 'There was no reason; I just felt like doing 
so'. I may decide to go to the theatre, to take a motor -ride, 
to do a crossword- puzzle, to sketch a cathedral tower, to 
listen to the wireless all for no reason at all. There 
is no pre- eminent example of an action, pp re and simple, any 
more than there is one pre- eminent example of a motive. The 
above are examples of actions; they may have been decided 
upon, they may not. The field of human activity is, as we shall 
see, a highly complex field in which all sorts of things count 
as actions, and all sorts of things as reasons, causes, motives, 
and explanations. We must not expect to find the type of 
consistency and cut -and -dried thinking which Nowell -Smith 
would have us find there. 
But of course it is not enough merely to quote a few 
random examples of the way in which the word 'decide' is 
frequently used. Nowell -Smith could well argue that these cases 
10. 
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indicate only a 'loose' or imprecise use of the word and that 
they do not exemplify the act of deciding at all. It will 
therefore be helpful to examine more closely the concept of 
decision. 
To suppose that the above examples reflect a weak sense 
of deciding would presumably be to assume that the genuine 
process is something more complex; to suggest, perhaps, that 
it must always involve some inner mental process, a kind of 
deliberating, or choosing between alternatives. Yet it is clear 
that if these are to be established as necessary criteria for 
saying that a person has decided, one common use of the 
concept will now be considerably restricted. It is probably 
true to say that in most cases, when a person states that he 
has decided to do something, he is merely expressing his 
intention to do it, and is far from wishing to convey by his 
statement that he has been deliberating about what it is that 
he intends doing. To ask a person whether or not he has 
reached a decision regarding the performance of a certain 
action is often a way of asking whether or not, all other 
conditions being equal, the actionX will be performed. It is 
sometimes - but only sometimes - an enquiry into whether or 
not the agent has deliberated, thought, worked it out, etc. 
Even in cases where deciding clearly involves choosing 
between a number of alternatives, it is not necessary - and 
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indeed it often makes little sense - to assume an inner 
process of deciding. A person may, upon being presented with 
two or more courses of action, immediately say that he has 
decided, or that he has already made his decision. 
It is true that we sometimes use the present participle to 
express deliberation. Thus if a person is said to be deciding, 
we regard him as weighing up the pros and cons, now thinking 
of this course of action, now of that. But it is all too 
tempting to draw what would be a misleading implication from 
this. 'Deciding' is an 'achievement' word which has certain 
important similarities with the concept of winning. It might be 
argued that a person cannot truly be said to be winning a 
race if it is not already clear that he cannot lose. Of course, 
we might sad, in reply to a request for information regarding 
someone's activity, 'He is busy winning the race' or simply 
'He is winning the race', but this would normally express our 
confidence in his winning. Our saying this meaningfully is 
dependent upon the assumption that he cannot or will not fail, 
that nothing can now impede his progress. But in fact he is 
not really winning at all: he is performing an activity, viz 
running the race, which is logically (though, as we have seen, 
not metaphorically) distinct from the descriptions 'winning' 
or 'losing'. 
Again, someone may say, during the race, 'He is winning 
now', and it is true that the word is now being used in 
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something more than a metaphorical sense; but this can be 
achieved only by invocation of the assumption that the race 
ends now - which clearly it does not. It is possible to use 
the word literally here only by restricting the conditions, 
the class of rules, which the runner would normally have to 
fulfil in order to qualify for this description. 
Now the concept of deciding might well be analysed along 
the same lines. We say of a person 'He is deciding', but we 
do so, I am suggesting, only in the light of the assumption 
that he will reach a decision; but reaching -a- decision is not 
part of what goes on before one reaches whatever it is that 
constitutes a decision. There are no half- measures: we cannot 
say °He is deciding, and is now half -way there - the process 
does not represent a progression of this sort. When we say 
'He has won the race', we do not mean to imply that he was 
winning it all along: he won it only after he had run a 
certain distance and had passed certain people on the way. 
Similarly, the statement 'He has decided' does not imply that 
he was deciding all along, even if the decision was preceded 
by a period of concentrated deliberation. He did certain 
other things, namely, weighed the pros and cons, by virtue of 
which he finally decided. The statement 'He was deciding', 
used to refer to the period preceding the decision, makes 
sense because it has now become appropriate to say 'He has 
decided° or 'He has reached a decision', and the 
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appropriateness of these latter statements is based upon the 
fact that the agent is in a position to say what he is going 
to do. 
It is noteworthy that if a person fails to reach a 
decision, we describe the activity in which he has been 
engaged not as a case of 'deciding' but as one of 'trying to 
decide', which emphasises what has already been suggested, 
that the ultimate criterion for saying that a person has decided 
is not that he has been deliberating, but that he is able to 
say what he is going to do. The person who has failed to 
reach a decision is not in a position to do this. But the 
remarkable thing about knowing what one is going to do is that 
one may achieve this state without having deliberated. One 
often describes oneself as having decided to, e.g. attend a 
symphony concert, knowing very well that at the time of 
doing so there was no consideration either of positive 
alternatives (going to the theatre, visiting a friend) or of 
the one negative alternative, viz not going to the concert. 
The situation is one in which I make an immediate, 
unhesitating, decision. 
Of course, this is not enough for the case I wish to 
put forward. Supporters of the mental -occurrence view may well 
retort that if the concept of deciding is used in the way in 
which I propose to use it, it would become very much an 
umbrella -term which, by virtue of its generality, would no 
longer allow for the distinction between deciding to do 
something and merely doing it. This would not be strictly 
true. It does not follow, on the present thesis, that 
everything I do is something which I decided to do. 
Eliminating the act of deliberating as a necessary requirement 
for the claim that a person has decided does not thereby 
eliminate certain other requirements which must indeed be 
regarded as basic if the concept is to be an operative one at 
all. We do not decide, for example, to do many actions which 
are done out of force of habit, nor indeed, it might be 
argued, do we decide to do many actions which are merely 
habitual as opposed to being the result of force of habit. 
There is a further class of actions which may loosely be 
described as absent -minded, to which the application of the 
term 'decide' is inappropriate; and there is finally that 
even larger class of actions, covering much in human 
behaviour, which we describe as impulsive. If one were to 
extract from the human field the actions which fall into the 
above classes, it is fairly clear that one would be left with 
a severely tailored picture. But this is not the important 
thing. The only actions of which human beings would now be 
capable would be those of a highly 'rational' nature. This is 
not to say that people would no longer make wrong or 
mistaken decisions, but it does mean that where the need for 
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But these statements need to be worked out in 
detail, a task to which we shall turn in Chapter III 
action arises, people would in general be aware of, be 
conscious of, what they were doing. This is not remarkable: it 
is merely the logical outcome of the elimination of impulsive, 
absent -minded, action. But this tailored -down picture does 
allow us to see how, on the present interpretation, a person 
who decides to do something differs from one who simply does 
it. It is, on this view, a contingent fact that we do not 
always employ the word in contexts where it would be 
appropriate to do so. From the fact that the word is not used 
on any particular occasion, it does not follow that what the 
person did was impulsive, absent -minded, habitual, etc.; but 
the fact of its use would be a sure guarantee of the 
inapplicability of any of the latter terms. In connection with 
this point, we should perhaps bear in mind that in recounting 
or relating our past actions, we frequently use the word in 
order to give an air of respectability to what we did. We claim 
that we decided this and that we decided that, thus giving the 
impression of order and coherency to our behaviour, when in 
fact we may know that many of these actions were done 
impulsively. We do not, in doing this, necessarily wish to 
give the impression that we had considered, or deliberated 
upon, our actions beforehand, but more importantly that we were 
aware of what we were doing, that we knew that we were doing it. 
One further point should be stressed. It has already been 
suggested that on the mental- occurrence view of deciding, there 
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are two ways in which deliberation may take place: the agent 
may have to decide or choose between a number of positive 
alternatives, or he may have to decide between doing or not 
doing just one thing. Now it may be thought that in denying 
that the former version of deliberation was a necessary 
requirement for saying that a person had decided, it was not 
also intended to deny this of the latter. And this may be said 
partly because the second version may, on the face of it, 
seem to be a watered -down example of deliberation. This, 
however, would be misleading. If what I do before acting is to 
merit the title 'deliberating' at all, there will be no such 
thing as a watered -down version of it. It is certainly true 
that for most actions a person freely performs, there was a 
choice between doing and not doing, but of course it does not 
follow from the fact that there was a choice in this sense 
that the agent actually chose between doing or not doing. And 
if there was not a choice in this latter sense, then it cannot 
be said that the agent deliberated. After all, so far as 
choosing between alternatives is concerned, there is no real 
difference between having two or three positive courses of 
action, and having one course of action which one has to 
decide to do or not to do. In both cases, the agent may ponder, 
pause, hesitate, scratch his head, frown, etc. The real 
difference is between both of these operations and simply 
resolving (that is, on the present thesis, 'deciding') to do 
something in full awareness of what one is doing. It will be 
evident, therefore, that neither version of deliberation (so 
far as we can distinguish them) is to be regarded as a 
necessary prior activity to deciding. 
If we now return to Nowell- Smith's argument, it can be 
seen that it is dependent upon a mental -occurrence view of 
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deciding. One can assert that a motiveless action "is not 
(-hat 
something Lek a man could be said to 'decide' or 'choose' to 
do" only by assuming that the examples of unmotivated actions 
considered earlier do not count as cases of deciding(for 
certainly these are cases in which a man is said to decide). 
And one can make this assumption only by ignoring the account 
of deciding which I have tried to expound in the foregoing 
pages. The consideration of, or the deliberation upon, a 
proposed course of action in most cases implies the existence 
of reasons, or of a reason, for doing it. (It would be a 
matter of small importance - so far as the mental -occurrence 
view of deciding is concerned - if these could be formulated 
only after the action had been performed.) And hence it is 
argued that if a person had a reason for doing what he did 
then, ipso facto, there was a sense in which he had considered 
his action beforehand. Nowell -Smith's is thus a restricted 
conception of deciding which fails to take into account certain 
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There is, it would seem, no independent evidence in 
the work itself for supposing that he holds this view, 
but one might suspect a very positive implication to 
this effect in his remarks upon 'choosing' - the 
relation between which and deciding he himself describes 
as one of 'quasi- implication'(p.IOI) - in the section 
on 'Choosing and Preferring', Ch.VII, Part II, p.IO2. 
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standard uses of the concept. The view that motiveless 
actions do not occur is, in consequence, a false one. 
It was remarked earlier that contained in what Nowell - 
Smith says is an implicit definition of action as something 
which has to be decided upon or chosen. This presupposition, 
like his implicit analysis of the concept od deciding, also 
suffers from being over -restrictive. It is one which can be 
advanced only by ignoring the very many examples of 
behaviour which, despite the fact that they are not chosen or 
decided upon, normally count as actions without reservation. 
Perhaps the more obvious and immediate consequence, if we 
consider this assumption in conjunction with his acceptance of 
the mental- occurrence view of deciding, is that actions which 
could have been decided upon according to the broader analysis 
of the concept are now excluded from the class of things which 
we call actions. Yet this is a pernicious exclusion, for, 
among other things, it entails denying the term to pieces of 
behaviour which, though they were not decided according to 
Nowell -Smith's view, were nevertheless actions for which we 
hold the agent fully responsible, and which he did in full 
awareness of what he was doing. A man may decide, for no 
reason at all, and without previous deliberation, to eat an 
apple, to see a film, to read a newspaper. These actions may, 
but need not be, impulsive, or absent- minded, or done from 
force of habit; they may, but need not be, 'considered', or 
'deliberated'. More importantly, adopting Nowell -Smith's 
analysis of deciding, it makes sense to deny that they were 
decided upon while still maintaining that they were actions. 
Indeed, to deny that they were actions might in one important 
sense be to excuse the agent for what he did. One of a 
number of possible implications of denying that a person has 
acted would be that he was merely reacting, or, alternatively, 
that what happened was accidental; and these are both examples 
of potentially excusable behaviour. But the cases to which 
reference has been made are those in which the agent has no 
desire to be excused. He was neither confused about what he 
did, nor does he misremember it; he did what he did wanting to 
do it, and not regretting having done it. Nowell -Smith might 
overcome the difficulty presented by these cases by 
maintaining that they fulfil the minimum requirement for 
deciding. That is to say, they are cases in which the agent 
wanted to do something, and wanting counts as a reason for 
acting. But this is a somewhat tenuous line of argument. The 
agent, as we saw, uses the fact of his wanting - his wanting 
and nothing else - to deny that he had a reason for doing 
what he did. And further, it is a fact about human behaviour 
that we want, in some sense, to do most of the things we do. 
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This is something we take for granted, so that when we demand 
an explanation for a person's action, we are asking for 
6.. 
something over and above his wanting. 
Some philosophers have argued that though it is true to 
say that many cases of decision are not immediately preceded 
by a process of choosing or deliberating, the agent has t 
nevertheless, at some point in his experience, made an explicit 
choice which may be said to determine all future actions 
relevant to it. There is no doubt that some cases of decision 
are amenable to this kind of analysis but, in the first place, 
these cases are relatively infrequent and, in the second place, 
it is not immediately clear that they constitute an objection 
to the non -mental- occurrence view of deciding. A person might 
reflect, for example, that he is smoking more than he ought 
and that he should therefore attempt to reduce the number of 
cigarettes he smokes per day. In consequence, there may come 
a time when, upon being offered a cigarette, he refuses, not 
hesitatingly, but promptly. His refusal may, under such 
circumstances, be akin to a reflex action such that one cannot 
maintain that it was the result of immediately prior 
consideration. Now it has to be said that this at least would 
not be a precise counter- example, for it is not one in which 
6. 
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I do not wish to deny, however, that wanting or 
desiring constitute an important aspect of 
motivation, when we take this term in its broadest 
sense (See Introduction p.6). Indeed, it is in 
recognition of its importance that I devote the 
final chapter to an analysis of it. 
the agent denies that he had a reason for doing or saying 
what he did. He does not, upon interrogation, answer that he 
just did not want a cigarette at that moment for, being the 
habitual smoker that he was, there was an important sense 
in which he did want one. In point of fact, he explains his 
refusal of the offer by reference to the earlier decision or 
resolution to reduce his consumption. It seems reasonable to 
assert that most cases of pre -conceived decisions fit this 
kind of analysis. It is precisely because these are not, 
originally, candidates for the non -deliberation view of deciding 
that the analysis is itself inapplicable. Genuine candidates 
for the latter view are those in which the agent does not and 
cannot refer to pre -conceived resolutions, cases in which he 
denies that there was a reason over and above his wanting or 
not wanting. A person might decide, for example, to attend an 
organ recital, but, other than the fact that he wanted to do 
so, there is no logical requirement that he should provide a 
reason when asked, Of course, it is always true that there are 
reasons why one decides to do this or that. His decision to 
listen to organ music in this case presupposes that he has a 
liking either for organ music in particular or for music in 
general. There may be further presuppositions involved, for 
example that he enjoys ecclesiastical surroundings or even that 
the solemnity characteristic of organ music is in some way 
7In this connection, see Ch.III,pp.107ff 
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conducive to his temperament. In the same way, there are 
reasons why he decides to take a walk in the park: he may be 
the sort of person who enjoys walking in general or walking 
in parks in particular; or again he may be the sort of 
person who is dispositionally inclined to indulge in carefree 
activity, and so on. But in both these examples the reasons 
cited are not those which the agent himself would supply. He 
could do so, of course, if he were asked specifically to 
survey his character objectively in this way; but even then he 
would have provided no more than a kind of causal explanation 
of the kind of things that he does, and causal accounts are 
not the sort of things which provide the material for 
decision- making. All decisions are naturally made within the 
framework which is constituted by what we loosely call 
'character'. It is in this sense that decisions are a product 
or a symptom of the collection of attitudes, likes, dislikes, 
8 
inclinations, etc. which comprise my character. But there is 
no sense in which these qualities can provide the ingredients 
for a conscious decision. In the above example, it is during 
the course of his intellectual development that the person 
has come to appreciate organ music, but this was not something 
for which he was responsible in any positive sense. He did 
not, at any stage in his experience, decide to like or 
appreciate it - and even if he could have decided this, the 
23. 
Chapter II provides a more exhaustive analysis 
of some of the points suggested here. 
regress to reasons on a mental -occurrence view would still 
present a problem. His present decision to attend the recital 
is of course a result of, a product of, his having come to 
like such music, but it is no more than this. It is based upon 
neither an isolated nor an episodic occurrence of anterior 
reflection. 
Moreover, even in cases where a person reflects upon 
alternatives prior to deciding, one could often, in theory, 
give reasons in terms of character- traits. It is precisely 
because we do not accept these as being the agents reasons for 
deciding what he did decide that it would be odd to emphasise 
them in cases where the agent clearly repudiates reasons for 
deciding.1 
But even if one advances beyond the field of deciding in 
either of its interpretations, no immediate distinction 
between what is and what is not action suggests itself. A line 
of argument which supporters of the Nowell -Smith view might be 
tempted to use would be to stress the importance of the 
concealed adjective 'human', as applied to action. Human action 
would be that kind of behaviour which is marked by a general 
awareness of one's situation, and in particular that it is 
behaviour which is preceded by decision or choice, that it is 
not a mere reaction to stimuli of one sort or another. Any 
24. 
This point is to some extent overlapped by the 
wider question of authority in decisions regarding 
motives, to which we shall turn in Chapter III. 
25. 
behaviour which falls short of this is no longer 
distinctively human as opposed to animal. 
This may be one way of looking at the situation. It might 
perhaps be more realistic to admit that human action is first 
and foremost that kind of action which human beings practise 
in a human context, a truism of which we sometimes need to be 
reminded. The only criterion for saying that it is human as 
opposed to animal behaviour is the fact that human beings 
practise it (though, admittedly, in view of what human beings 
are, this is to say a lot). Actions are essentially things 
that men do, as opposed to the things that are done to them. 
It should be neither strange nor degrading to reflect that 
animals also do things and that some of the things they do 
are very similar to the things we do. A dog, not unlike his 
human counterpart, will jump from the path of an oncoming 
vehicle. Both are acting in so doing, but neither has decided. 
One might even take some steps towards the undermining of the 
role of decision as a distinguishing characteristic of human 
behaviour. Dogs may not have reasons for their actions, but 
they exhibit certain behaviour which, in human beings (and on 
external evidence alone), might be described as deciding. The 
dog is exhibiting the same kind of behaviour when he hovers 
between two plates of meat, now sniffing at this one, now at 
that, and finally eating one and not the other as the man who 
hesitates between taking grapefruit or cereal at breakfast. It 
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is true that the latter, being a rational creature, may have 
reasons for his choice, but he need not on any particular 
occasion. In so far as he does not have reasons, in so far as 
he is simply attracted to one and not to the other, his action 
is to that extent indistinguishable, on grounds of classification, 
from the dog's. If we are prepared to say that the man decided 
to do what he did, and - despite the fact that the case is being 
assessed on external evidence alone, we might well sax that 
he decided - then the dog also decided. If the man cannot be 
said to have decided, then of course this cannot be said of 
the dog either. 
That we sometimes cannot distinguish between animal 
action and human action should not be a matter for concern; far 
less should it be made the basis for the view that only action 
which is the result of decision can really be regarded as action. 
Cuite apart from other considerations, one would have to bear 
in mind that upon this view of action, certain distinctively 
human activities such as speaking and thinking would be ruled 
out. I rarely decide, in Nowell- Smith's sense, to say the things 
I do say, or to think the things I do think, but unless one 
adopts a'physical -movement'conception of action - and to do so 
would also be to invite the charge of arbitrary definition - 
one would, for most purposes, have cause to say that I was 
acting, that, essentially, I was doing things. 
There is really no answer to the person who feels obliged 
to make a sharp distinction between animal and human 
behaviour in such a way that the term 'action' is denied to 
certain things which men do. It is of course easy to see where 
the dividing line would naturally suggest itself. We know that 
men are capable of acting for reasons, that they can act in 
full awareness of what they are doing, and of what the eels 
consequences of their doing it will be; and we know that 
animals are, for the most part, not capable of this. But it 
would be one thing to infer from this that actions which do 
not fall into the above class are no longer distinctively 
human; it would be quite another - and a mistaken inference - 
to deny not only that such behaviour was human but also that it 
was a case of action at all. 
But though one can deny the legitimacy of this latter 
inference, one cannot (in one sense of 'cannot' anyway) deny 
a person's right to define human action as he pleases. It can 
only be pointed out that such an account, if it is committed 
to ignoring certain cases which we clearly call action - cases 
in which we want to claim that a man was doing somethigg - is, 
by its very nature, inadequate. A.I.Melden, talking in a 
similar context, quite rightly points out that it is "the 
enormous variety of cases that defeats any attempt to provide 
a summary account of the nature of action in terms of bodily 
io. 
and psychological factors." He goes on to say: "The 
IQ. 
'Action'. Phil.Rev. Vol.65.p.526, I956 
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characteristic philosophic vice of generalizing from special 
cases is involved in the familiar summary explanation of the 
concept of action in terms of various psychological factors 
or processes. Perhaps the most frequent instance is the 
explanation given in terms of motives, in which the 
preoccupation with the text -book examples of actions performed 
with ends in view leads the philosopher to ignore the very 
many sorts of actions in which no end in view is present at all." 
The word 'action', it might be argued, is a kind of 
sophistication whose function in the language it is not easy 
to define. Perhaps one ought to regard it as being a 
sociological description, and perhaps as having a meta- linguistic 
usage, rather than as being itself a linguistic item. We do not 
commonly ask what action a man performed: we ask what he did. 
We do not ask whether a man is acting: we ask whether he is 
doing anything. We do not ask whether a man is going to act 
(except when this, like the preceding question, is given a 
dynamic sense by being asked in a context where it is 
generally expected that he must do, or be doing, something, 
and sometimes something in particular): we ask whether he is 
going to do something. The word 'action' has the same kind of 
linguistic role as the word 'behaviour'. The latter has an 
ff.Loc.cit.p.526. 
It will be one of the aims of Chapter VII to 
provide a more thorough -going analysis of the 




altogether wider connotation, of course. It is a word used 
to connote not one action but a series of actions or 
reactions spread over a period of time. But in its perfectly 
neutral sense - in its reflexive use it contains a built -in 
appraisal - we do not ask whether a man has behaved, for he 
is continually doing this by virtue of his actions and 
reactions: we speak of the sum -total of his activities as 
'behaviour'. It is in this aense that its function, like the 
word 'action', may perhaps be regarded as meta -linguistic. It 
must be stressed with respect to the word 'action' that it is 
frequently used of what a man does; the point being made is 
that when it is so used it introduces a sophistication - 
sometimes a pal plain emphasis - which the context would not 
otherwise have. What is of some importance, however, is that 
the kind of contexts in which the word is employed are those 
in which a great deal hangs upon the decision which the agent 
makes, and upon the action which is the result of it. 'Has he 
acted ?', or 'What action did he perform ?' are questions which 
bear witness, on the one hand, to the pregnancy of the decision 
involved and, on the other, to the anxiety of those who will 
be affected by it. Further, 'act' and 'action' convey a 
k 
fomality, a sense of importance, which the verb 'to do' lacks. 
Now it could be that those who, like Nowell -Smith, hold that 
action is that which is preceded by the kind of decision for 
which a person has reasons are misled by the use suggested 
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above. That is to say, they have supposed that the above use 
is in some way paradigmatic of the way in which the word 
ought to be employed, that it signifies the kind of 
'happening' to which the word properly refers. It would then 
be easy to see how the concept comes to be defined in terms 
of decision and choice. But, supposing this were the 
explanation of the mental -occurrence view of action, the 
conclusion is unfounded. That there are actions which seem to 
call for description in terms of acting rather than doing is 
neither here nor there so far as the concept of action is 
concerned. This fact does, admittedly, as I have tried to 
show, reflect upon the importance of the particular decision 
being taken, and the action which is the result of it; but 
there is an all -important sense in which the content of a 
decision and of an action fails to have a bearing upon their 
form. The way in which a person decides( assuming for the 
purpose of this point that deciding always presupposes having 
reasons) is the same, whether his decision is a simple or a 
difficult one: he considers the merit of various courses of 
action, the end- product being the knowledge of what he is 
going to do. And the way in which a person acts is in a 
general sense always the same: he is doing something which 
has an effect - obvious or non -obvious - upon the world; 
something which takes time and which may sometimes be timed; 
something which may interfere with, encroach upon, other 
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activities. It is merely an incidental fact that some of the 
things I do have some important consequences either for me or 
for those around me. The same action may not always have such 
consequences, and it may not always, therefore, be appropriate 
to describe what I did as acting as opposed to doing. 
The theatrical use of the word 'act' is perhaps an 
instance of the emphasis or sophistication which attaches to 
the word. To watch a stage -play, or a film, is to watch what 
is essentially a piece of doing, as it were. The things which 
actors do on the stage are the things which we, as ordinary 
human beings, do in real life. It is true, of course, that 
what we do, they are pretending to do, and it is also true 
that the word 'act' often means merely to pretend; but there 
is nevertheless a sense in which theatrical acting is a means 
of emphasising a piece of doing, of isolating extracting 
it from the context of real life and placing it upon a pedestal 
for public viewing. It is thereby given what is best termed 
a kind of sophistication; an extra -social, extra -linguistic, 
setting. In a slightly different way, these are the qualities 
which attach to our use of the word in non -theatrical 
contexts where, by virtue of the a importance of the actual 
decision involved, the end- product is described as 'acting', 
'action', etc., as opposed to 'doing'. I am suggesting that a 
possible - if unlikely - source of the definition of action in 
terms of decision or choice is to be found partly in a 
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preoccupation with this sophisticated use of the word, to the 
exclusion of the large variety of cases in which a person 
either does not decide at all or else decides in the absence 
of reasons® 
II. MOTIVES AS DISPOSITIONS 
The dispositional analysis of motives is perhaps given its 
most prominent expressicn by Ryle, in The Concept of Mind, where 
he says: "When we ask 'Why did someone act in a certain way ?' 
this question might, so far as its language goes, either be an 
enquiry into the cause of his acting in that way, or be an 
enquiry into the character of the agent which accounts for his 
having acted in that way on that occasion. I suggest.... that 
explanations by motives are explanations of the second type and 
not of the first type." 
A 
It is worth mentioning as an incidental remark here that 
the dichotomy between an enquiry into the 'cause' of an action, 
and an enquiry into the character of the agent is, on the face 
of it, somewhat perplexing, even if the activity entailed under 
these respective labels is fairly clear. The fact is that by 
'cause' Ryle is referring to that which we would normally class 
as an objective, external, event. This is instanced by his 
distinction between explaining the shattering of glass either by 
reference to its inherent brittleness or by reference to the 
fact of its being struck. Since the inherent brittleness of 
glass corresponds very closely to personal characteristics of 
a dispositional nature, we have to assume that by 'cause' Ryle 




opposed to any other. In the case of human actions, this can 
only correspond to particular features of the 'objective' 
situations in which we find ourselves at any given time. Thus 
the immediate 'cause' of the man's decision to book 
accommodation at a continental hotel is the sight of the 
holiday advertisement in the travel -agency's window; the cause 
of Mrs Moore's visit to the mosque, in Forster's 'A Passage to 
India', was the sight of the building itself; the immediate 
cause of my attendance at the local symphony concert was my 
having received a free invitation, and so on. But situational 
features of this kind do not, independently of their relation 
to the needs and requirements of the agent, constitute what we 
mean by explanations in terms of motives. It is true that the 
question 'Why did someone act in a certain way ?' may be an 
enquiry into the cause of his acting in that way, where the 
term 'cause' does in fact refer to some feature objective to 
the agent; but it is false tm suppose that it could be a 
reference to motivation. Ryle would seem to be suggesting that 
explanations in terms of motives are not of this causal nature 
as though it were possible they might well have been. That is 
to say, his language seems to imply that the question is 
debatable, and that at least some philosophers have held that 
motive -explanations are of the kind which he rejects. Yet it 
would in the first place be plainly ridiculous to suggest that 
causal factors external to the agent can adequately explain a 
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given action and at the same time to assert that this is what the 
agent's motive consists of. It is certainly true that such causal 
factors may, in particular cases, entirely determine the nature 
of the action; and it may even be that in a large number of 
2- 
cases - impulsive, absent -minded, perhaps habitual actions 
suggest themselves here - these are the factors in which we 
will be primarily interested; but these would be cases where 
the motive is either insfugnificant in the explanation of what 
happened, or where it was simply non- existent; so that these 
actions could initially never have been candidates for 
motivated behaviour. 
In the second place, if we interpret Ryle to mean by 
'cause' the conjunction of some objective event with the agent's 
desire or need for this or that, then clearly we are no longer 
in the field of purely causal factors - unless facets of the 
agent's character are regarded as such, and Ryle himself 
discounts this latter possibility. The fact is, therefore, that 
in referring to the agent's likes and dislikes, in referring 
only to what he wanted at this or that particular moment, we 
are referring to one aspect of his character. And this is no 
more than a reiteration of something which is obviously 
peculiar to motives, namely that they always refer to personal 
characteristics of this nature. This being the case, it is hard 
to see how Ryle can be saying anything informative when he 
asserts that explanations by motives reveal some aspect of the 
z° See Chapter III 
agent's character. 
It is fair to point out, however, that this is not his 
principal contention. We have seen that the operative example 
in the statement of his case is the brittleness of glass, where 
we are meant to see this as a long -standing or permanent 
feature of the commodity. By analogy, we are meant to infer that 
motives not only refer us to a person's character, but that 
they refer us to a dispositional feature of that character. Thus 
Ryle's view is to be construed as saying "'he boasted on 
meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies the law -like 
proposition that whenever he finds the chance of securing the 
admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will 
3, 
produce this admiration and envy." Miss Anscombe's comment 
upon this particular passage was that "it seems to say, and I 
can't understand it unless it implies, that a man could not be 
said to have boasted from vanity unless he always behaved 
vainly, or at least very very often did so. But this does not 
4-. 
seem to be true." And from one important point of view, it 
certainly is not true. Plainly, we cannot, and in practice do 
not, infer from the fact that a person acted jealousy on a 
particular occasion that he is therefore of a jealous 
disposition. 'Confirmed' bachelors sometimes fall in love with 
pretty girls, but we do not, for this reason alone, suppose that 





males. And if we did make such a judgement, it would be 
curiously incompatible with its predecessor, especially when 
one considers the kind of evidence which would lead to it. 141 
But such counter -examples really only scratch at the 
surface of a problem which Ryle must have had in mind, even if 
he never clearly formulated it. This is the problem of deciding 
whether anythiñgrreally counts as being 'out of character' in 
the sense in which this is popularly used. It might be argued, 
for example, that it is possible to formulate a law -like 
hypothetical proposition even in cases where a person's action 
is apparently an exception to his previous record. This may be 
done simply by amplifying the details of the total situation 
so as to make it obvious that certain of its features were 
absent in previous situations similar in most other respects. 
This would, presumably, on Ryle's view, constitute a basis for 
prediction while avoiding the risk of incompatibility with 
some other proposition concerning the same character. There 
would be a difficulty, on this view, of justifying its status 
as a law -like proposition having the form 'Whenever... then...', 
for, in general, a proposition of this form owes its validity 
to the fact that the event or action in question has occurred 
more than once; and since we are defining the present case as 
an exception to a person's general behaviour, this fact is 
absent. 
But it has to be realised that this general difficulty is 
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common to Ryle's theory in any case. The definition of a 
motive as a dispositional characteristic itself makes the 
assumption that law -like propositions are valid independently 
of antecedent supporting evidence; and if it did not make such 
an assumption, the definition would be purely and simply 
arbitrary. What lies behind Ryle's account is, no doubt, the 
persuasive supposition that once a person performs a certain 
action from a certain feeling or with a certain end in mind, he 
is then always potentially liable to perform the same action 
again in precisely similar circumstances; and this would be 
what we mean by saying that it is 'in his nature' or apart 
of his character to do so. And in one important sense, the 
proposition would remain true whether it were subsequently 
substantiated or not; nor would its truth be challenged by 
what would otherwise constitute counter -instances. Potential 
counter -instances would be rejected on the ground that they did 
not resemble, in every particular respect, that which had gone 
before; and the absence of any eengrma4evy confirmatory 
evidence at all would be dismissed on the ground that to talk 
about tendencies and dispositions is in no way to imply 
(within a limited class at any rate) the actualisation of them - 
or alternatively, one might argue that absence of confirmation 
was entirely due to there being no subsequent situation 
comparable in every respect to that which had already occurred. 
The stipulation with regard to the insignificance of 
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confirmatory evidence is of course an important one. Absence 
of such evidence can be dismissed only within a general 
framework which takes it into account. Thus, using Ryle's 
illustration, we cannot afford to neglect cases where glass has 
withstood the impact of a hard object unless there is 
initially sufficient evidence to show that nevertheless, in 
general, glass, as a commodity, has a tendency to shatter in 
such cases. The lack of this more fundamental evidence would 
prohibit us from making light of the subsequent exceptions. And 
similarly, a statement about what a man has a tendency to do 
or not to do falls into the much wider class of statements 
which characterise human beings in general. In general, if 
no one ever substantiated statements concerning tendencies, then 
we should have no right to allow the non -fulfilment of any such 
tendency, and indeed the definition of 'tendency' or 
'disposition' would come to lose its mean/ing. However, granted 
the existence of a general framework of favourable evidence, 
this allows us to admit a limited number of counter -instances, 
and thus to salvage this aspect of Ryle's position. 
One has to bear in mind in connection with the 
dispositional analysis that we are not obliged to give it a 
tretrospective' interpretation - though it would seem as though 
Miss Anscombe has done. so. We do not have to suppose, that is, 
that because X is jealous on this occasion that he must, 
therefore, have been jealous on all previous comparable 
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occasions, any more than we have to suppóse that because Mr 
MacMillan was (if he was) guilty of negligence in connection 
with Mr Profumo that he had therefore been similarly guilty 
in other instances. (It is perhaps wotth pointing out here 
that in this particular case - that is, in a political context - 
there may indeed be a preponderance of people who are, by 
virtue of their political bias, psychologically predisposed 
to place a retrospective interpretation upon this action, of 
lack of action; and that it would therefore have to be 
discounted just for this reason),If we excl.de such bias, 
political or otherwise, then it would seem as though there is 
much evidence for saying that, as a rule, we do not make a 
reference to those actions - known or unknown - which have 
nx 
preceded the one in question. Waht we may do -.and this would 
appear to be a very common a feature of the judgements we make 
about one another - is to give it a predictive interpretation. 
If it is true that the predictive analysis characterises most 
judgements of this kind, then this is obviously a main source 
of evidence for the kind of theory which Ryle is putting 
forward; in which case it might be more appropriate to describe 
his theory as sociological rather then psychological. It is, 
after all, only fair to point out that Ryle's explicit intention 
is not so much to analyse what is is to have a motive as to 
explain what we are doing when we ascribe a motive to a person. 
41. 
And it may well be that in ascribing motives we make the 
implicit assumption that the agent in question is thenceforward 
liable to act from the same motive again on similar occasions. 
The tendency to make such an assumption is represented 
paradigmatically in the attitude of suspicion with which we 
regard ex- convicts; so that, so far as a predictive analysis 
goes, as opposed to a retrospective one, the ascription of a 
motive becomes to some extent irrevocable, and it is in this 
sense that the motive is properly termed a dispositional 
characteristic, being part of the 'character' of the agent. 
It is of course questionable whether Ryle intended that his 
theory should be given only a predictive interpretation, or 
whether it was to be extended to the bolder thesis for which 
Anscombe and others have attacked him; but certainly there 
appears to be nothing in the language of this section which 
specifically commits him to the stronger view. It is true that 
Ryle describes 'He boasted from vanity' as satisfyimg a law -like 
proposition, but we have already observed that the fulfilment 
of such a proposition need not entail any antecedent 
occurrences of the action in question, any more than the 
shattering of a piece og glass entails such previous instances 
in order for it to be true that glass, when struck by a hard 
object, will shatter. It is not the case, upon the present 
interpretation, that because X has (now) boasted from vanity, 
therefore he must always have been vain - even though this is 
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in this case very likely; rather, because X has (now) boasted 
from vanity, therefore he will be vain on similar future 
occasions. 
But now let us examine this weaker version more carefully. 
It is probably true to say that if X is known to have acted 
from jealousy on any particular occasion, this will be ground 
for expecting him to act in a similar way on subsequent 
occasions - because this is how we tend to think about each 
other's actions. But it is also true that information 
concerning the reaction of the agent himself to his own action, 
or the consequences of it, may cause us to alter our opinion 
about what he may be expected to do; and this may happen after 
what is only the first occurrence of his acting in this way. 
Now if we suppose that what we mean by 'character' is the sum - 
total of the descriptions of, or statements about, X which 
other people would make, then there is some ground for 
thinking that his acting from jealousy on this particular 
occasion would not form part of this description. Such grounds 
would of course be, in particular, that we do not expect X to 
exhibit jealousy again, and we do not therefore feel justified 
in listing it as a facet of his character. Clearly, this 
reluctance to attribute jealousy to X as a dispositional 
characteristic will not be based merely upon a consideration 
of the uniqueness of the circumstances in which X found himself, 
for, from the point of view of what people think about the 
action, how they react to it, what emerges as being of primary 
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importance is the revelation that X was (after all) capable 
of jealousy, and this tends to overshadow the isolated, 
improbable, nature of the circumstances. The uniqueness of the 
situation may well be a necessary but certainly not a sufficient 
condition for the social repudiation of the relevant sentiment 
as being dispositional. After all, our tendency is tm think not 
that the situation is unlikely to occur again, but that having 
exhibited a capacity for jealousy once,X may do so on other 
occasions. 
Then can we suppose that this condition is capable of 
becoming both necessary and sufficient by making the reference 
already mentioned to the reaction of the agent himself to his 
own action or to its consequences? The answer to this would 
seem to depend very largely upon the nature of such a reaction. 
It will not be enough to say that the agent has (now) resolved 
not to fall prey to this sentiment again for resolutions of 
this sort are, notoriously, not easy to make.5, We would require 
some knowledge of the context in which it was made. If it were 
the case that the action which the agent performed was rationally 
decided upon - and we do sometimes make cool, calm, decisions 
of this sort even in our jealousy - then this would, I suggest, 
cast doubt on his power to carry out a resolution against its 
further execution from the same motive. This perhaps comes out 
more clearly when contrasted with another mind of action having 
See Chapter V 
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the same kind of results. Thus there are some situations in 
which it is appropriate to say that the agent's action took him 
by surprise, that the responsibility for the action does not 
really rest with him, or that he was unable to foresee how 'he 
would react to a certain situation. It is, in other words, the 
kind of action which falls into the orbit of qualities which 
require a suspension of judgement as well on the part of the 
agent himself as on the part of the those who observe his conduct. 
The soldier who suddenly retreats upon his first confrontation 
with enemy fire, or who disobeys an order from fear of the risk 
to his own life, might be held to illustrate such actions. Here, 
it is not the case that he weighs up the risks involved, not 
indeed has he had time to reflect upon the dangers of the 
situation. Admittedly, there may have been much time for 
reflection prior to meeting the circumstances for the first time, 
but then the action is what it is precisely because such 
reflection is largely ineffective in its bearing upon future 
action in these cases. It is rather like the actor who is given 
his first important part in a major play. He is no doubt aware 
of the prominence of the theatre itself, the good reputation 
which it has, its seats always packed to capacity, and so on; but 
no amount of reflection upon these facts can enable him to 
predict or foresee the stage -fright with which he is dia suddenly 
seized on first facing his audience. Essentially, these are cases 
where only the very experience of the situation itself can cause 
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action or lack of action. What happens to the actor on the stage 
is very like what happens to the soldier on the battlefield, in 
that both are overcome by an uncontrollable emotion resulting 
do 
in failing tonanything at all in the one case, and an impulsive, 
almost reflex, movement into action in the other. Now what the 
soldier does is normally described as being cowardly, but 
perhaps this is not the important thing. Whàt it illustrates 
is that it is sometimes possible to put a legitimate stress 
on the involuntary nature of what was done. Granted that most 
of our desires and impulsions have their origin in a civilised 
context, we might describe the action of which the soldier was 
guilty as being a reversion or regression to something which is 
not specifically human. But if it is so described, then there 
is at least a temptation (perhaps unjustified) to place it 
outside the cAtegory of 'character' proper. The kind of character 
which a man has turns upon what he does, or has a tendency to 
do; but then what he does is, it may be argued, what he is 
responsible for doing, or for making a habit of doing. Jumping 
from the path of an oncoming vehicle does not, for this reason, 
form a constituent of the character -framework. Patently, it 
cannot - apart from exceptional cases - for, on account of its 
widespread practice, its reflex nature, it simply fails to 
characterise. (One cannot identify an orange, within a group of 
oranges, by its colour). What is being suggested, therefore, is 
that if we stress the uncontrollable nature of the action, it 
can sometimes be regarded as a reversion to a pre- or a- 
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social state, and thus as being excluded from the traditional 
or popular conception of character. And it will, of course, now 
be evident why it has to be distinguished from the earlier 
type of action we considered, namely, that for which a decision 
was responsible. To decide to do something may be regarded 
pre -eminently as 'building upon the substance of character'. It 
is, as it were, to make oneself answerable for the action which 
is the result of it, and to make oneself answerable whether or not 
one regrets what has happened. The act of deciding is thus also 
the admission of onus or responsibility, the admission by one's 
whole self that 'this action is to be attributed to me and not 
(directly anyway) to my environment, or my upbringing, or my 
more animal impulsions'; so that one might say that actions which 
are the result of decisions are those which are written with an 
indelible pencil upon the character -chart, whereas those for 
which responsibility is .egitimately denied do not - again with 
exceptions - appear at all. 
But again it is difficult to see just how far this line 
can be pursued. We have already seégathe nature of the last - 
mentioned action may not in itself be sufficient to inhibit our 
natural tendency to perpetuate the motive as a long- standing 
quality of character. In the absence of some guarantee that what 
the soldier did was a genuine'reversion', we may well suspect 
that his cowardice does not end there. Periaps we have to go 
even further, and admit that even in cases where we are entirely 
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satisfied that the man was not responsible for what he did, 
the above suspicion may linger - if only because there was no 
accompanying resolution, on the part of the soldier, to be on 
his guard against such situations. And one begins to think that 
the whole case for a dispositional interpretation of motives 
suffers what Flew, in another context, once termed a 'death 
by a thousand qualifications'. That is to say, when each 
counter -example is rebutted with a further qualification, it 
begins to look as if one could go on making qualifications 
ad infinitum; and if this were so, then of course that which 
is being qualified is no longer of any practical value. E'en 
when faced with a limited number of qualifications, it is hard 
to resist the thought that the notion has become so esoteric 
as to be beyond philosophical significance. Yet, when all is 
said and done, we are still faced with the evident fact that 
not all motives are used as a basis for prediction, that we do 
not always label a man with a certain feeling, a certain 
tendency, or propensity, merely because he has been observed 
to exhibit it on some one occasion. And we have to note, at 
this point, a further feature of our judgements upon one 
another. It is not just that an isolated display of a certain 
sentiment frequently fails to suffice as a basis for prediction; 
we also sometimes allow a series of'isolatéd' incidents of this 
kind, treating them all as being 'out of character'. The 
statement 'He sometimes acts out of character' is of some 
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significance in this matter; for, above all, it indicates that 
only an underlying class of actions ultimately counts as 
contributing to the make -up of character, and that other actions, 
no matter how frequently they occur - again within a certain 
limit - somehow fail to be of importance in this respect, 
somehow fail to be part of what has come to be accepted as 
an established pattern. The statement 'Such actions are not 
characteristic of him' indicates just this. It begins to look, 
therefore, as though we shall have to force a dichotomy 
between the practice of ascribing or not ascribing qualities to 
a man's character, and, on the other hand, making predictions 
on the basis of what we know about him. This is not of the 
nature of a remarkable discovery about our judgements upon 
other people: it is merely to record what in fact we do in this 
particular field. We deny that an action, or series of actions, 
is characteristic of X (in the positive sense of denying that 
certain qualities would find a place in the description of his 
character) while still being prepared to predict on the basis 
of these (exceptional) qualities. This would be a compromise 
between the predictive interpretation put upon Ryle's thesis, 
and the view that motives are always long -standing qualities 
of character. It will be to concede to Ryle that isolated 
displays of certain sentiments Ea cause us to expect the 
subject of such displays to act in similar ways upon 
subsequent occasions. This concession itself will have to be 
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qualified to some extent, for we know that if the incidence 
of the sentiment is sufficiently isolated, we may have no 
tendency to predict its recurrence. If we discount such cases, 
then there will be some justification for regarding this as 
a dispositional account of motives so far as the predictive 
aspect of this thesis is concerned. It is a dispositional 
account if only because we have to cash the adjective in terms 
of law -like hypothetical propositions to which Ryle refers - 
a remark which, under the circumstances, may sound a little 
trite. Yet it is importantt in bringing out the nature of what 
is not being conceded to him, namely, that a dispositional 
account in this sense remains independent of what is properly 
described as 'character'. The kind of cases which might be 
cited here are those in which X has acted out of character 
sufficiently often to cause us to expect him to do so on 
future occasions, but where the occurrence is not frequent 
enough to warrant our saying that this is a feature of his 
character. Perhaps this is not important for Ryle's thesis, 
but this much must at least be said: if Ryle believes that in 
providing a dispositional account of motives he is merely 
giving an account which conceives of motives as potential 
evidence for prediction, then this is at least partially, if 
not wholly, true. But if he believes that such an account also 
provides an analysis of what we mean by 'character traits', or 
simply what is normally subsumed under the title 'character', 
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then this is clearly false for the reasons which I have tried to 
set forward. In particular, to be satisfied in respect of a 
prediction one makes on the basis of certain (exceptional) 
displays of sentiment is not necessarily to be satisfied that 
such qualities constittte part of the description of ials a 
man's character. 
Acknowledgement of this dichotomy allows us to explain 
our reluctance to ascribe certain features to a person's character 
by reference to the considerations which we saw earlier to be 
inadequate. That is to say, we may now meaningfully point to 
the uniqueness of the circumstances in which X found himself 
in order to explain how he came to act as he did. Within limit, 
a series of unusual actions of this kind may occur¡é, and we 
would merely extend the explanation by pointing out that the 
agent's capacity to avoid reacting unfavourably is a matter to 
which he has to habituate himself. The acknowledgement of 
these actions, notwithstanding the judgement that they are 
exceptional, leads us to make corresponding predictions - 
predictions, that is, which take them into account. What it 
does not lead us to do is to suppose that these actions are 
'characteristic' of the agent, to suppose that they are 
indellibly marked up as a feature of his character. 
The introduction of this dichotomy may, from one point of 
view, seem innocuous. I do not, however, think that this need 
be of any great importance. I have been primarily concerned 
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to establish that the predictive - as opposed to the 
retrospective- interpretation of Ryle's 'dispositions' is to 
some extent inevitable. The difficulty which the present 
dichotomy was intended to solve was that of accounting for our 
occasional if not frequent reluctance to attribute certain 
features to a man's character, even though we may be prepared 
to predict on the basis of these same features. I was merely 
suggesting that it may be fallacious to equate the ability to 
predict with the ability to characterise, that, in some sense, 
the equation represents a form of category mistake. Now the 
solution to this particular problem might well lie in the 
field of psychology. The reluctance which we have talked about 
may be analysed in terms of certain inhibitions brought about 
primarily through likes and dislikes within the field of 
personal relationships. Thus if X is fond of Y, he will be 
not be predisposed to accept as part of Y's character certain 
undesirable features. (Equally, of course, one might argue that 
he will not be prepared to predict on this basis either, but 
let that pass). And if this analysis is true, the result will be 
to render the above dichotomy somewhat artificial, and, as we 
have seen, innocuous. 
But I am not. essentially concerned to answer this objection. 
The remarks already made go some way to counter it: I pointed 
out that at least some of these inhibitions may be due to 
something in the nature of a rational theory concerning the 
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'criteria' for the concept of character; .bue the notion of 
character is in one important sense embedded in the context 
of society, and in a context of sophisticated behaviour in 
particular; that this is why the concept of rational decision 
looms so large in any attempt to stipulate what featues belong 
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to a person, and what features do not - for the kind of 
things which a person decides to do are those things wh for 
which he explicitly accepts responsibility; and that it was 
in the light of this theory that one might be led to see the 
exceptional actions as reversions to something essentially 
non- social. No doubt, the psychological explanation will be 
at least partially true. If it is only partially true, then 
the central problem would still await a solution, for the 
interesting cases will now be precisely those which the 
psychological analysis fails to explain, and the remarks which 
I have made would furnish at least a potential solution. If, 
on the other hand, the claim is made for the psychological 
approach that it is all -embracing, then the onus falls upon 
the would. -be exponents of this theory to account in some other 
way for those cases where there are no obvious personal 
affections or antagonisms, or where such feeling as there is 
is insufficiently strong to warrant sensible talk of 
'inhibitions'. To enquire into this in more detail is to depart 
from a purely philosophical issue. And it would in any case be 
unjustified, since I have only been concerned to 'put feelers' 
out, as it were, towards a plausible solution of the problem. 
Peter Winch has three important criticisms of Ryle's 
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accountfig of motives which I should now like to consider. The 
first of these is that it seems to render motive -explanations 
in some sense vacuous. Winch refers his reader, for expansion 
of this view, to a passage by Peter Geach in Mental Acts, 
where the latter says that when Ryle "explains a statement of 
an actual difference between two men's mental states as really 
asserting only that there are circumstances in which one would 
act differently from the other, and apparently holds that this 
could be all the difference there is between the two, he is 
running counter to a very deep- rooted way of thinking. When 
two agents differ in their behaviour, we look for some actual, 
not merely hypothetical, difference between them to account 
for this.... Ryle explicitly and repeatedly compares 
psychological accounts of behaviour to saying that a glass 
broke because it was brittle (had the dispositional property 
of brittleness); in so doing, however, he is setting them on 
a level with the statement that opium puts people to sleep 
because it has a dormitive power - which I believe was not his 
intention." 
There are, I think, two things which must be said about 
this criticism. In the first place, that Ryle's account should 
run counter to a very deep- rooted way of thinking is neither 
here nor there. Philosophical analysis often does; and this is 
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therefore not a worthwhile objection to the account. But 
secondly - and this is more imprtant - whether or not it is 
legitimate to translate actual differences into hypothetical 
differences within the field of human behaviour is a question 
which would appear to have no direct bearing upon whether 
differences in terms of hypothetical events reduce to vacuity, 
on a par with the statement that opium puts people to sleep 
because it has a dormitive power. Clearly Winch thinks that it 
does have some bearing. But if it is characteristic of the 
latter statement that it has no explanatory value, then this 
is not a feature which is shared by a dispositional account of 
motives. Or we may put it in this way: if it is indeed true 
that a dispositional analysis of motives reduces to this kind 
of vacuity, then it looks as if we must say that accounts 
in terms of actual differences would be similarly reducible . 
Thus we may assume that actual differences will consist of 
mental acts, or events, or occurrences - in general, the 
things with which Ryle wishese to dispense; and it is patently 
obvious that reference to such occurrences do in fact 
function as legitimate explanations of conduct. Yet if we do 
not question the legitimacy and the informative value of these 
explanations, then by what principle do we begin to question 
the dispositional analysis? It is not even as though the kind 
off statement one makes in these contexts differs from those 
made in the light of a dispositional account. For, whether we 
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conceive of jealousy, for example, as a mental event, or 
whether we interpret it ás a tendency to act in certain ways 
on certain occasions, we nevertheless explalain a man's conduct 
simply by asserting that he was jealous. 
Admittedly, given some philosophical perversity, one can 
trace the presence of vacuity somewhere. If one simply said, for 
example, that to explain an action by reference to a motive 
is to say that a man did Y because he has a tendency to do Y, 
or because this is the sort of thing that he does, this would 
seem to be largely uninformative. But Ryle is not saying this. 
The first step in his account of motives is not different 
from ordinary thinking upon this matter. He would agree that 
to assert that X is jealous is a means of explaining (and a 
means of explaining by reference to a motive) an action 
appropriately related to this. Such a statement is informative 
and explanatory to one who is in ignorance either of X's 
character or of the significant antecedent factors involved. 
Ryle's concern is surely with the analysis of precisely what it 
is that we are saying when we assert of someone that he is 
jealous, or indignant, or angry, or proud, etc., and this is a 
problem which is, so to speak, subsequent to the act of 
imparting information. 
One might, then, look for vacuity elsewhere. Perhaps it 
lies, for Geach, in this very analysis of what it is to have a 
motive. Thus one might be led to say that the account of e.g. 
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jealousy in respect of one's wife in terms of a disposition 
to stay at her side at all public functions, to intercept 
other men's conversation with her, to query her independent 
activities, etc., is only to draw out what is already 
contained within the meaning of jealousy (given the context). 
But again, this would be a strange candidate for vacuity. 
Jealousy, like most motive -words of its kind, and unlike opium, 
is not something which is characterised by one predominant 
feature. There is no standard to which a man's jealousy has 
to conform: the form which it takes will differ from one man 
to another. This being the case, it is hard to see how one 
could ever hope to determine, a priori, the kind of actions 
which will characterise a man's jealousy. Yet if Ryle's analysis 
really were analogous to the statement about opium, this is 
precisely the type of move one would expect to make. 
In fact, we happen to know that it is wrong to interpret 
Ryle's dispositional account merely as an analysis of, or 
piece of synonymity for, words like jealousy; for it entails a 
lot more than this. Above all, his account would allow us the 
right to expect a man to exhibit the same behaviour on future 
appropriate occasions. This is the point of saying that an 
investigation of motives is an enquiry into a man's character. 
Yet if this is what makes his thesis different from the standard 
conception of motives, in what sense does his analysis become 
vacuous? Admittedly, there is again a superficial resemblance 
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to the opium case here, considered from one point of view: to 
say of opium that it has a dormitive power is to say that it 
will always, or nearly always, make people sleep; and similarly 
to say that someone is jealous is to say, on Ryles thesis, 
that he will always, on appropriate occas4.ons, be jealous. But 
we have already seen that there is no one thing which we mean by 
jealousy in the way in which there is one thing in particular 
which characterises opium, namely, its dormitive power. It may 
well be that there is a definite class of actions which are 
symptomatic of jealousy, but it still remains open to question 
which member(or members) of this class characterises X as opposed 
to Y, and this alone should lead us to fight shy of vacuity. 
Indeed, one might well argue that the notion of vacuity is more 
appropriate to a mental- occurrence view, for an exponent of 
this view may wish to maintain that jealousy is the name for a 
specific mental feeling or sensation; and if this were the 
case, the feeling or sensation would begin to look very like 
the dormitive power of opium, as far as its explanatory force 
is concerned. 
Let us look at it from another angle. Geach could put the 
objection thus: Just as there is something uninformative about 
saying that opium puts people to sleep because it has a 
dormitive power, so there is something similarly odd about 
saying that X is jealous because he tends to do A, B, and C, 
where A, B, and C are expressions of his jealousy - just as 
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putting people to sleep is an expression of the dormitive power 
of opium. But, quite apart from the difficulties we have just 
met in connection with jealousy, it is again misleading to place 
this interpretation upon Ryle. Of course it is true that the 
observation of X's behaviour is the only means which an observer 
has of telling whether or not X is jealous, and there is no 
doubt that Ryle means it to be true in just this sense. 
Consequently, it is possible to put the position eliptically by 
saying that X is jealous because of A, B, and C. But while there 
is at least a quasi- causal relation between the agent's 
judgement and the reasons which he has for making it, there is 
not, and cannot, on Ryle's view, be a causal relation between 
the agent's jealousy and the expression of it; for the latter is 
nothing more nor less than the former. Thus, in the ultimate 
analysis, Ryle is not saying that X is jealous because' he tends 
to do A, B, and C. And only if he were saying this - and 
provided we could overcome the difficulties we have already met 
in connection with jealousy - could we meaningfully talk of 
vacuity. 
Winch's second criticism is one with which we have already 
dealt at length in the earlier sections og this chapter. " Ryle's 
account ", he says, "runs into difficulties where we assign a 
motive to an act which is quite at variance with the agent's 
previously experienced behaviour. There is no contradiction in 
saying that someone who never before manifested any signs of 
a jealous disposition has, on a given occasion, acted from 
jealousy; indeed, it is precisely when someone acts unexpectedly 
that the need for a motive explanation is particularly apparent." 
Suffice it to say here that it is hard to see why, prima facie, 
this should present a difficulty for Ryle. He is not, we argued, 
committed to giving a retrospective emphasis to the dispositional 
account. That is to say, if a person acts from jealousy for the 
first time, it may be right to say that this is now a facet 
of his character - except in the (special) cases to which we 
referred. There is, after all, nothing very peculiar about 
saying that a person has acquired a certain tendency or 
inclination. And this is presumably one way in which Ryle can 
account for actions which are termed 'out of character'. 
I would agree with Geach that there are places in The 
Concept of Mind, and particularly in the sections on Motives, 
where Ryle seems to suggest a retrospective analysis (in addition 
to one which we have termed 'predictive' or 'forward -looking'). 
And indeed, perhaps he does wish to suggest this. I want only 
to point out that a dispositional account does not necessarily 
imply it, and that One can make sense of Ryle's thesis without 
drawing this implication. 
The wording of the quotation which we considered at the 
beginning of this chapter might, I suppose, be taken as being 




favourable to the view which Geach puts forward. There, he 
points out that when we ask why a man acted in the way he did, 
this may, among other things, be "an enquiry into the character 
of the agent which accounts for his having acted in that way on 
that occasion ". And the very notion of an enquiry into 
character in this way suggests an enquiry into some sort of 
pre- established pattern of behaviour, something already 
existent. But surely, in defense of the general thesis 
(independently of whether Ryle holds it or not) one has only 
to point out tilt the acquisition of tendencies, inclinations, 
dispositions, and the like, is as much a part of a person's 
character as any other feature we may care to mention. We 
surely learn as much about a person when we learn that he 
recently acquired a certain quality - dispositional or 
otherwise - as we do when we learn that he expressed a pre- 
existent tendency. Of course, this raises once more the whole 
issue of what legitimately eetuate belongs to the notion of 
character, and what does not, and what kind of criteria we 
employ in order to make the distinction. But this question 
cannot be of crucial relevance here. It is merely being claimed 
that if we grant the validity of a dispositional analysis of 
motives, this analysis is not necessarily committed to a 
retrospective view of character and that, in view of the above 
remarks, the present passage from Ryle need not be given this 
interpretation. 
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Winch's final criticism of Ryle is that he misconstrues 
the nature of motive -explanations. After having given some 
attention to Mill's causal account of motives, he goes on to say: 
"But for my present purposes it is more important to notice 
that though Ryle's account is different from Mill's in many 
respects, it is not nearly different enough. A dispositional, 
just as much as a causal, statement, is based upon 
generalizations from what has been observed to happen. But a 
statement about an agent's motives is not like that: it is 
better understood as analogous to a setting out of the agent's 
reasons for acting thus. Suppose that N, a university lecturer, 
says that he is going to cancel his next week's lectures 
because he intends to travel to London: here we have a 
statement of intention for which a reason is given. Now N does 
not infer his intention of cancelling his lectures from his 
desire to go to London, as the imminent shattering of the glass 
might be inferred, either from the fact that someone had 
thrown a stone or from the brittleness of the glass. N does not 
offer his reason as evidence for the soundness of his 
prediction about his future behaviour Rather, he is 
justifying his intention. His statement is not of the form: 
'Such and such causal factors are present, therefore this will 
result'; nor yet of the form: 'I have such and such a 
disposition, which will result in my doing this'; it is of the 
form: 'In view of such and such considerations this will be a 
reasonable thing to do." 
Now it must be said here that this view of motives is a 
significant one which, with certain modifications, I wish to 
endorse. It is a view one aspect of which is considered in 
the later section of the following chapter. It is, however, 
important to see the raltion between this view and Ryle's in 
its proper perspective. Winch, it would seem, has misrepresented 
this relation. Let us look at a fairly rep ±esentative 
quotation from Ryle once again, one to which Winch in fact 
refers. Ryle says: "To explain an act as done from a certain 
motive is not analogous to saying that the glass broke, 
because the stone hit it, but to the quite different type of 
statement that the glass broke, when the stone hit it, 
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because the glass was brittle." As we have already had 
occasion to notice, what Ryle is doing - and this is surely 
clear from his very words in this passage - is providing us 
with an account of what it is that we are saying, what it is 
that we are doing, when we impute a motive to a person, namely, 
referring to a facet of that person's character. On the other 
hand, what Winch is clearly trying to do is to show us how a 
motive - whether it refers to a long -standing trait of 
character or not - is able to make an action intelligible, how 
it is able to function as an explanation of the action at all. 





can be justified in criticising Ryle's position on the basis of 
his own. Indeed, Winch inadvertently makes it clear that his 
own view cannot be regarded as incompatible with Ryle's when 
he says on the following page: "To say, for example, that N 
murdered his wife from jealousy is certainly not to say that he 
acted reasonably. But it is to say that his act was intelligible 
in terms of the modes of behaviour which are familiar in our 
society, and that it was governed by considerations appropriate 
to its context. These two aspects of the matter are interwoven: 
one can act 'from considerations' only where there are accepted 
standards of what is appropriate to appeal to. The behaviour 
of Chaucer's Troilus towards Cressida is intelligible only in 
the context of the conventions of courtly love. Understanding 
Troilus presupposes understanding those conventions for it is 
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only from them that his acts derive their meaning." And while 
I would agree with this, it is not at all clear why it should 
prevent a person from holding a view about what is immediately 
entailed by the ascription of a motive, as Ryle claims to be 
doing. It is one thing to ascribe jealousy to a person as his 
motive: it is quite another to show how motives ultimately 
derive their explanatory value. It is indeed the difference 
between the descriptions 'immediate' and 'ultimate' which makes 
this dichotomy meaningful. Winch himself clearly implies that 
there is one thing, namely, understanding Troilus - corresponding 
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to that aspect of the matter in which Ryle is interested - 
which is dependent upon another, namely, the social conditions 
which render it intelligible. Concentration upon the first 
has a certain amount of intrinsic philosophical interest, and 
is of particular significance in the philosophy of mind. For 
this reason alone, there is some justification for treating it 
in isolation. 
But quite apart from these remarks, has not Winch 
misconstrued Ryle's thesis from another point of view? In the 
first place, Winch speaks as though, on a dispositional 
account, one must talk about 'inferring' motives. Indeed his 
own example is intended to rebut this suggestion by pointing 
to the fact that the lecturer does not infer his intention of 
cancelling his lectures from his desire to go to London - and 
the example is proffered as the paradigm of motive explanations 
in general. But it is not unreservedly true, even on Ryle's 
thesis, to say that an agent infers his own motives. Of course, 
he may do so in cases where he cannot understand why he did 
what he did, and where psycho- analysis may be required, but 
we would then be in the realm of unconscious motivation, and 
neither Ryle nor Winch is concerned with this field. 
The general points which Pyle wishes to make about motive 
explanations is that they deny that the action was merely 
automatic, that they imply that the agent "was in some way 
thinking or heeding what he was doing, and would not have acted 
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in that way, if he had not been thinking about what he was 
doing." He says: "The sense in which a person is thinking 
what he is doing, when his action is to be classed not as 
automatic but as done from a motive, is that he is acting 
more or less carefully, critically, consistently, and 
purposefully.... ", and Ryle clearly means this to imply that 
the agent will, under these conditions, be able to answer, 
unhesitatingly, questions about what he is doing or has done, 
Among the answers given in this way will be the answer to the 
question 'Why are you doing this ?' or 'Why did you do that ?'. 
Ryle indeed explicitly denies, in these cases, that one infers 
one's motives. He had already said at an earlier point in the 
chapter: "We shall see.... that a person who does or undergoes 
something, heeding what he is doing or undergoing, can, 
commonly, answer questions about the incident without inference 
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or research." And an example which Ryle gives almost 
immediately after this passage, though not intended to illustrate 
the same point, nevertheless makes clear what possibilities he 
is prepared to admit of. In this further passage he says: "A 
person replying to an interrogation might say that he was 
delving into a ditch in order to find the larvae of a certain 
species of insect; that he was looking for these larvae in 
order to find out on what fauna or flora they were parasitic; 
fa. 13. 
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that he was trying to find out on what they were parasitic in 
order to test a certain ecological hypothesis; and that he 
wanted to test this hypothesis in order to test a certain 
hypothesis about Natural selection. At each stage he declares 
his motive or reason for pursuing certain investigations.... rr 
Now in a sense these explanations are no,dependent for their 
validity upon a generalisation from past actions than is the 
explanation of the cancellation of the lectures by reference 
to the journey to London. In neither case is it true to say 
that the agent infers his motive or reason. These are, as it 
were, ready -made explanations which derive from the 
circumstances themselves, the context in which the actions 
occur. All Ryle wants to assert in connection with such 
statements is that (almost whether we like it or not) in 
providing the motive or reason, we are speaking of a facet of the 
agent's character. The scientist's inspection of the larvae 
and the lecturer's trip to London are both to be regarded as 
expressions of the kind of thing which these men, respectively, 
are inclined, or want, to do; and a description of what a 
person likes doing - or alternatively the kind of things which 
he does - is part of the account of 'character' as we know it. 
It does not follow from this account that an agent, in order 
to provide a motive for his action has to inspect the kind of 
things which he has a tendency to do, 




a distinction not generally acknowledged in descriptions of 
his account, and which does tend to support the criticism 
laid forth by Winch. This is the distinction, not explicitly 
stated by Ryle himself, between particular motives and long- 
term motives. And it seems that Ryle wants to say that the 
discovery of one's own long -term motives is a matter of 
inference. Talking first about the motives of others he says: 
"The process of discovering them is not immune from error, but 
nor are the errors incorrigible. It is or is like an inductive 
process, which results in the establishment of law -like 
propositions and the application of them as the 'reasons' for 
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particular actions.... ", He then goes on to say: 'The way 
in which a person discovers his own long -term motives is the 
+'y 
same as the way in which he discovers those of others.... ", 
suggesting that this, too, is an inductive process. What is 
objectionable here is not so much the claim that I may 
discover certain things about myself as the claim in particular 
that I may discover my motives, when it is made clear that these 
are not unconscious motives. What, may one may ask, is it that I 
discover of which I was not previously aware? Certainly I may 
discover that, over a period of time, my actions have formed 
some sort of pattern with certain common characteristics. This 
may be another way of saying that I have a4 tendency tó°this 
rather than that, and so it may be said that I discover certain 






of this. But I am sure that we would not normally wish to say 
that we were thereby discovering our motives, so long as we 
mean by motives reasons which had consciously led us to action, 
reasons which had been influential in determining what we should 
do. Reasons of this kind are, notoriously, not the sort of things 
which I have to discover. We might concede to Ryle that there 
are some things which we discover about ourselves which are very 
like motives in some ways. They do, that is to say, have some 
explanatory value. Thus Ryle's own example (p.I13) of the man 
who passes the salt out of politeness is a case in point. It 
is perfectly conceivable in this context that if the man were 
asked whether he would describe himself as a polite person he 
would go through the process of perusing his past actions in 
order to decide (assuming that he had never considered the matter 
befère). But if we can correctly assume that this is what Ryle 
means by a long -term motive, then the question arises whether 
we are justified in calling this a motive at all. Admittedly, 
it goes some way towards explaining why the man passed the 
salt, but we cannot assert that it was his reason for doing so. 
To supply this as an explanation of his passing the salt is 
in some ways - but only in some ways - like giving a 'causal' 
account of how he came to act as he did; though in fact Ryle 
wishes to make this the la alternative to a causal account. A 
causal account for him would be some such statement as 'He heard 
his neighbour ask for it'. 
69. 
The whole point is that these assertions concerning what 
he calls long -term motives seem to be at variance with his 
earlier remarks concerning the ability of the agent to answer, 
unhesitatingly, questions about his action; his statement that 
in acting from a m4eive motive, as opposed to acting from force 
of habit, one is acting "more or less carefully, critically, 
consistently, and purposefully ". Unless one says that 
politeness is a sub -conscious prompting to action, then,on 
this account, one is faced with saying both that X passed the 
salt purposefully (to use one of the adverbs) and also that X 
was unaware of the reason why he did this - for Ryle will 
apparently not admit that X's having heard someone ask for the 
salt can be his reason for passing it. Yet this involves,if not 
a contradiction, at least some inconsistency and muddled 
thinking on motives. 
The sense of confusion is further strengthened when one . 
reverts to his example of the scientist inspecting the larvae, 
for there, in saying that the scientist "declares his motive 
or reason for pursuing certain investigations ", he clearly 
admits the possibility of uninferred motives. It may be that he 
would want to call these short -term motives, but if this is the 
case, it is hard to see why he should deny the same term to 
the e)= planation of passing the salt by reference to the request 
for it. 
There is, then, some ground for Winch's criticism in this 
connection. We must only point out that it is not a criticism 
which stands unreservedly: that Ryle, despite some confusion in 
his account, does acknowledge the existence of motives which 
resemble, in some measure, Winch's own paradigm. Furthermore, 
as we have already been at pains to emphasise, the question of 
how one discovers one's motives, and even the question of 
whether it makes sense to talk about 'discovery' of motives at 
all, remains independent of any account of how motives derive 
their explanatory value. If X passes the salt out of politeness, 
then this functions as an explanation simply because the concept 
of politeness is something which is intelligible within the 
context of the particular society in which we live. We know that 
the action of passing the salt when requested to do so is one 
of the thijgs which expresses the meaning of what it is to be 
polite. We could not begin to understand why Antony Powell's 
a- 
character Barbara empties a canister of sugar over Mr Widmerpool 
if she announces that she did so out of politeness, for, patently, 
this is hardly the kind of action which normally issues from that 
quality. The explanatory value of a motive, then, derives from 
the social context in which it is a motive, but this has no 
bearing upon what we may or may not say about a person's 
character in imputing a motive to him. And it is with aspects of 
this latter thesis that Ryle is primarily concerned - and rightly 
concerned too, for we have already had cause to notice that the 
ig. 
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ascription of motives is intimately - perhaps inextricably - 
tied up with the popular notion of 'character'. I have felt 
obliged to defend, and to some extent to endorse, the 
dispositional account of motives because I believe that it has 
much to contribute to any discussion concerning the explanation 
of human behaviour. It may be that the Rylean account goes 
too far in insisting that all motives hame a tendency or aeI ea4 
inclination which is always expressible in terms of hypothetical, 
law -like propositions. We shall be noticing incidentally in 
Chapter VII, for example, that there are times when it is more 
appropriate to account for an action in terms of specific 
emotional factors antecedent to the event than to give an 
explanation which names a long -term character -trait - even if 
the former in some way commits us to the latter. But Ryle's 
account does have the merit of drawing our attention to an 
important truth for the most part ignored by previous, and 
still strongly contested by subsequent, writers on the subject. 
I have tried to emphasise this truth by pointing to what is 
best called the social implications of motive -ascription - by 
pointing in particular to our tendency (for which in part I 
have tried to account) to attach a general label to a person 
on the basis of a particular motive. This in turn is an aspect 
of one of the central aims of this thesis, which is to bring out 
the enormous complexity of the concept of motivation. It is true 
in a sense that Ryle cannot be given the credit for revealing 
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this complexity, for his account is, notoriously, as dogmatic as 
any we shall see, but he has at least isolated a feature of 
motive -ascription, some of the general implications of which 
I have tried to work out in the present chapter. 
III. MOTIVES AND HABITS 
We noticed in the previous chapter that Ryle distinguishes 
between motives and habits by saying that in acting from the 
former I am aware of what I am doing, while this is not so 
when I act from the latter. I want, in this chapter, to turn 
our attention more closely to the ;Satin between these two 
concepts. 
We might begin by hinging the discussion upon some 
remarks which N.S.Sutherland makes in an article entitled 
'Motives as Explanations'. He maintains that an action, or 
series of actions, explained by reference to force of habit 
precludes the possibility of an explanation in terms of a 
motive. It will be correct to say of a person who has developed 
the habit of locking his back door every night that he does so 
from, or out of, force of habit. It will be incorrect, 
Sutherland suggests, to state that he does so, for example, 
from a desire to keep out burglars, even though this may 
have been his original motive for performing the action. The 
statement 'He has a motive for locking the back door' is true, 
in this context, only in the weak sense that the first action 
in the series was motivated and this is, according to him, 
insignificalit. 
Sutherland's contention is not, I think, entirely borne 




for one of the door -locking instances, or for the series asX a 
whole, it is certainly not an adequate answer to reply 'He 
locks the door every night because it is a habit of his'. 
Professor W.H.F.Barnes pointed out in this connection that 
the adequacy of the answer really depends upon the level of 
questioning. I would agree that this is in general true. But 
there are two things which count against its adequacy in this 
context. In the first place, that nightly door -locking is a 
habit is something which the questioner can often observe for 
himself. Thus the man who, upon hearing his clock chime ten, 
rises in a deliberative manner to lock his door might be a 
case in point. But secondly, there is the question, to which 
T, 
I shall be returning, of what it is that I am being informed 
of when I am told that X's action is habitual. For the most 
part, I shall want to argue that to say an action is habitual 
or is done out of habit, is merely to comment upon the regularity 
with which it was performed. But if this is the case, then 
clearly it is not an answer to a 'why' question to say 'He 
always does it'. To say that a person always does something is 
not in itself to say whz he does it. Now one may be tempted to 
argue that there are situations in which such an answer will 
have some informative value. Thus we can imagine a situation 
in which a person has done something which, in the light of 
existing circumstances, it was clearly nonsensical to do; and 
at 
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it may be asserted that here it would be helpful if we could 
say 'But he acted out of habit'. But the issue is really very 
much more complex than this. The assumption to be made here in 
order to explain why X did what he did is that in some sense he 
was not aware,of sufficiently aware, of what he was doing. In 
particular, this would explain why he failed to recognise a 
change in the circumstances. Yet one has only to look at other 
cases to see that the mere use of 'habit', 'habitual', etc. 
does not necessarily imply this. Indeed, the counter -examples 
in this context are so numerous as to make it tempting to reject 
the notion that the use of the term 'habit' explains in this way. 
Immanuel Kant was notoriously a man of habit, but the kind of 
incidents which his biographers appeal to in support of this 
contention demonstrate not so much that he was unaware or only 
semi -aware of what he was doing but that, on the contrary, he 
was very acutely conscious of his own activities. Thus Bertrand 
Russell, in The History of Western Philosophy,(p.731) says: 
"Kant was a man of such regular habits that people used to set 
their watches by him as he passed their doors on his 
constitutional, but on one occasion his time -table was disrupted 
for several days; this was when he was reading 'Emile'..." 
Observing a time -table requires attentiveness, and indeed the 
implication here is that one has to be more attentive to one's 
activities in order to be a creature of habit than would 
otherwise be required. But, independently of this consideration, 
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it looks very much as though 'habit' here describes nothing 
more than an accustomed regularity - and this hardly 
constitutes an answer to a 'why' question. It is unnecessary 
to labour the point: I am not especially concerned to show 
that there are no cases in which reference to habit in this 
way is explanatory; but there is strong evidence for this view, 
and hence my inclination to talk of the inadequacy of such an 
appeal in cases where a person wishes the explanation of an 
action. 
There is the further point that reference to habit in these 
cases more often than not gives rise to the additional 
question 'But why does he do this (which you say he does from 
habit) ?' This obviously calls for the agent's reason, for the 
purpose underlying the door -locking ritual; and the question 
is normally intended to obtain a more informative answer than 
a reference to habit will supply, for example that the agent 
wishes to keep out burglars. And it is in fact important to 
note that the statement 'Because he is afraid of burglars' or 
'In order to keep out burglars' is the type of answer we would 
normally regard as appropriate for any and every stage of the 
series. We frequently produce such explanations in face of 
knowledge that the agent is in fact not thoroughly aware of 
what he is doing. 
A solution to the problem of what it is to be motivated 
now seems to be demanded. This is important because, on the 
face of it, one cannot assert that to act from force of habit 
is not to act from a motive unless one is already clear about 
what it sans to act from a motive. We may clear the ground 
somewhat by pointing out that a motivated action is not 
necessarily one in which the agent was conscious - episodically 
aware - of his motive before acting. Nor indeed is it necessary 
that he should have thought about his motive during those 
moments immediately preceding his action. If this were an 
essential part of what we mean when we say that a person is 
motivated, we should no doubt be committed to saying that few 
people were ever motivated at all. It is probably true that 
most actions are motivated, but it is not plausible to suppose 
that a person must always have thought about his motive while 
or immediately before acting. It would seem, then, that we 
cannot dismiss an action done from force of habit from the 
realm of motivated action merely on the ground that the agent 
is not aware of the purpose of his action at some specified 
time. 
More positively, the criterion for the existence of a 
motivd, for most general purposes, would seem to be that the 
agent should be able to provide, when asked, and given that 
all other conditions are equal, a reason for, a purpose in, 
acting. He should be able to say Ely he is going to act in such 
and such a way, or why he did act in such and such a way. There 
4. 
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tried to show in Chapter I. 
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are, of course, various reasons why he may not be able to 
answer immediately. He may quite well have forgotten why he 
is acting as he is. The man who sets out to buy a newspaper in 
order to check his football pools may, after oge or two 
unusual encounters in the street, not be able to remember why 
he is buying a newspaper when a friendly newsagent casually 
asks him; but it would be exceedingly odd to suppose that, for 
this reason, he could not have been motivated. Moreover, it 
is frequently the case that a person concentrates so closely 
upon performing a certain action that he temporarily casts 
out of his mind the purpose, the end, which his action is 
designed% to serve. (This is to put the point naively because 
in one important sense it would not follow that if I were not 
concentvating I would be 'thinking about my motive' - though 
of course I az be.) Yet again, it would be odd to deny hold 
that his action was unmotivated. It is sufficient if, after 
some consideration, he is able to supply the answer. Indeed, 
it is perfectly compatible with the present view that an agent 
should never remember his purpose in acting. It will be 
sufficient if he can say 'I know that there was a perfectly 
good reason why I did this, but I really cannot remember what 
it was'. I was at one stage led to believe that this latter 
point conceded too much, and also that it was in some ways 
incompatible with the view (stated above) that the important 
criterion for motivation is that a person should be able to 
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provide a reason for his action when asked. But then, it has 
been pointed out that this depends upon the equality of all 
other conditions. Lapse of memory, mental blockage, excessive 
concentration, will be in the nature of contingent reasons for 
the agent's inability to state his motive. In each of these 
cases, we want to say that the agent would have been able to 
explain if where the blank is occupied by an acceptable 
excuse. Clearly, one unacceptable reason would be '.... if he 
had known'; but we do not suggest lack of knowledge in this 
sense when we say that a person may never remember. 
I do not wish to conceal the fact that there are many 
difficulties when it comes to deciding what counts against 
a man's being motivated. I am merely saying that such factors 
as those mentioned above need not; and that, on the other hand, 
it is legitimately claimed that X is motivated when he can 
supply a reason for acting as he did. 
If we now turn to the phrase 'force of habit' in 
particular, we shall find that actions characterised in this 
way fall roughky into two kinds. There is that action done by 
a person who, upon being asked, is able to state his purpose 
without hesitation. There is, on the other hand, the action 
which has become very much a part of the doer's routine and 
for which he cannot supply an explanation other then a 
statement of habit. Both of these cases may satisfy the 
criterion of motivation suggested above. The latter is 
admittedly more problematical; but if we accept that a 
person who has merely forgotten his motive is nevertheless 
motivated, we should also be inclined to accept that a person 
for whom an action has become habitual and who cannot remember 
hick motive is in a similar position. The stumbling block in 
the discussion of this point would appear to be, as I have 
tried to suggest, an ingrained belief that a motive is something 
which necessarily 'pushes' one into action, something which 
lies immediately behind one's actions, and sets them in 
motion. Little wonder, on this view, if one should suppose an 
action unmotivated because the agent acted automatically, or 
in general because he cannot remember his motive. This would 
be the natural conclusion. But it is idle to suppose that we 
can regard all motives in this light. Certainly some motives - 
notably, those which Hume termed 'passions' - would seem to 
fall into this category. We normally think of jealousy, 
indignation, and hatred, for example, as passions which push 
us into action; and thus it is sometimes convenient to account 
for them in terms of this model. But we need to bear in mind 
that we also quite clearly regard a man as being motivated 
when he acts from the consideration that by going to the 
theatre he will manage to avoid a person whom he does not wish 
to see. His decision to go to the theatre may have been taken 
a week or more before the actual evening, and it makes not a 
n this connection see Chapter VII 
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whit of difference if, when the time comes, he forgets wh he 
decided to go. 
There is perhaps a tendency, to which we have already 
referred, to put all actions vaguely connected with habit in a 
similar class. It is said of them generally that they are 
actions in which the agent does not have his mind on his job, 
as it were. He acts automatically, in a mere semi -state of 
consciousness; he may not be aware of what he is doing, and 
may not remember later that he has done it. We have seen that 
it is not clear that all habitual actions are of this nature. 
Even if they were, it is more than doubtful, in the light of 
our earlier remarks, whether this would give grounds for 
asserting that they are unmotivated. But I want now to consider 
the whole question in relation to what appears to be a 
working distinction between the use of the phrase 'force of 
habit' and the use of the term 'habit' or 'habitual'. By 
describing it as a 'working distinction' I mean to imply simply 
that oRdinary language seems to contain an implicit 
acknowledgement that there are times when it is appropriate 
to describe a person's action as having been done from force 
of habit, and that there are other times when, though 'habit' 
or 'habitual' may be appropriate, the phrase 'force of habit' 
would misdescribe the situation. Elaboration upon this might 
clear the ground a good deal. 
Sutherland's example of the man who locks his back door 
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every night is instructive here. The same man now arranges to 
have an outer door constructed so as to make the locking of 
the existing door unnecessary. Suppose that soon afterwards 
an onlooker finds him locking the original door, and questions 
him about it. This is a situation in which the agent may reply 
'That was silly of me: it was force of habit'. In so replying 
he is suggesting, as the phrase itself implies, that he was, in 
some weak sense, 'forced' to go through the motions. One 
might almost say - though this is too strong - that he was not 
responsible for what he did. Had he been thinking, we want to 
say, the futility of the action would have been evident to him, 
and he would not have acted so. It is not being claimed that 
we would not describe the agent's action as habitual nor that 
we would not say of him that he acted from habit: it is being 
claimed that in using the phrase 'force of habit' in this 
situation the agent is deliberately waiving any suspicion that 
he meant to do it, that it was sensible or intelligent, or 
that he was motivated. In this case, he is in fact informing 
us that there was no motive. 
One point of clarification needs to be made here. It has 
been said that, basically, to be motivated is to be in a 
position to explain one's action, to give a reason for acting. 
It does not of course follow from this that all explanations 
are motives. It is certainly true in this particular case, as 
we have already had cause to mention, that the reference to 
habit provides an explanation of the action, and it has been 
admitted that this is in one sense an answer to a 'why' 
question. But there are two things to be said about 4he such 
a reference. Firstly, the explanatory value which it does 
have is due entirely to the absence of a motive. In other 
words, the action is ultimately an unintelligible one. It is 
not unintelligible because it has no motive. There are many 
actions which are motiveless in this sense and which are far 
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from being either unintelligible or unintelligent. But it is 
unintelligible in the sense that the motive which would have 
been approprite under circumstances which no longer obtain is 
known to have been explicitly rejected by the agent himself. 
Secondly, the reference satisfies a 'why' question only 
indirectly, that is, by referring to the manner in which the 
action was performed. It is as though the agent is saying 'I 
did not have my wits about me'. It explains why the agent 
performed an inappropriate or unintelligible action; it does 
not explain why the action was of that kind rather than of fift 
another. 
The point about the use of 'habit' or 'habitual' when 
these are distinguished from the stronger term 'force of 
habit' is that we do use e4 them of actions done by people 
who have their minds on their jobs. 'He habitually leaves the 
house at 9.0.am' - but there is no suggestion here that the 
agent is not aware of this. He may well use tie same words of 
See Chapter I 
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himself without making this suggestion. 'My nightly door - 
locking is habitual.', he may say, but this leaves entirely 
open the question of his awareness or non -awareness. But 'I 
lock the door from force of habit' does suggest that he does 
so without fully realising it. 
Of course we do convey something by our use of the words 
'habit' or 'habitual': we convey, among other things, that 
the agent has acted in the same way on a number of past 
occa$ons; that he does the action regularly, or at regular 
intervals, and so on. The correct use of these terms may 
therefore depend merely upon observation. The witnessing of 
actions alone may qualify one for the use of the term 'habitual'; 
while more is demanded for the use of the phrase 'force of 
habit'. One cannot assert that the agent who continues to lock 
the original door after the outer door has been built is 
acting from force of habit unless one at least knows that the 
agent is not only aware of the existence of the outer door 
but is also aware that that door makes the locking of the 
existing door unnecessary. In many cases, we can learn this 
only from the agent himself, and so one might be led to claim 
that the phrase id 'primary' only in cases where the agent 
himself employs it, secondary in relation to anybody else. 
The terms 'primary' and "secondary' are perhaps not the 
most apt; but there is no need to attach any great importance 
to the labels themselves. They are simply intended to bring out 
the point that when the agent himself uses the phrase 'force 
of habit', he is making a comment upon his own action from a 
position of authority. (This point requires separate 
treatment, and will be dealt with in the concluding sections 
of this chapter). This is not to deny that others may have a 
right to use the term. We have seen, indeed, that there are 
circumstances in which it would appear to be the only 
reasonable thing to say. But having a right - in the sense of 
having good grounds - for a statement is one thing: it is quite 
another to talk about its corrigibility. In short, it would 
seem always to be logically possible in the kind of cases we 
are discussing that the agent, despite all appearanwes to the 
contrary, may have a perfectly acceptable reason for doing 
what he did. This is not necessarily to resort to the notion 
of private or privileged access. His reason, like most others, 
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will be found in the context in which his action took place. 
Where does this analysis lead us in relation to motives? 
I am still tempted to hold the following simple position: that 
ghe case in which the agent replies 'IT was force of habit' to 
an enquiry concerning some action of his exhibits the only 
species of habit, as it were, which may be said to preclude 
the possibility of a motive explanation; and this not because 
the agent was unaware of his motive, not because he was unable 
to remember it, but simply by virtue of his statement that it 
7, 
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was done out of force of habit. By saying this he is 
implying that in some sense he was unable to help doing what 
he did, and we do not have motives for actions of this kind. 
More importantly, however4, he is waiving the attempt to look 
for a motive. He himself is dß-1 -i1 e _+ejr disregarding the 
fact that there was once a reason why he should for example 
lock the first door; disregarding it as irrelevant and 
inoperative here. He is denying that it 'moved' him to action. 
Now it may be that this is all we can and should say in 
this cohnection. But it is difficult to resist the thought 
that there are cases in which a man will admit to having 
acted from force of habit while denying that this admission 
points to the absence of motivation. It is confessedly 
debatable whether it would be legitimate to speak of 'force of 
habit' as opposed to saying that what happened was habitual, but 
it is significant that Ryle does use the phrase in precisely 
this kind of situation: "I certainly can run upstairs ", he 
says, "two stairs at a time from force of habit and at the 
same time notice that I am doing so and even consider how the 
S 
act is done ". Granted that this use is a legitimate one, it 
might seem as though a sub -class of actions done from force of 
habit requires to be acknowledged in which one has to say that 
there is no question of waiving the possibility of motive. 
There are, however, grounds for being reluctant about such an 
9. 
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acknowledgement. These are simply that wkela in the event of an 
enquiry concerning an action which has been done out of force of 
habit and which is nevertheless motivated, the agent will not 
naturally refer to the habit. The original claim was that a 
man answers 'I did it out of force of habit' only where he 
rejects the notion of motive; and therefore one might argue 
that the Rylean kind of case does not really have any bearing 
upon this. 
But it looks, in any case, as though this must remain an 
open question. There may well be a finil answer, but to psiie 
pursue the matter further here might be to run the risk of 
depriving the whole issue of philosophical interest. It will be 
sufficient if the chapter has, even at this atage, succeeded 
in drawing attention both to the paucity of paridigms, and to 
the 'cobwebby' nature of the material. 
It may be argued that a person say 'I wanted to keep 
burglars out' in a situation in which it is known that he is 
aware of the second door and that he has explicitly 
acknowledged that it cancels out the purpose of the ritual. 
Under these circumstances, one may remind him of these facts 
and thereby induce him to withdraw the motive- statement. He 
then reverts to 'I'm sorry: it was force of habit'. This 
would be a significant case because, prima facie, it indicates 
that the agent's ability to explain his action is not a 
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reliable guarantee that he is in fact motivated. 
In reply to this objection, it must be said first of all 
that it has no tendency to show that the agent is not the 
final authority in deciding which motive is applicable. What 
it does have a tendency to show is that the agent is not the 
final authority in deciding whether or not he is motivated. 
But it is not clear that this is a legitimate implication. 
There is an important sense in which 'I wanted to keep 
burglars out' is in this context the statement of a genuine 
motive. This is the end which the action - habitual or not - 
has always been designed to serve. It is the general 
explanation under which all the particular actions are 
subsumed. It is the explanation which, in terms of the 
practices of this society, (would have) made the action 
intelligible. He does not - though he might - conduct a process 
of introspection in order to determine the motive. Rather, he 
refers to the current norms or standards. Now admittedly, in 
giving the answer he does give, he is displaying his 
ignorance or forgetfulness of certain (new) features of the 
situation, and thus it is that the motive he does give fails to 
make his action intelligible. This is one way of saying that 
there was no motive. Yet the fact remains that we normally 
allow that a person may be motivated by a false impression, 
where we mean precisely this, that he is in some sense unaware 
of, or confused about, certain features in the relevant situation. 
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It is hard to see how the present case differs from this in 
any material respect. The agent does waive the motive - 
statement upon being reminded of the additional facts, but he 
does so not because he realises there was no motive, but 
because he sees that the appropriate motive cannot render his 
present action intelligible. Even this is not unreservedly 
true, for he might, instead of referring to habit, have 
appealed to the form of words employed in most cases of simple 
illusion, namely 'I thought ' or 'I was under the 
impression that.....', where again we do not necessarily imply 
that he had consciously thought, or consciously formed the 
impression. 
The general point to be made at this atage, then, is that 
there is only one case of habit which may be said to exclude 
a motive -explanation, namely that in which the agent himself 
asserts that it was done from force of habit - and we have 
just observed that even this assertion is one which has to be 
made with reservations. Sutherland is right up to a point, but 
this is far less than he intended to say. As we have seen, 
there is more than one kind of habitual action. The door - 
locking example - the only kind to which Sutherland's thesis 
is properly applicable - represents just one aspect of a very 
complex network of actions. The agent himself is really the 
only person who is 2ualified to state that he acted out of 
force of habit. Others are able to do so only because he has 
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already said this or certain other things which entitle 
them to use the phrase. Of course, the phrase is, in practice, 
used very frequently, but also very loosely; for a person 
who uses it will normally be willing to admit that he makes 
no assumption about motivation. He will readily admit that he 
does not know enough about the agent to say whether he is 
motivated or not. On the other hand, as we have seen, there 
is that very large class of actions which are described as 
habits, many of which, for their designation, rest upon the 
simple claim that they are done regularly. These may or may 
not be motivated, but to state that they are habits, to state 
that they are actions which are done habitually, is not in 
itself to rule out the possibility of motivation, as 
Sutherland has maintained. One has to probe further into them; 
one has to know something about the agent, and about how he 
himself would describe his actions. Then, and then alone, 
will we be in a position to judge of motivation. 
There are certain cases of habit which, because of their 
peculiarity, deserve separate attention. The points I shall 
make are, from one point of view, somewhat trivial, but they 
nevertheless serve to draw attention to a further aspect of 
the general topic. 
We might have cause to say, for example, that a person 
has a habit of putting on his left shoe before his right. 
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Surely, it may be maintained, in saying this we rule out the 
possibility of motivation. And there are two reasons which 
may lead a person to hold this view. The first is, I would 
suspect, a prevalent belief that habits usually refer to trivial, 
everyday routines for which we have no particular explanations. 
Undoubtedly, habits often do refer to such actions, but they 
also refer to actions which are of the utmost significance. It 
is precisely by virtue of this significance that we 
consciously set ourselves to form a habit of them: it is as 
though we take out an insurance against lapse of memory, 
mistakes, and the like. There may also be some tendency to 
designate such actions trivial or insignificant on account of 
the 'automatic' manner in which they are performed; but, under 
the circumstances this is clearly a misleading use of the term. 
The second reason is that, on the face of it, what is 
being described as a habit is not, in the real sense of the 
word, an action. And if it is not an action, some may wish to 
argue that talk of motivation becomes inapplicable. There is 
certainly some ground for discussion here, but it is not clear 
that the latter inference is legitimately drawn. It will be 
wise, therefore, to turn to a closer examination of what it is 
that the term 'habit' refers to in this example. 
It does not refer mere /all /merely to the act of putting a 
shoe on, nor indeed to the act of putting a left shoe on. What 
is being described as habitual is the act of putting -on -a -left- 
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shoe -before -the -right. What constitutes that habit is something 
more than putting on the left shoe, namely putting it on 
before the right one. One might therefore formulate the 
following dilemna: if we hold that the term 'habit' is used to 
refer only to actions, and we also hold that the term is here 
correctly employed, we must presumably hold that to- put -one's- 
left- shoe -on- before -one's -right is to perform an action; if, on 
the other hand, we assert that only the act of putting- one's- 
left -shoe -tin can be regarded as an action, we seem to be / 
committed to the view that habits cover something more than 
actions proper. 
Let us consider the position once more. There is nothing, 
no movement, no position taken up or maintained by the agent 
which can be described as putting -one's -left- shoe -on -first as 
opposed to putting -one's- left -shoe -on. That is to say, there 
is nothing in the first description, considered as the 
description of an action, which is not present in the second. 
The movements, the procedures, are identical. It follows, then, 
that 'putting -one's -left- shoe -on- first' becomes significant 
only in relation to the action of putting -one's -right- shoe -on. 
One could not, for example, command a person to put-his-left- 
shoe-on-first in the context of putting on a pair of shoes 
while at the same time preventing him from using his right shoe. 
The significance, then, lies in the relationship between the 
two sets of movements. Clearly the relation is not itself an 
action. Neither does it alter the nature of either 'action', 
considered in itself. 
Yet it must be noted that it makes sense to ask both 'Why 
do you put your left shoe on ?' and also 'Why do you put your 
left shoe on first ?'. In both cases, the agent may produce 
reasons other than a statement of habit. This being the case, 
it is evident that we may often treat 'putting- one's -left -shoe- 
on- first' as an action in addition to 'putting- one's -left -shoe- 
on'. Despite the fact that it does not seem to fulfil the 
basic requirements of an action,' it does the duty of one. We 
ask for its motive and expect to receive a sensible answer. 
Whether oh not it must be regarded as an action, it has to be 
added to the contention that the term 'habit' is used to refer 
only to actions a reservation: it also refers to certain 
things which, though they do not meet the basic requirements 
of an action, nevertheless serve as such. More important for 
our present purpose is the fact that, though there may arise 
some temptation to question whether what the habit refers to 
is an action or not - though we may hesitate to call it an 
action - we have no similar temptation to withdraw the term 
'habit'. We establish what the agent does as a habit on the 
ground that he does it regularly, and for no other reason; and 
we include in what is described as a habit the 'temporal 
relationship' - the priority in time of the one shoe before the 
other. The general conclusion to be drawn is that, even when 
See Chapter I,& Chapter V 
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the term 'habit' is used of something which we do not regard 
as an action, it makes sense to ask for a motive. This is not 
in itself of any great consequence. What is of consequence is 
that the general airing of the case brings to the forefront a 
further and perhaps neglected aspect of the concept of habit, 
and thus helps to underline its inherent complexity. 
Again, we regard smoking as sometimes being a habit; and 
I want now to consider the kind of cases which it represents. 
It is clear, I think, that we describe a person's smoking as 
being a habit when he smokes regularly. In describing it as 
such, we do not necessarily make any assumptions about the 
manner in which he smokes - whether he does so automatically or 
unthinkingly, or whether he considers the matter before every 
cigarette. The description may depend solely upon observation. 
There is no reason to suppose that we would wish to alter this 
description upon hearing that he considered the matter before 
smoking; but certainly hearing this might effectiiiely eliminate 
any temptation to use the term 'force of habit', as opposed to 
'habit'. 
Suppose someone objects that although the smoker's 
actions as a whole may be described as a habit on the ground 
that he is often to be found smoking a cigarette, it does not 
follow from this that each action in the series is correctly 
labelled 'habitual'. It may be, so to objection may proceed, 
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that each individual act of smoking is pondered and considered, 
and is far from being automatic or unthinking. The force of 
this objection would be that though we use the word 'habit' of 
the series as a whole, this will have no bearing upon the 
question of whether the agent acts from habit in doing 
what he does in the particular case. 'Habitual', it may be 
claimed, is a word reserved for actions for which the agent 
was in some sense not responsible. ISuse in connection with a 
whole series of actions is a weaker or watered -down use. 
This point would really seem to turn upon the nature of 
the 'actional' antecedents in this context. Naturally, we can 
think of cases in which a man does ponder over, or meditate 
upon, whether to have a cigarette or not. Thus one who does 
not usually smoke may do so on a particular occasion because he 
feels that it is polite or sociable, because he wants to break 
with traditional patterns (this once), or because he wishes to 
find a means of distracting his own attention from un 
undesirable occupation (for once). Now it is theoretically 
possible that there should be a number of such occasions; but 
there will come a point at which such pondering cease to be 
'genuine', if we take as one of the criteria for genuineness 
that they sometimes lead the person to reject the prospective 
action. In other words, our knowing that he ponders in this way 
after having observed his doing so on a number of previous 
occasions in no way detracts from the appropriateness of the 
96. 
statement we are inclined to make, namely that he takes a 
cigarette out of habit. It may be that, in order to justify 
such a statement, we shall have to refer the habit back one 
stage, but this does not matter: He ponders out of habit' is 
a meaningful assertion. We have to avoid the temptation, 
already mentioned, of supposing that actions may be habitual 
only in so far as they may be considered as physical 
movements. 'Suspecting', 'supposing', 'being scared', 'being 
angry', etc. are all activities which we may, on occasions, 
wish to describe as habitual. 'Considering' or 'pondering' 
before smoking falls into the same category. if, therefore, 
a man considers or ponders often enough, we come to think of it 
as a habit. We might even go further and assert that he does 
so out of force of habit on certain occasions - in particulat 
in those situations in which the circumstances indicate that 
pondering was unnecessary. In short, where the pondering is 
'genuine' we would clearly not say that he was acting from 
habit, but then, equally clearly, we would have nothing which 
could be called a series of actions falling under the general 
description 'a habit'; for the pondering is genuine only when 
it occurs in a limited number of cases, and this is precisely 
the situation in which the term is normally withheld. There 
seems to be no reason, therefore, to add any qualification to 
the statement that the main criterion for its employment is 
mere repetition and regularity of occurrence; nor indeed would 
there seem to be reason to distinguish, in respect of 
relevant criteria for use, between the term 'habit' used of 
a pattern or series, and its corresponding adjectives or 
adverbs used of individual actions in that series. 
At one point in his article, Sutherland says: "Of course 
there are occasions when we are not quite sure how far 
something is done from a motive and how far it is done through 
force of habit; someone can lock the back door partly out of 
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habit, partly because he wants to keep burglars out." There 
are two points worth raising about this statement. The first 
is one aspect of something which has already been sufficiently 
laboured: though we do speak of a person acting 'from' force 
of habit, it can often be misleading. A person does not act 
from habit if this is on a par with acting from a motive. Even 
though it can often be equally misleading to regard a motive 
as ah inner thrust or push to action, it is sometimes helpful 
#o perpetuate this picture in order more clearly to contrast 
it with other forms of explanation of action. A motive is, at 
any event, something which is 'responsible' for my action; it 
is what I proffer when someone asks me wha I acted. It stands, 
metaphorically, 'behind' my action, and if it were not there 
I might very well not act at all. But a habit does not stand 





out of force of habit, I am not asserting that some 
distinguishable anterior event or entity was responsible for 
what I did. To say that one acted from force of habit can and 
does have explanatory value, but it constitutes an 
explanation of a particular kind, and it may be that 
Sutherland is not consistently aware of this. It is in fact a 
statement about the wax in which I acted. It places the action 
in the sphere of the automatic, the unthinking, and sometimes 
ghe unmotivated. It describes the action: it does not tell us 
why it was performed. It might constitute the answer to a 
'why' question, but it does so only by virtue of waiving the 
question of reason or motive. 
If we regard 'habit' and 'motive' respectively in this 
light, it is not difficult to see as a category mistake the 
way in which Sutherland links the two. If I tell Y that X acted 
out of force of habit, I am not, strictly speaking, telling him 
wha X acted as he did. He may of course be satisfied with this 
piece of information, but by giving it I do not eliminate the 
possibility of a 'why' question. He may still sensibly ask it. 
This question - the 'why' question - except at a further 
remove, is inapplicable once the motive has been stated. Yet, 
by linking them both together, Sutherland is suggesting that 
there are two things both of the same nature - both, that is, 
standing 'behind' my action, 'pushing' me into activity - from 
which a man may act. Really, there is only one thing of this 
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nature, and that is the motive as traditionally - but 
misleadingly - conceived. 
In the second place, what does it mean to say that a person 
can lock the back door partly out of habit, partly because he 
wants3to keep burglars out? In view of what has been said, it 
will be evident that I should want to interpret this as 
meaning that a person may act from habit while yet motivated. 
Yet Sutherland cannot mean this, for his thesis, as I see it, 
is devoted to showing that habit, in his sense, precludes 
motive. If, however, he does not mean this, then what he does 
mean seems rather peculiar. Is he wanting to imply that a bit 
of habit and a bit of motive cause me to act? Does it really 
make sense to say that a person may act partially from habit? No 
doubt, the expression is used in reference to certain actions, 
but consider for one moment what we would mean. One thing we 
are not likely to be saying is that the agent acted out of 
force of habit, for we have argued that this is even stronger 
than the simple term 'habit °, or 'habitual' - and Sutherland 
suggests that the action is not adequately described even by 
these latter. Suppose, then, that we exclude the stronger 
notion when we say that a man ::.cted partly out of habit. Now 
one can make sense of this on the present thesis because one 
need mean no more than that he acted as he did because he had 
acted in this way on a number of previous occasions, because he 
was accustomed to act in this way. We mean, in other words, 
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that reflection upon his own activity was partly responsible 
for the action. We know what it is for a person to be satisfied 
that his having done this on innumerable past occasions is a 
good reason for his repeating it now. It hardly needs saying 
that 'This is what I always do' is a bad, but notoriously 
efficacious, reason for acting. But if this is what it means 
to act partly out of habit, then clearly it does not make 
sense to contrast it with acting from a motive, for they are 
now one and the same thing. This will merely be a case in 
which more than one motive is operative in the explanation of 
the action. 
It may be that Sutherland wishes to emphasise that some 
actions are done semi -automatically, sinee to act entirely 
from habit will, on his thesis, be to act without thinking at 
all. This is an acceptable interpretation; but it then raises 
problems about motivation; for the way in which he puts it 
suggests that it is my not acting purely from habit which 
allows for the possibility of part -motivation, that, in 
proportion as one eliminates the habitual aspect, so the 
motivational increases. But this is bizarre. In so far as the 
agent is able to say 'I wanted to keep burglars out', the 
question of motivation becomes to that extent an all -or- nothing 
affair. To be in a position to say this is to be motivated. We 
shall indeed see, in Chapter VI, that there is no sharp 
dividing line between the motivated and the unmotivated, that, 
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as Ryle commented in connection with another distinction, they 
"shade into one another as an English day shades into an 
English night.' All I presently wish to point out is that in 
so far as a person is able, in this example, to say that he 
wanted to prevent the entry of burglars - and Sutherland 
explicitly implies this ability - then he is clearly motivated, 
and all talk of 'part motivation' is without meaning. 
I now wish to clarify a point which was perhaps not made 
explicit in an earlier section of this chapter. It has been 
suggested to me that there are times when a person may assert, 
independently of any remarks upon the part of an agent, that 
that agent acted from force of habit. I wish to give a 
qualified agreement to this statement, and to show that it is 
not at all inconsistent with the general trend of the present 
chapter. Certainly it is true that on some occasions I would 
seem to have very good grounds for asserting that X acted from 
force of habit. If X is presented with a new pair of shoes 
which happen to be laceless and we observe him 'trying' to tie 
the laces, we can be reasonably sure that he is acting from 
force of habit. If a man continues to walk to a place where 
the bus no longer stmps in order to catch it, we can also be 
reasonably sure that he is acting from force of habit. The 
point which it was intended to establish earlier was that these 
cases are not significantly different from those in which we go 
It- 
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about ascribing motives to people on the basis of 'external' 
factors. These, and cases of supposed 'force of habit' actions, 
have this in common: that we are always prepared to be told 
that X's motive was not what we had supposed it to be, or that 
X did not in fact OH act out of force of habit. In the shoe- 
lace case, it may turn out that he was pretending to tie his 
laces in order to amuse his onlookers, or that he was going 
through the standard motions in order to satisfy himself that 
it was possible to do so without actually handling the laces. 
In short, ouR imputation of motives and our categorization of 
actions in this particular way do not and cannot carry with 
them absolute certainty. This is not something to regret, for, 
in general, it does not undermine our ability, our justification, 
for indulging in either. But it does mark a clear distinction 
between these and the safer and more harmless procedure of 
classifying a certain action, or series of actions, as habitual. 
In the latter case, very little, if anything, can count against 
the genuineness of my description. It depends merely upon my 
observation of regularity, and I intend to assert no more than 
regularity when I describe the action as habitual. Whereas, my 
statement that a person acted cut of force of habit (provided it 
is based upon observation of external circumstances) may often 
be corrected or revised in the light of what the agent informs 
me. This is why, in general, we rarely use the phrase 'force of 
habit' (except loosely) on occasions when the information at 
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our disposal is insufficient. And this is why I have termed 
its use on the part of the agent 'primary' and its use onX 
the part of an observer 'secondary'. In most, but not all, 
cases, we shall have to take 'secondary' to mean 'derivative' 
for, properly speaking, if the statement were to carry the 
claim of certainty, it should be based upon information 
imparted either directly or indirectly by the agent. 
There is one further point which calls for clarification. 
I have so far been speaking as though the agent were 
ultimately responsible for the 'truth' about his motive, and 
I have suggested that there would be something exceedingly odd 
about any attempt to contradict him, except, of course, in 
cases where we have grounds for thinking that he is 
deliberately deceiving us. I have done so intentionally, 
because I believe there is a sense in which the agent is 
indeed the final authority in this matter. 
The psychologist often claims to provide us with what he 
terms the 'real' reasons for our actions. The word 'real' is, 
in this context, misleading, and it is partly because the 
psychologist's 'real' does not mean real at all that I have 
chosen to ignore, and will continue to ignore, the psychologist's 
account of motives in this thesis. His 'real' reasons are those 
given in va terms of various sub -conscious desires or impulses, 
and these are invariably termed real even in cases where the 
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agent himself is clearly capable of providing a reason or 
motive. My present point will be that the claim that these are 
the real reasons is an arbitrary one based upon a particular 
conception of human motives, and that the term 'real' is 
relative to the interests of the person carrying out the 
investigation. For anyone who is interested in the various 
sub -conscious impulses and springs to action, explanations in 
terms of the agent's stated reasons will be in some sense bogus; 
and this will also be so of explanations in terms of biological, 
sociological, or anthropological factors - yet clearly these 
are all legitimate explanations of human conduct, depending upon 
what particular aspect of human behaviour the researcher is 
concerned with. The psychologist has no priority in this 
and he would therefore have no right to discount as bogus, false, 
or unreal - for, in general, this is what he implies - other 
forms of explanation. 
His own explanation is in many ways a causal - quasi - 
mechanical - account of human behaviour. It is this because, in 
most cases, the explanation he provides is not something of 
which the agent was already aware. To be aware of the'cause' 
before consulting a psychologist is to know that his help is 
unnecessary. I ask for the cause of my behaviour when I do not 
know what the reason or motive is, when I nevertheless feel 
that what I did was not freely decided upon, when I suspect 
that there is something which is not part of my conscious self, 
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not part of me as a thinking being, which is responsible for 
certain actions. The cause of a human being's action is not 
linked to its effect in the way in which a person's reason or 
motive is linked to the corresponding action. The latter is 
intimately bound up with what the agent intends doing, and 
there is a sense in which it cannot be detached from this. But 
the cause of a person's action is not related to the action 
in the same way, and we normally want to claim that it is 
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describable independently of its effect. 
What is more, it may be supposed theoretically possible 
that the psychologist should provide a causal explanation in 
this sense for every single action a man performs, and this 
regardless of his overt reason for performing them. If this is 
so - and there is little reason to doubt the possibility - and 
if he claimed that all these explanations stood on the same 
laIsAft plane, then presumably they would all represent our 
real reasons for acting, or would constitute the only possible 
reasons for acting. Yet we have only to envisage such a situation 
in order to perceive the futility of the claim that he is 
presenting us with the 'true' explanation or the 'real' reasons. 
In order for this to be a genuine or serious claim it would 
have to be accompanied by a campaign to dispense with 
'superficial' or stated reasons for acting, or at least an 
exhortation to distrust or ignore, where possible, such reasons. 
This issue is considered in more detail in Ch.VII 
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But this would be undesirable, to say the least. We know, as 
a matter of fact, that this would render human intercourse, 
social life, as we now know it, extremely difficult, not to 
say impossible. It is accepted that fellow -members of our own 
society are responsible, rational, beings who may have reasons 
for acting, and who sometimes do not; beings who, sometimes, 
may not know why they acted, or cannot remember why; and beings 
who may sometimes try to deceive us. It is the presence or 
absence of these reasons which primarily interests us. For the 
most part, we realise that these particular explanations of 
conduct may or may not be compatible, from one point of view, 
with some alternative explanation which the psychologist may 
provide. But this is all we would be entitled to say about the 
matter. The incompatibility is incidental. There will be 
occasions on which we shall want to attend to what the 
psychologist has to say, but what he says has no bearing upon 
the 'reality' or the 'genuineness' of the agent's stated 
reasons. Provided that he is not attempting to deceive us, 
these are his reasons, no matter what anybody else may tell him. 
It is in the light of these remarks upon the psychologist's 
account of conduct that I want to consider the more serious 
objection that in cases which resemble 'rationalisation' (as 
the psychologist terms it), the agent may need to be told his 
real reason for actiflg, and that he invariably accepts it as 
such. There would seem to be no standard case of rationalisation, 
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and so I shall consider three classes of action about which a 
person may be said to 'rationalise' concerning his motive. 
In the first place, an agent may be genuinely at a loss to 
know why he did a particular action, and he toys with various 
means of completing 'I must have done it in order to...' until, 
quite arbitrarily - though sometimes quite reasonably, in view 
of the circumstances in which the action took place - he chooses 
one of them. Once he has chosen, he will presumably give this 
as his reason upon every occasion on which he is asked. The 
important thing to notice about this case is that the agent 
remains in a state of mind in which he is prepared to be told 
what the explanation really was. What is more, provided it is 
a case where he has not merely forgotten his reason, then 
what he is seeking, and what the psychologist may tell him, is 
what caused him to act in the way he did. That is to say, 
though we speak loosely of the explanation in terms of reasons 
or motives, nobody supposes that this was the agent's reason 
(that is, his reason) for acting. It is the inappropriateness, 
or, Austinianwise, the infelicitous use, of the possessive 
adjective which marks off the psychological account as being a 
causal one. It will cettainly be true that there was a reason 
why he did what he did; but it will not be true that he had a 
reason for doing it. 
It is the second brand of this type of rationalisation 
which presents the real difficulty for the point I wish to make. 
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This is a case where the agent fills in the blank in a 
similar way but of whom it will not be true to say that he has 
an open mind about the matter. That is to say, he convinces 
himself that whatever explanation he adopted really was his 
reason for acting; and he presents this reason when asked, 
not with provisos, but with conviction. How does he now stand 
in relation to the psychologist's account, and would we not 
admit that the latter's account is the true one, that the 
only thing which distinguishes this nian from the previous is 
his dogmatism? 
The psychological explanation is not the 'true' one for 
the reasons which have already been mentioned: it is merely one 
explanation among others. Neither should it be the explanation 
we would naturally accept - granted our desire to accept some 
explanation and not deny that there are any at all, and 
granted our awareness of the agent's rationalising. That which 
distinguishes 'rationalised' reasons from others would appear to 
be that in the latter case the reasons are postulated after 
the ev4s event, whereas in the former they 'exist' before the 
event. The latter are considered to be legitimate; the former 
not. There is no doubt that there is room for a distinction 
of this kind, but whether the distinction is sufficiently well - 
defined to warrant the use of such labels as 'legitimate' and 
'illegitimate' is not at all clear. I shall argue that in many 
cases the distinction is non -existent, and that the 
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corresponding labels are therefore inappropriate. 
It must not be thought that in having a reason for 
something, an agent has the only possible reason, in the 
sense that all notion of choice in the matter is ruled out. I 
mean that it is not always the case that the agent, in 
explaining his action, is doing something which had, in a 
sense, been pre- determined. It is not that there are any 
other reasons now that he has given us this one, but that had 
he not mentioned this reason he might have mentioned another, 
equally acceptable. In other words, in giving us a reason for 
doing what he did, or what he is going to do, the agent is 
expressing his decision to render the action explicable in a 
particular way: he is deciding that the action is to be 
explained in this way rather than that. We are not, explicitly, 
given George's reason for shooting his friend Lennie in John 
Steinbecl4's short story 'Of Mice and Men', but we have a 
general idea of the range of reasons which would be relevant, 
and we know that, by virtue of the circumstances, these 
reasons are closely inter -related. If he had said 'I had to 
shoot Lennie because not to do so would be to permit the 
possibility of his suffering greatly', then, in the context of 
the story, we could have inferred immediately the existence of 
other, related, reasons. It might, for example, equally have 
been said: 'Since Lennie is destined to die in any case, I 
will kill him because then his death will be less painful', or 
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'I have always been responsible for Lennie and I must 
therefore be responsible for his death now'. In view of the 
relationship which existed between the two men, it is 
inconceivable that George should not have had all these 
things 'in mind'. Given the story, and this relationship, 
there is no way of deciding which reason George would choose 
in order to explain his action, if he were called upon to do so. 
To this extent, there is a limited choice involved; but once 
he has chosen, we may regard his choice as an expression of 
the way in which he wants his action to be explained. On a 
different level, and in a different world, Charles March, in 
C.P.Snow's novel 'The Conscience of the Rich', can be seen to 
be in a similar position. His decision to leave the practice 
of law for the practice of medOcine may be explained by 
referring to one reason in particular, but in the context of 
the story one can think of a number of reasons, each of which 
would have been equally satisfactory. 
Now, if we look upon 'having a reason' in this way, it may 
be possible to see cases of rationalisation in the same light. 
That is to say, the agent must be regarded not as 'inventing', 
'invoking', or 'introspecting' reasons, but rather as 
choosing them. He is confronted with a n .mber of inter -related 
+eaeeas means of explaining the action he has already 
performed, just as the person who intends to perform a 
certain action is similarly confronted with various means. 
Reasons, after all, are not entities which we carry around in 
our heads. To say that a person has a reason for what he is 
going to do is in fact to say that he is able to explain 
the proposed action and, in a similar way, to say that the 
subject of rationalisation has a reason is to say that he is 
able to explain what he did. The'rationaliser' is doing no more 
than making a choice, except that his is at a later stage. His 
choice is no more arbitrary than that of a person with the 
so- called 'legitimate' reason. He examines the context in 
which the action occurred and chooses the type of reason which 
he could have been expected to have - and in many cohtexts 
there will be a number of these. 
It will be seen, then, that the gulf between having reasons 
beforehand, and rationalising afterwrds, need not be as great 
as some would imagine, So Jong as we are willing to accept 
as his own reason - and his own uncontrovertible reason - that 
which the agent gives us before acting, there is also good 
ground for accepting the rationaliser's reason since, as I 
have tried to show, they are not essentially different. Of 
course it must be added that we are not always in the same 
position as Steinbeck's 'George', or Snow's 'Charles'. This 
does not matter vety much. What does matter is that such 
characters display one 'way' of 'having a reason', and that 
this is a perfectly acceptable way. So long as the process of 
rationalising is held to be analogous to this, labels such as 
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'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' are without content in this 
context. 
(Mr Bedford has pointed out to me that it is not only 
the psychologist who claims to discover a person's real 
motives: we all do so in everyday life. In answer it must be 
said that I have talked primarily about cases of rationalisation 
because I believe that these embody the strongest e.pgtEÌ 
argument against the view that the agent is his own authority 
in the matter of motives. I am not entirely convinced that the 
considerations which have been brought forward are satisfactory 
counters to these cases in particular; but, for all that, it 
may be considered worthwhile to test the theory at its extremities 
if only in order to draw attention to some more general details 
of a truth too often overlooked.) 
The final case which might conceivably be regarded as a 
piece of rationalisation is that of which the drug -addict or 
alcoholic is representative. An addict may give as his reason 
for calling at Y's house the fact that he wished to speak to 
Y about a ceatiin project for which the addict was responsible. 
We may later learn that Y was in possession of certain drugs 
which the addict was known to crave. Now of course he could 
have been deceiving us. That does not matter. Provided that he 
was not trying to deceive us, then there was no sense in which 
he was mistaken about his motive or reason. To say that he was 
really hoping that Y would enable him to purchase some drugs is 
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possibly to say that he was subconsciously moved, and this is, 
as we have suggested, to give a quasi- causal explanation of 
the action. It in no way contradicts what the addict has told 
us. Indeed, the addict himself may well admit that he was 
subconsciously motivated in the above manner while nevertheless 
claiming that he genuinely wanted to see Y about the project, 
that, indeed, he was consciously thinking about it while 
approaching Y's house. 
In short, then, the psychologist's 'really' or 'real' does 
not mean 'principal' or 'primary', without qualification: it 
means 'principal' or 'primary' for the psychologist, in his 
own domain. 
These remarks upon the notion of rationalisation will, I 
hope, tend to preserve as intact the claim that the agent is 
the final authority in matters concerning his own motive. There 
may indeed be other situations (apart from those in which 
rationalisation takes place) in which we should wish to dispute 
the agent's statement. There are clearly some situations - to 
which we have already referred - in which we should want to 
say that the agent is 'fishing around' the circumstances in 
order to find a reasonable explanation for his action. The 
important thing about these cases is, I would argue, that the 
agent is here prepared to have others enlighten him on the 
nature of his motive. These cases are not, initially, proper 
candidates for the claim that the agent is his own authority; for 
indeed, by his own reckoning, he does not know why he did 
what he did. 
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IV. MOTIVES AND 'REASONS' 
We have so far been talking as though the terms 'reason' 
and'motive' are synonymous. I believe that this is justifiable - 
though, if it were not, this would not matter materially, since 
the aim of this thesis is to discuss the concept of 
motivation, where this term covers those things in general 
which we offer as explanations of (reasons for) our actions. 
Nevertheless, there is some prima facie ground for supposing 
that the occasions on which it will be appropriate to use the 
word 'motive' are not necessarily those on which the term 
'reason' is equally appropriate. I shall therefore devote 
some space to a consideration of these grounds. 
It may not be out of place to remind ourselves at the 
outset that the unwritten rules governing the use of certain 
words in language are sometimes fairly well- definable and 
sometimes almost indefinable. Those governing the use of 'red' 
fall into the former class and those governing the use of 
'good' into the latter. It is of no particular consequence if 
the rules are more or less indefinable. Absence of definition 
does not entail incorrect usage. But it is always very tempting 
to suppose that those areas of language which are distinguished 
by their paucity of rule -governance are easy prey for the 
tidy- minded philosopher; and those who succumb to this 
temptation often succeed in misrepresenting or distorting an 
otherwise uninhibited usage. I shall argue that this is very 
largely what has happened in the various attempts to 
distinguish sharply between motives and reasons. R.S.Peters' 
1. 
account is a case in point. It seems to me that no consistent 
distinction of the type which Peters' envisages exists, and 
that the concept of motivation is by no means as distinct and 
as clear -cut as he represents it as being. The arguments of 
the preceding chapters have, I hope, gone some way towards 
demonstrating this general point. 
Peters is prepared to assign to motive- explanations three 
characteristics. In the first place, he says, "we only ask 
about a man's motive when we wish, in some way, to hold his 
conduct up for assessment ", where "there is an issue of 
P. 
justification as well as of explanation ". Secondly, motives 
3. 
are reasons of the "directed sort ". And thirdly, motives must 
4. 
be reasons why a person acts. It will be obvious from these 
quotations that Peters is not denying that motives are reasons. 
These three characteristics are meant to indicate the way in 
which motives differ from other reasons. But, as I shall try 
to show, this is precisely what they do not indicate; and I 
am not altogether clear that Peters himself was convinced of 
the consistency of these characteristics. Perhaps this would 
explain what seems like an attempt to support their existence 
by referring to the subtleties of ordinary as opposed to 
scientific language.5. It is true that ordinary language does 
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l'In his book 'The Concept of Motivation'. 
2 Loc.Cit.,p.29 3.Loc.Cit.,p.31 Loc.Cit.,p.34 
5 Loc.Cit.,p.29 
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observe a number of fire distinctions which scientific 
language dies not, but this fact is not in itself important 
for the present case. In order to demonstrate that the above 
characteristics really do attach to motive explanations, it 
would require a further step on Peters' part to show that the 
relevant ordinary language distinctions are consistently 
observed. 
There is no doubt of the truth of his first statement 
that the word 'motive' is used in contexts where conduct is 
being assessed and not simply explained; but we cannot 
satisfactorily use this as a means of distinguishing between 
reasons and motives because it is obvious that we would also 
use the word 'reason' in the same sort of context. There need 
be no difference at all between the two statements 'He must 
have a motive for entering his neighbour's house' and 'There 
must have been a reason why he entered his neighbour's house:, 
where it is known that the entry was affected without permission. 
It is compatible with either statement that the person stating 
it should be aware that the agent is deviating from accepted 
social patterns. The suggestion that the reason or motive might 
be discreditable is also compatible with both. We could indeed 
go on to discuss further cases where Peters' distinction is so 
reversed that 'reason' is used in contexts of suspicion and 
'motive' in contexts of innocent curiosity. But this particular 
kind of investigation into the uses of language can serve no 
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useful purpose. It could be rendered conclusive by 
converting it into a strict scientific enquiry; but a 
philosopher could conduct such an enquiry only at the risk of 
belying his vocation. As things stand, he has the right to 
Appeal to language only in so far as he is a user of that 
language. As such, it will be possible that he will be 
contradicted by some other person, especially when the point 
which the appeal is intended to support is of the present 
kind, that is, the discussion of a word which has come to be 
linked closely with some other word, the uses of both of which 
are fairly interchangeable. We are able to say, in connection 
with Mill's attempt, in the Essay on Utilitarianism, to' show 
that pleasure is desirable, that where he uses the word 
'desirable' he ought, perhaps, to be using the word 'desired'; 
and we can support our criticism by referring to the way in 
which 'desirable' is normally used. It is possible to do this 
because there is no ambiguity: the rules governing the use of 
this word are clear -cut. Many appeals to language fall into 
this category. But the motive -reason distinction does not, 
and, consequently, it takes only another moderately proficient 
user of the same language to rebut the suggestion that 
certain characteristics attach to the word 'motive' and not to 
the word 'reason'. 
I.f we ask a man's motive for getting married, says Peters, 
we imply that this is, for him, an efficient way of getting 
to some other end. "The implication is that he is not sticking 
to standard moves." This may be so, but it is not the use of 
the word 'motive' in particular which suggests this. The 
implication would have been the same had we used the word 
'reason'. It is the fact of our asking the question at all in 
a context where explanations are not generally demanded that 
gives rise to this implication. The word we use is neither 
here nor there. It is the contextual inappropriateness of any 
question at all which Peters seems to have overlooked. 
With regard to his second characteristic - the 
directedness of motive explanations - the point remains the 
same, that this is no criterion for distinguishing them from 
other reasons. But one thing must be noted about Peters' 
elaboration upon this point. He says: "Now, as I have shown, 
not all reasons for action are of the directed sort." This 
statement, taken in isolation, is acceptable. But he continues: 
"We can explain a man's action in terms of traits of 
character, like considerateness, and punctuality. These may be 
reasons why people act; but they are not motives." What he may 
be suggesting, if we take his illustrations as representative, 
is that reasons which are not motives fall into the class of 
quasi -causal explanations - those explanations which an external 
observer, rather than the agent, might be expected to give. But 





misrepresentation of what we mean by reasons in the field of 
human conduct. When we make surmisals about a person's 
reasons, we are speaking about the explanations which he 
would, or might, give, in the relevant situation; and it is 
certain that he would not give an explanation in terms of his 
considerateness or punctuality. It may indeed be the case 
that X's turning up on time is due to what we call his 
punctuality, and there will be times when this is precisely the 
type of explanation we seek; but X himself is not likely to 
quinte his punctuality in an attempt to explain or justify his 
own action. He is more likely to say 'This was the time 
appointed for my arrival', or 'Mr Y expected me to be here at 
this time'. The nearest he may approach to a reference to 
punctuality will be in some such statement as 'I like to be 
punctual on such occasions', but even this is not, strictly 
speaking, a reference to punctuality, as such. He did not act 
'from' punctuality in the way in which a person may act from 
jealousy. Perhaps the point now borders upon triviality, but 
this much must at least be said: that if it is inappropriate 
to speak of considerateness or punctuality as motives, it is 
equally inappropriate to speak of them as reasons. 
Whichever way we interpret the above quotation, Peters 
appears to be in difficulty. If we summarise the first 
statement as 'Not all Xs are Y', then the second statement 
could be rendered either as (a) 'Some Xs are Z' or (b) 'The 
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remaining Xs are Z'. If we adopt the interpretation 
represented by'(b)', we shall have to draw the conclusion 
just mentioned. But this would be preposterous on the ground 
that reasons for action are simply not exhausted by the class 
of which considerateness and punctuality are illustrative. In 
addition, it is obvious that we do, in practice, use the word 
'reason' of explanations which Peters is proposing to call 
'motives'. 
On the other hand, if we adopt that represented by '(a)', 
this would seem to leave open the possibility of there being 
reasons for conduct which are like motives in being of the 
directed sort. Yet if Peters wishes to use the directedness of 
motive explanations as their distinguishing characteristic, 
then to admit that other reasons may share this feature would 
be evidently sel¢ defeating. Clearly, there is no way out of 
this impasse. 
As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to establish, by 
way of the same kind of appeal to the use of language, that 
reasons as well as motives have this quality of directedness 
in common with the latter. If we penetrate the terminology of 
' directedness' and 'directive dispositions' we shall find that 
Peters means simply that all motives name or imply a goal. 
After citing 'He married her for the sake of her money' and 
I370 
'He went 1,1;434 politics in order to advance himself' as 
exercises of directive dispositions, he says, "All such 
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explanations assign a goal to the individual whose motives 
are in question." But not only is this not startljing: it is a 
statement which would have made as much sense had we 
substituted 'reason' for 'motive'. We certainly say, for 
instance, 'His reason for getting married was his desire to 
share his wife's fortuhe', or 'That politician's reason for 
entering politics was his desire to advance himself'. It is 
true, of course, as Peters implicitly acknowledges, that reasons 
of this sort can generally be incapsulated in single -word 
labels such as 'greed' or 'ambition', and that these labels 
frequently - though not always - carry with them the descriptive 
term 'motive' rather than 'reason'. The association of the 
word with these labels can, perhaps, be traced to its use with 
8, 
the older philospphers such as Hume, and present -day 
psychologists, for whom the word denotes a mental impetus to 
action, a 'drive', a moving force. But it is important to 
stress that these labels are not in lieu of, but the 
incapsulation of, reasons. When we speak of greed or ambition 
as motives, we do not regard them as long- standing characteristics 
bereft of cahh- value. Their being motives is in itself 
dependent upon their being responsible for certain actions - in 
this case, marrying for money and entering politics. Yet once 
this is realised, one can no longer suppose that the labels in 
themselves constitute a complete explanation. They are in fact 
7, 
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incomplete summaries. Completing them, or filling them out, 
entails a statement such as 'He married her for the sake of her 
money', etc. But the fully blown -out statement is nothing more 
nor less than a reason. Cne -word labels, then, might be 
associated only with the term 'motive' and not with the term 
'reason'; but this is insignificant when one realises that they 
are simply incomplete descriptions of what is ultimately as 
much a reason as a motive. 
But regardless of - what I hope I have shown to be - the 
insignificance of the association of the term 'motive' with 
single -word labels, it is abundantly clear that we think of a 
man's reasons for action as being of the directed sort. To say 
that an action had a goal is to say that the agent had a reason 
or motive for what he did: it does not reserve a linguistic 
priority for the latter. 
It is strange, incidentally, that Peters should quote 
'considerateness' and 'punctuality' - which I take to be third - 
person descriptions - as examples of reasons for action in a 
context of what could be called first -person explanations. It is 
true, as he states, that these could not count as motives, but 
then, so long as we regard them as third- person explanations, 
they cannot count as reasons either. The argument is again 
self- defeating. Considerateness is not a motive because it is 
not of a directive nature: it does not state or imply a goal. 
But by the same token it is not a reason. To quote 
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considerateness as an explanation of Jones' helping the blind 
man across the road is one thing: it is quite another, as we 
have seen, to state Jones' reason or motive for doing so - 
where this is taken to be the naming of a goal. The assertion , 
no more precludes the possibility of a reason which is 
entirely inconsistent with the description contained therein 
than it does a motive. 
It must be noted that a distinction between first- and 
third- person explanations is something which reasons and 
motives have in common. It might be put as the distinction 
between what the agent says in order to explain his own action, 
and what an observer may say about the same action. The 
latter's account will be based upon one or both of two sources. 
Firstly, there may be knowledge og the agent as a person, the 
product of which would be the mention of a character- trait.69' 
Secondly, there may be knowledge of the context in which the 
ro- 
action took places here, we assign motives or reasons to a 
person on the basis of established norms or patterns. Thus a 
man may have killed his wife's lover because he was jealous; or 
he may have done so to obtain the money which his victim was 
known to possess. The first- person explanation - what the agent 
himself says - may or may not be consistent with these. Now, 
In this connection, see Chapter II. 
In this connection, see Ch.III, pp.0-11off., and 
an indirect approach to the same issue in Chapter VII 
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provided it is agreed that the above distinction is one which 
reasons and motives share, then in discounting considerateness 
and punctuality as motives, it is as though Peters is 
proposing to ignore third- person explanations of conduct. There 
would be no partcular objection to this - indeed, there is 
some justification for it - if he had applied ,ß.`15 it to both 
reasons and motives; but in fact he accepts 'reason' and 
rejects 'motive' as descriptions of these two words. 
Perhaps the present objection to Peters can be brought 
out more clearly in the following way. He is able to achieve 
a distinguishing characteristic at the expense of confusing 
first- and third- person explanations of conduct. Thus if we 
allow that these two kinds of explanations exist for both reasons 
and motives, what Peters has done is to make a comparison 
between first -person motive statements and third -person reason 
statements. In the light of this confusion, it is easy to see 
how directedness appears to be peculiar to motives. Third - 
person statements of considerateness or punctuality are not 
indicative of goals or ends. To endow a motive with this 
curious quality of directedness is in effect to demand that it 
be the agent's own explanation, for only he can have the goal. 
Thus the third -person statements of jealousy, indignation, 
greed, etc. - all of which may be described as being motives, 
especially in a law -court - will, if it turn out that the 
motive was in fact something else, constitute a 'loose' use of 
the word. But 'reason' has a similar use, as I have tried to 
show. This is why it is possible to put forward 
considerateness and punctuality as reasons before we know - 
and even despite the fact that - the agent later confesses 
some other reason. Just as it would be silly to take the loose 
or third -person use of motive as being representative when 
considering motives as opposed to reasons, so it is equally 
silly to take the corresponding use of 'reason' for the same 
purpose, as Peters has done. 
The third characteristic of motives as a class of reasons 
for action is, as we have noted, that they must be reasons why 
a person acts. "By this is meant that the goal which is quoted 
to justify a man's action must also be such that reference to 
it actually explains what a man has done.... The motive must 
be the reason why he did whatever he did." the face of it, 
this is a peculiar thing to say for, without some qualification, 
it appears to be false. We are familiar with the concept of 
non -operative motives. We know what it is, under this 
description, to 'have' a motive in both its present and its 
past tenses; and we know that having a motive in this sense 
is quite compatible with either a confession or a denial on 
the part of the agent. When we discover that Jones did not 
after all commit the murder we do not therefore withdraw our 





way to stress that, anyway ("even if I was mistaken "), he did 
have a motive. 
It is difficult to know what force the 'must' - used 
twice in the above quotation - has. If we look at the 
statement naively for a moment and assume that motives fall 
primarily into two kinds, operative and non -operative, then we 
could suppose Peters to be ignoring the second type in the 
present statement. But if so, what he says is uninformative: 
naturally, all operative motives are the reasons for action. On 
the other hand, if we suppose him to mean that of all the 
things which may be regarded as candidates for the term 'motive' 
the only one which really counts as such, from a purely 
linguistic point of view, is that which is operative, that 
which was actively responsible for the action, then, as we have 
had cause to observe, this is plainly false. It hardly needs 
saying that the concept of non -operative mo Cives is a familiar 
one. 
The first interpretation is possible but unlikely. We 
must therefore concentrate more closely upon the second. There 
is certainly a sense in which the motive which was actually 
responsible for the action takes priority over all other 
candidates. This is the straightforward sense in which it, and 
not any other motive, 'moved' the person to action. It was the 
motive or the reason and not just a motive or a reason. But the 
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priority involved is one of'activating Ispewee , whether this be 
a matter of degree or an absence -presence disjunction. It is 
not a linguistic priority. It does not, in other words, 
constitute one of the rules governing the use of the term 
'motive', and it would seem as though the problem of 
formulating some of these rules wasAPeters originally set 
himself to surmount. Thus he says: "Our preliminary problem 
about the concept of 'motive' is to specify its delimiting 
criteria within the general class of 'reasons for action'." He 
goes on to say: "There are, I would suggest, three 
characteristics shared by explanations in terms of motives 
which account for the difficulty of fitting them neatly into 
the framework of types of explanatim4 which has been 
2 
outlined." These characteristics are justified by frequent 
overt appeals to the way in which the word is used. The 
delimiting criteria, then, were not originally intended to be 
arbitrary but representative. It can therefore only be 
assumed that in the present context Peters has confused what 
constitutes an operative motive with what constitutes a 
legitimate use of the word at all. 
In this connection it is significant that in the ensuing 
section on 'The Psychologist's Concept of Motivation' Peters 
repeats the statement of his third characteristic and adds: 
"This is a logical point - part of the analysis of what is 
¡3. 
meant by 'motive'." Perhaps this tends to support the 
j2 Op.cit.,p.38 Op.cit.,p.38 
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contention that he has confused two distinct issues here. It 
is trivially true that 'operative motive' is the reason that 
actually moves the agent to action; it is false that 'motive' 
is the reason that is actually operative. Admittedly, as 
Peters points out, the O.E.D. defines 'motive' as "that which 
moves or induces a person to act in a certain way.... ", but 
this in itself does not explicitly lay down the condition that 
in order to be a motive a reason must be an operative one. It 
is important to observe the difference between the statement 
of the function a motive can perform, and the statement of the 
function it is performing or has performed. A motive does not 
surrender its designation simply because it is not operative 
on any particular occasion, any more than a paper -weight does 
when it is not being used. 
In general, it must be said that we no more demand that 
a motive, in order to he a motive, must be the one upon which 
the agent in fact acted than we demand that a reason, in order 
to be a reason, must be the one which in fact influenced the 
agent. If we did demand this, then the probability is that we 
would demand it of reasons also. And the tautology that an 
operative motive is that which is responsible for the agent's 
action could certainly be stated of reasons as well. 
V. MOTIVE AND INTENTION 
While it may not be possible to draw a legitimate 
distinction between motives and reasons, it is certainly not 
only possible but also, as I shall try to show, necessary to 
draw a distinction between motives and intentions; for I do 
not believe that it is possible-4e plausible to regard 
intentions as a sub -class of reasons for action in the way in 
which it is prima facie - though only prima facie - plausible 
to regard motives as such a sub -class. In fact, as we have seen 
in the preceding chapter, there appears to be no underlying or 
consistent distinction in usage between'motive' and 'reason'; 
but at least if there were such a distinction such that we 
regarded a motive as a special sort of reason, then, it is 
being suggested, intentions do not form a comparable sub -class - 
and this because I do not believe intentions are properly 
called reasons at all 
Again, I shall consider these two concepts in relation to 
particular accounts of a fairly representative nature; and the 
latter part of the chapter will be more specifically centred 
upon 'intention'. 
Anthony Kenny, in his recent book 'Action, Emotion, and 
Will' describes motives as backward- looking, and intentions as 
forward -looking, reasons for action. It has to be said first 
of all that it is perhaps misleading to speak of intentions as 




my reason for doing it. It is true that to state a person's 
intention is frequently to explain his action: X's journey to 
London may be partly or wholly explained by the disclosure of 
his intention to see a show there. And it is precisely because 
what a person intends to do is usually what he wants(in a 
positive sense) to do that the statement of intention often 
constitutes a sufficient explanation of the action. If X just 
wants to see the show, then it is pointless to seek some 
2 
further explanation of his going to see it. But what I intend 
doing is not always what I want to do. Most of us, at some 
time or other, intend to do things which we know to be 
extremely distasteful. In these cases, an intention -statement 
does not provide an adequate explanation of the action. 
But not only are motives and intentions logically 
distinct in this way: there is a further difference which, 
though trivial, must be emphasised. The concept of motive is 
primarily an explanatory one; the concept of intention is, for 
want of a better word, primarily informative though 
contingently explanatory. That is to say, the statement of 
intention is meant to inform zit us of the goal at which an 
action is aimed. Since, as we have seen, the statement of the 
goal does not always explain why the action was performed at 
all, we cannot regard an intention -statement as primarily 
explanatory; and when it is explanatory it is not directly 
but indirectly so. Its being explanatory is dependent upon the 
See Chapter I, p.9. 
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assumption that what the agent intends to do is what he wants 
to do and nothing else. Intention is, as it were, the thread 
underlying all purposeful action: it connects, but it does not 
explain. If this analysis is correct, then it is misleading 
to regard intentions as reasons for action, as Kenny has done. 
However, Kenny's major thesis is that intentions are 
forward- looking. It is, I think, possible to agree with this 
statement in so far as it concerns intentions, but at the 
expense of demanding that motives be regarded as forward - 
looking in the same way. Kenny says that "the man who goes to 
the fire to get warm, if asked why he went to the fire, may say 
that he did so because he was cold, or that he did so in order 
to get warm. In the first case, the reason given is backward - 
looking; in the second case it has the form of the repatt of an 
3, 
intention." It is in the light of this par digm that he goes 
on to assert: "We can see why 'out of a desire to... ' does 
not assign a motive in the same way as 'out of ambition', and 
why 'because I wanted to... ' is not a backward -looking 
4-- 
reason as 'because he killed my father' is." Certainly it is 
possible to see Kenny's point in this latter case. It is, as 
it were, the contemplation of a past event (the killing of my 
father) which causes me to act, and there is evidently a 
difference between this and merely wanting something for no 
reason at all. But though the difference undoubtedly exists, it 
4. a 
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is far from being sufficient to show that all motives are 
backward -looking, and this would appear to be Kenny's purpose. 
His original paradigm, together with the first of the two 
comparisons quoted above, point only too clearly to a game of 
linguistic juggling. 'Out of a desire to... ' is surely as good 
and as genuine a way of stating a motive as 'out of ambition' is. 
One could almost always substitute for the latter phrase others 
such as 'out of a desire to better himself', '....to get on in 
the world', '....to advance himself', etc. But quite apart from 
whether motive -words like'ambition' are readily substitutable 
in terms of such phrases, it is a matter of small importance so 
far as the question of motives is concerned. There are innumerable 
ways of filling in the details of 'out of a desire to... ', each 
one of which would be regarded by common usage as a perfectly 
proper statement of a motive. Kenny himself admits that there 
are several different ways of stating a motive. 5 It is strange, 
therefore, that he should, at the same time, wish to regiment 
all motive -statements into a single sentence -frame, namely, 
backward- looking reasons. 
Again, speaking of the relation between motives and ; C 
intentions, Kenny says: "One cannot have an intention for a 
motive, but one may have a motive for an intention This is 
because motives and intentions admit of ascription only to 
voluntary actions: and intending to do something is itself a 





But it is relevant to point out here what Kenny appears to 
have overlooked: while we often ask what made, or what caused, 
a man to want to do that, we never ask what made him intend to 
do it, or what caused him to form that intention. Yet if Kenny 
were right in saying that we can have motives for intentions, 
one might expect to find support for this in ordinary usage. 
The obvious way to overcome this objection would be to assert 
the synonymity of intending with wanting; but kenny, far from 
wishing to assimilate these concepts, quite rightly distinguishes 
between them. The difficulty arises, I believe, because he is 
treating of both motives and intentions in a pre- action state, 
and as such it is difficult to give any content to the intention 
without in some way specifying that in which the intended 
action consists. For this reason, it makes little sense to 
speak of having a motive for an intention as though this were 
some kind of anterior happening a step removed from action, At 
this atage, to have a motive for an intention is the same as to 
have a motive for doing or being something in particular - 
for an intention is always to do or to be something. But if 
intentions must always be formulated in this way, it is 
pointless to speak of having motives for them: the latter are 
meant to explain the actions which the formulation of the 
intention expresses. Thus, to ask a man why he performed a 




it, provided that the action is one which is correctly 
described as intentional. 
But though this is the type of consideration which 
indicates the transparency of the concept of intention, one 
must not make the mistake of concluding that the concept is 
also superfluous. If it were always possible to infer from 
actions themselves what the intention of the agent was, the 
concept of intention might not loom as large as it now does in 
the study of human behaviour; but this would still leave 
unaccounted for the many cases where we are concerned not with 
post -action explanation but with pre- action prediction. 
Moreover, it is only in cases of what we may call schematic 
action that one can infer - and here again not with absolute 
certainty - what the agent intended. Putting one's pyjamas on 
would be a case in point, for here it would always be reasonable 
to infer that the agent is going to bed even though the 
inference might not in fact be borne out. An intention is not 
transparent in the same way when it is serving an explanatory 
purpose after the action. Actions frequently seem pointless 
until the intention is stated. In such cases, the full action, 
so far as its physical aspects are concerned, is in view, but 
it is not self -explanatory. The statement of what was intended 
does not me mirror the action as it would do had the action 
not yet occurred: rather, it provides the underlying thread 
without which the action would have no meaning. It is the 
function of the statement of intention which has changed, and 
not its nature; indeed, the statement itself, except in so far 
as its tenses are concerned, does not vary. 
It is, then, as I have tried to show, the transparency 
of the concept of intention in its pre- action state which 
accounts for the impossibility of motive- ascription. 
Discovering why a person performed a certain action normally 
precludes a further enquiry into why he intended to perform it. 
It is interesting to note that Kenny regards 'intending 
8, 
to do something' as an action. I am not convinced that this 
standpoint can be justified. One of the fundamental 
characteristics of action is that it should bring about some 
change in its object. This condition allows us to account for 
such borderline cases as 'thinking', 'listening', and 
'learning French', even though we may be inclined to use the 
word 'activity' of them rather than 'action'. In all cases of 
action or activity one may say that something is 'being done' 
to something else. If someone is thinking, it will be true to 
say that the object of his thought is being thought about; and 
if someone is learning French, it can be said that French is 
being learned. Admittedly, if someone is intending, it can 
reasonably be said that something is being intended; but 
through the ew wording suggests a similar model, the difference 
may be brought out by considering certain questions and the 




sense to answer the question 'What are (or 'were') you doing ?' 
with 'I was thinking'; and one may ask 'How long were you 
thinking ?', 'When did you first start thinking that ?', etc. 
These questions are not applicable tm intentions. Intending is 
not an activity. One does not spend one's time intending - 
except, appropriately enough, when this is contrasted with 
doing. And there was never a time when X started intending nor 
a time when he finished, though there was, of course, a time 
before which and a time after which he was not intending. 
Intending does not and cannot encroach upon or interfere with 
other activities. It would make nonsense to speak of X's being 
distracted from his studies because he was intending, or intended, 
to visit the art gallery. In so far as we might say such a 
thing, we would mean that it was his thinking about the art 
gallery, and not his intending, which distracted him. Intending 
is a state, not an activity, such that when X is said to be 
intending something, this means no more than that he is in a 
position to state that, all other conditions being equal, a 
certain event, or series of events, will come about. (Considered 
from this point of view, there is indeed little to distinguish 
between intentions and motives. I have already made a 
parallel point in connection with motives in Chapter III, and 
a similar line will be taken in Ch #pier VII). To say that a 
person was thinking about something, however, is above all to 
say that he is doing something which may well interfere with 
other actions or activities. Of course, a person may have been 
thinking about something for months, and we do not mean when 
we say this that he has been constantly occupied; but we do at 
least mean that there have been periods of thought during 
which time certain other activities may have been neglected; 
and we also mean that his thihking took time. But we cannot 
have periods of intending in quite this way. There may have 
been periods at any moment during which, had I been asked, I 
would have been able to make a statement concerning my future 
behaviour, and the periods during which I was able to do this 
may have terminated every so often; but again my intending did 
not take time, nor did it or could it interfere with any other 
activities. 
These considerations should, I think, be sufficient to 
show that intending is neither an action nor an activity. 
What is perhaps strange is that Kenny himself, in a later 
chapter, produces similar considerations to indicate the 
same conclusion. This would appear to contradict the 
statement presently being discussed, that 'intending to do 
something' is itself a voluntary action. 
It must further be noted that if one questions the term 
'action' or 'activity' as applied to intending, one may also, 
by implication, be questioning the applicability of the 




or attitudes may in special circumstances be described as 
voluntary, it by no means follows that intentions, in so far 
as they may be regarded as states, fall into this class; nor 
is it easy to imagine any special circumstances under which 
one might be inclined to say that X was or is voluntarily 
intending to do so- and -so. It is true that X is responsible 
for the action he has perfromed or is going to perform, and in 
another sense of 'responsible' it is true that he is 
responsible for intending to do that action: nobody else 
intended it for him. But it is not true that X chose to intend 
in the way that he chose to act, nor that he decided to intend 
in the way in which he decided to act. Certainly X's intending 
did not come about by accident, but it is notorious that one 
cannot legitimately infer from the fact that a person acted not 
accidentally that he was therefore responsible for what he did 
in the sense that he did it voluntarily. In particular, if 
there is a sense in which X is not responsible for intending 
Y - and we have seen that there is such a sense - it does not 
follow that his intending Y came about accidentally. Indeed, 
the very idea of intending accidentally is itself contradictory, 
and it would evidently be unjust to suppose that Kenny had not 
realised this. No doubt, he takes 'voluntary' to be opposed to 
'involuntary' such that when intending is described by the 
former it is meant to imply that I can help my intending in a 
way in which I cannot help my motives. Yet the confusion arises 
not so much from the mere use of the word 'voluntary', but 
more importantly from its use in conjunction with the word 
'action'. Kenny is saying X not that intending is voluntary - 
a statement which in itself and in one sense of the adjective, 
one would hardly dispute - but that it is a voluntary action; 
and this raises, as we have seen, awkward questions about 
deciding and choosing, concepts which are not properly 
associated with intending, as such. Such an association could 
doubtless be established if it were possible to regard 
intending as an action; but this in its turn might well depend 
upon being able to regard deciding or choosing as a possible 
if not necessary prior activity, the attempt to do which would 
be not only arbitrary but also, it would seem, inconceivable. 
In connection with this latter point, it is significant 
that Kenny attaches a footnote to the assertion that having a 
io. 
particular motive is an involuntary affair. In this he refers 
to Miss Anscombe's statement that "it is a mistake to think one 
cannot choose to act from a motive. Plato saying to a slave 'I 
should beat you if I were not angry' would be a case." Kenny 
objects that while one may be motivated to an action, and, 
knowing this, choose not to act, one cannot, having chosen to 
do a certain action, settle what motive one will act from, 
"except by choosing to perform a second action which may set 
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that Kenny is now talking in terms of 'choosing' to do actions, 
and his language in this footnote certainly suggests the 
underlying assumption that all voluntary actions are chosen 
or decided upon. This may in itself be a perfectly proper 
assumption, but it does entail his commitment to the view that 
intentions, since he describes these too as voluntary actions, 
must be chosen or decided upon. It has already been shown that 
we do not speak of choosing or deciding to intend. 
Despite the fact that Miss Anscombe's remark is a little 
misleading, there are certain other borderline cases which, 
though they cannot be said to refute Kenny's thesis, do at 
least indicate the kind of thing it ignores. A person who decides 
to postpone the giving of financial help to one who claims to 
deserve it may do so on the ground that he must first feel a 
genuine sympathy for the claimant; and there are circumstances 
under which mne may wish to regard this as an acceptable way 
of 'choosing one's motive'. It is not that he is merely hoping 
that the relevant feelings will suddenly occur: rather, he is 
setting himself to understand the other man's predicament, and 
there are definite steps which he can take to achieve this. He 
can, for example, make certain enquiries about the ag nsét's 
address, his general activities, his own ability to extricate 
himself from the financial straits into which he has fallen, 
the extent to ehich he is to blame for his present position, 
142. 
and so on. It is during the course of this investigation that 
he may come to feel sympathetic towards the man, and it is out 
of this 'genuine' sympathy that he may now act. It is true 
that the underlying motive for this investigation itself was 
the desire to understand, or even a desire (perhaps not 
explicitly acknowledged) to be sympathetic; but the action he 
finally performs for the ages.* claimant is now motivated not 
by a- desire- to -be- sympathetic but by his sympathy. No doubt, 
there will be times when it will be correct to state that the 
very decision to investigate presupposes an initial desire to 
help the man; but I have been concerned to isolate an acceptable 
situation in which one does not have to make this 
presupposition in order to interpret it. It is certainly 
conceivable that there are men of strict principles who feel, 
quite impartially, that in a case of this nature, in order to 
help a person, they must do so from a socially acceptable 
motive. Complete impartiality would ensure that if the results 
of the enquiry demonstrate a straightforward indolence, the 
potential benefactor would be not only unsympathetic but 
possibly actively antagonistic. 
I am not wanting to argue that this example indicates a 
straightforward choosing of, or deciding upon, one's motive, 
but I do wish it to be seen as a case in which the motive is 
not involuntary. It did not just happen that X became 
sympathetic: he took active steps to be so. He made an effort to 
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feel sympathetic provided the situation warranted it. Of course 
he could not have 'turned on' a feeling of sympathy at will; it 
is in this sense that one can never choose one's motive. But 
one can choose to t to act from a particular motive, and 
this is different from a case in which one's motives are involuntary. 
It is this very diversity of the concept of motivation and 
related concepts which it is the primary purpose of this thesis 
to stress:the impossibility of fitting motives into a single, 
simple, model; the danger of defining them in terms of 
involuntary halalienings, or of dispositions, or of backward - 
looking reasons. (It is worthwhile noting, for example, that 
the distinction between backward -looking and forward -looking 
reasons, which is for Kenny the difference between motives and 
intentions, is for Miss Anscombe simply the difference 
between two kinds of motives). It is, I believe - and one must 
liken him here to Ryle, Nowell- Smith, Peters, and, as we shall 
see, Hume - Kenny's eagerness to restrict and thus define 
the concept of motivation for the sake of a piece of 
philosophical tidying -up which has resulted in his ignoring 
at least one of the very many ways in which a man may be 
motivated. 
However, if Kenny imposes restrictions upon our use of the 
12.m. 
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though he is concerned only with intentions, is also 
restrictive. He is preoccupied with what he terms two 
"different models of an intention ". One of these models is 
demonstrated by Henry Pulham, the man who takes his bowler hat 
from its peg every morning, is handed his umbrella and his 
attache case, opens the front door, closes it carefully behind 
him, and so on. These actions are semi -mechanical in nature; 
they are performed as regularly as clockwork every morning; but 
we would not say of them that they happened by accident. Indeed, 
we would, quite legitimately, describe them as intentional. The 
other is what Passmore calls the 'planning models. This 
"assimilates intending to deliberately planning a course of 
O. 
action." He quotes from Sir John Salmond a definition which 
is presumably paradigmatic of this view: "Intention is the 
purpose or design with which an act is done. It is the 
foreknowledge of the act coupled with the desire of it... An 
act is intentional if, and in so far as, it exists in idea 
before it exists in fact." 
q. 
It is probably undeniable that there are these two models, 
as the other symposiast, P.L.Heath, is only too eager to point 
out. What is not clear is whether it is correct to regard this 
as a disjunction of intentiond, that is, as two ways in which a 
person may intend or be intending. There is nothing which can 
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case. In both cases, it is true to say that X intends or 
intended to perform an action if he is or was able, in a 
dispositional sense, to say what he is or was going to do next, 
or at some future date. (An essentially parallel point was 
made in connection with motives proper in Chapter III). Now if 
this is the case, Passmore's planning example must be seen not 
as the model of an intention but as the model of a certain 
kind of action, namely, that kind of action the means to and 
the results of which have been calculated beforehand. But it 
cannot be said that one is more genuinely intending here than 
in the more mechanical cases. It is not as though the mental 
activity involved in the former somehow enhances or 
intensifies the agent's intending. This activity is itself the 
result of an original intention. Nor indeed is the agent 
doing or being anything different in this case when he is 
intending than he is in the other. It is true that one would 
not normally say (because one would not have cause to say) 
that Henry Pulham intends wearing his bowler hat tomorrow. He 
habitually does this, and so it is, in a sense, uninformative 
to use the expression. If, however, there were some independent 
reason for thinking that tomorrow Henry Pulham will break his 
habit, then, regardless of whether anything has happened to 
alter Pulham's own thinking upon this matter, one might have 
cause to assert 'Yes, he intends wearing his bowler hat 
tomorrow too'. In general, we speak of what a man intends 
doing only when we wish to be informative. It is therefore no 
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accident that the action, information about which we impart 
in stating someone's intention, often is one which is 
described as having mental antecedents: it is a planned action 
simply because the agent does not do it regularly - he has to 
think about its execution. 
It is difficult to see why Passmore (and indeed Heath as 
well in this connection) should be unduly worried about Pulham's 
behaviour. Heath maintains that this case falls somewhere 
between that in which 'intentional' is contrasted with 
'unintentional' (lack of responsibility) and that in which it is 
S- 
contrasted with 'casual', 'habitual', or 'unpremeditated'. Yet 
Pulham's case seems to satisfy most of the conditions necessary 
for the claim that he intended to do these actions in the 
former sense; and further, it is not immediately clear that the 
latter sense is corroborated in ordinary usage at all. 
Certainly it may be the case that actions which are correctly 
described as casual, habitual, or unpremeditated, are also 
unintentional, but there is surely no inference from the 
correct use of the former to that of the latter. In particular, 
if an action is intentional, there is nothing to prevent it 
from being habitual or unpremeditated. This may be said without, 
I believe, assuming or postulating a definition of intention as 




avoid. It is unnecessary, in discussing intentional action, 
to define what one means in the sense of committing oneself 
to one of the two models mentioned above. But it is important 
to discuss the way in which ordinary usage handles this concept, 
especially in relation to words such as 'habitual' and 
'unpremeditated'. 
The distinction between habitual actions and those done 
from force of habit is fairly clear -cut. We have already 
discussed this distinction at some length in Chapter III, and 
we concluded that the use of the word 'habitual' denotes 
regularity only, and never (except in a loose sense) does it 
refer to the unintentional or the unmotivated. But the 
regularity with which an action is performed can hardly be 
construed as a reliable mark of its unintentionality. (The 
man who attends the cinema every Friday night surely 
illustrates this). Even if we consider those actions which are 
done from force of habit as opposed to those which are merely 
habitual, it is important to realise in connection with them 
that we are often responsible for making actions quasi - 
16 
mechanical in nature. We form an intention to do things 
which later we allow ourselves to do from force of habit. 
Ordinary usage will support the statement that such actions 
cannot always be regarded as unintentional. One would have 
grounds for doubting their intentionality only if they no 
1G 
See Chapter III. 
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longer seemed to have point, or if they led to situations of 
which one could not expect the agent to approve.17 If this 
be true, then the contrast which Heath draws between intentional 
action and habitual (force of habit ?) actions is hardly 
plausible. The man who locks his back door every night is 
perhaps a good example of one who may be acting from force of 
habit, but unless one had reason to believe that this action 
was in some way pointless one would ee4 normally assume that 
the action is intended. The fact that an action was habitual 
in this sense is hardly sufficient ground for questioning its 
intentionality. 
Similar reference to a kind of action with which most of 
us are familiar should be sufficient to show that the further 
contrast between intentional and unpremeditated action is not 
easily supported. One must think in particular here of those 
actions or activities which are based upon the agent's 
reaction to objects in his environment. One might suppose, for 
example, that it is the sight of the mosque for Mrs Moore, in 
A Passage to India which causes her to enter and explore the 
building, but we do not have to suppose that she said to 
herself "Ah, a mosque; I haven't seen the interior of one 
before; I will go in and have a look round." She merely went 
in, and of course she intended to do so. This is 
representative of a large number of actions which are far from 
VI.And we saw in Chapter III that even this 
has to be said with reservations. 
being habitual or semi -mechanical. We can take it that Mrs Moore 
was fully aware of what she was doing, perhaps even more aware 
than Henry Pulham was of his actions; but these actions were 
not premeditated, thought -out, or planned - not at least if 
these descriptions carry their usual meaning. 
However, it will be wise not to disregard Heath's 
contrast until we have discussed one further point of 
importance. During the course of an interrogation, one could 
easily imagine Mrs Moore saying, "0f course, I hadn't intended 
to visit the mosque.... ". One has to admit that the word 
'intend' is often used in just this way, and, on the face of 
it, this is an argument in favour of the contrast between 
intentional behaviour and unpremeditated actions. But in cases 
of this sort, it is not enough to examine the way in which the 
offending expression is ordinarily used. It is 414 more to the 
point to examine the revisions which one who uses the 
expression would be prepared to make in the light of certain 
questions. It is clear in this case, I think, that Mrs Moore 
would be speaking of a period of time prior to the actual 
circumstances in which she found herself on the evening of her 
visit to the mosque. She had recently arrived in India and, 
until this time, the idea of sitting in a mosque had not 
'entered her head', as we say. Therefore, we can reasonably take 
her to mean here not that she hadn't intended to visit the 
mosque (despite the fact that this is what she says) but rather 
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that she had not intended until and then we insert a 
reference to the new situation. She means merely that her 
intention was a snap- decision. 
In a similar way, a person may say: "I didn't really 
intend to go to the theatre.... ". I want to suggest that here 
too he is not necessarily expressing an absence of planning 
or calculation beforehand: he may rather be expressing the 
fact that he was either not fully responsible for what he did 
(in the sense in which he was persuaded against his will to 
attend, or in the sense in which circumstances obliged him to) 
or that he was unable to make up his mind about going (and 
was in fact uneasy about it on his way there and perhaps even 
during the performance). If this analysis of these two uses of 
the word id correct, it surely illustrates that there is no 
legitimate contrast between intentional and unpremeditated 
behaviour; and this, taken in conjunction with our denial of 
the supposed contrast between intentional and habitual, should 
lead us to see Henry Pulham's actions as a fairly 
straightforward example of intentional behaviour. 
What is of fundamental importance to the notion of 
intentional action is that a person should know either what he 
is going to do, or what he is presently doing - just as it 
would seem to be a basic requirement of motivated action that 
a person should be able to explain or justify what he did. This 
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awareness in connection with intentional action is more 
immediate in some cases than in others; but in general one may 
asks a person's intentions as well with respect to what he is 
now engaged in doing as with respect to what he will be doing. 
It is only a contingent matter of fact that we can normally 
see for ourselves what a person is presently engaged in doing, 
though it is doubtless this fact which explains why some have 
been induced to draw a sharp distinction between what they 
regard as two ways of intending. Passmore falls into this 
class, while both Kenny and Heath, it would seem, would deny 
that activity which was premeditated was really a case of 
intended activity at all. 
VI. THE PERIPHERY OF MOTIVE AND INTENTION 
For the most part, we have been discussing clearly- formed 
motives and clearly -formed intentions. It must not be inferred 
from this, however, that intending and not- intending, being 
motivated and being unmotivated, are always black -or -white 
distinctions. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the 'positive' state blurs 
into the 'negative' state, and vice versa, is often 
misrepresented by writers on this subject. Thus Professor W.H.F. 
Barnes put forward one prevalent view when he said, in an 
article on 'Action' in Mind, Vol.L, 1941, "We intend many 
things which we never come to the point of choosing to do." And 
one has to say that, on the face of it, this statement has 
some undesirable implications. It may well be that many 
intentions never achieve fruition. That is to say, there are 
many intentions upon which we never act. But surely part of 
what we mean by intending is that we have chosen to do or to be 
something. To intend to do or to be something is in a very 
real sense to choose to do it. Yet it is obvious that Barnes 
takes the distinction between intending and choosing quite 
seriously. "There is something which occurs between intention 
and action ", he says, "namely, what we describe as choosing or 
deciding or resolving or making up one's mind to do such and 
2. 






as succeeding the act of intending, any content. Intending 
itself is avowedly unamenable to analysis, but the difference 
between a pre -intending state and a post -intending state is at 
least clear -cut: at one stage X was not in a position to make 
a statement concerning his future behaviour, whereas at the 
other stage he was. Granted this analysis, what sense can we 
now give to the statement that, in addition to intending, X 
has also chosen,or decided, or made up his mind, to do so- and -so? 
All these terms surely denote the same thing, namely, that, all 
other conditions being equal, X will at a certain time or upon 
some future appropriate occasion perform a certain action; and 
it matters little which of these terms we use to describe the 
ae4len situation. One might indeed argue that if X intends to 
visit a friend, there may come a second stage when he will be 
required to choose when to do so. But his choosing to act at 
a particular time is in no way different from the forming of 
his original intention. It may well be that the act of 
choosing a particular time is in itself a distinguishable 
activity, but it was of the same logical type. The term 'intend' 
would be a thoroughly acceptable substitute to describe what 
X did in the second case. In so far as he chose to meet Y at 
8.pm - and in so far as his choice is admitted to be a 
conscious one - he also intended, decided, made up his mind to 
do so, etc. 
It is noteworthy that on the following page,3.Barnes refers 
3' p.248 
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to Prichard's distinction between deciding to do something 
4- 
on some future date and'setting oneself to do it', and he 
casts doubt upon its validity. But this doubt takes 
precisely the same form as the doubt which I have - and I 
think most people would - cast upon Barnes' own distinction 
just outlined. Barnes says ".... When I decide no* to do 
something at some future date, I am not sure that I need to 
set myself to do it at that future date. The decision in the 
past seems sufficient to bring about the action.... " 
5. 
But, if 
we assume for one moment that there does exist a coherent 
distinction between intending and deciding with respect to 
the present point, one might make an essentially parallèl 
remark in reference to Barnes' point, namely, that it is not 
clear that I have to decide to do a particular action after I 
have already formed an intention to do it. 
Of course, in stressing that intending and deciding are 
one and the same thing in the present context, I do not wish 
to blur what is in other respects a perfectly legitimate 
distinction. I can decide certain things which I cannot 
intend. I can decide - and take time over deciding - that 
a monarchical society is superior to a republican one; I 
cannot intend this, and even if I could, I could not take 
time over doing so. Intending is a substitute for deciding only 
when the latter concept concerns doing or being things. (I can, 
H,A.Prichard: 'Duty and Ignorance of Fact'. (Annual 
Philosophical Lecture to the British Academy, 1932) 
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of course, also intend to have things, but this is parasitic 
upon my intending to do things about getting them). Again, the 
process of deciding cannot be equated with that of intending, 
assuming that we may meaningfully speak of such a process: we 
saw in Chapter I that this was at least debatable. Deciding may 
take time; it may be regarded as an activity which can 
encroach upon and interfere with other activities. Intending, 
on the other hand, is something we must regard as 
instantaneous; it is not an activity, and it does not take time. 
The important thing is, however, that whenever I decide, or 
choose, or resolve to do or be something, I am also intending; 
this is a single step which may be described in different ways. 
It is not difficult to see how Barnes has been led to draw 
6, 
the abmve distinction. In the final paragraph, the case of 
Hamlet is used as a paradigm. "The motive is revenge ", says 
Barnes, "the intention is to kill his uncle." He then goes on 
to point out that the situation is a little more complex than 
this simple statement indicates. There is what he calls the 
"detailed working out of the motive" - the kind of death which 
Hamlet's uncle deserves, the reason why this particular kind 
of death is necessary, and so on. These considerations are 
meant to delineate the intention. The motive "must not only 
develop itself freely into a detailed plan; it must also 
develop in such a way as to accommodate itself to the conditions 
6. 
Paragraph IO, p.256-257 
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prevailing. If, and only if, it develops in this way have we 
a real intention. When the process is as complete as it can 
be before any overt change can be initiated, a primary 
(provisional) choice takes place, which embodies the real 
intention." 
There is little doubt, I think, that this is an elaborate, 
over -complicated analysis of what might be termed a period of 
mental activity prior to action. It is misleading to suppose 
that there exists a gulf between the original (unreal) 
intention and the'final choice' - the gulf which Barnes, in 
this article, consistently tries to perpetuate. It is indeed 
only by emphasising such a gap that he is able to present an 
account of the half- formed, incomplete, or partially 
unacknowledged intention or motive. The mistake in this account 
would seem to stem from the assumption that the whole period 
of time, from the stage at which the original intention to kill 
his uncle was conceived by Hamlet, and continuing through all 
the intermediate steps to the final fruition, is to be 
regarded as a continuous whole, a single if prolonged event in 
the life of Hamlet, something which had a beginning and an end. 
But the light in which Shakespeare saw his drama is not 
necessarily the model for the philosophical analysis of the 
concept of motive and intention. It is the deployment of this 
model which has, I believe, resulted, in this article at least, 
in what is a fundamentally misleading account of motive and 
15 7. 
intention. 
It may be noted that Barnes gives no content to the 
final, 'primary', choice. If we suppose he means Hamlet's 
decision to murder his uncle, then one cannot possibly 
distinguish this from the original intention to do so. (If X 
intends to vote Conservative at the General Election, it would, 
in one important sense, be silly to ask whether he has 
decided or chosen to do this, for his intending implies that 
he decided or that he chose). If, on the other hand, Barnes 
meant by 'choice' the decision to murder his father's brother 
in this way, rather than that; in these circumstances, rather 
than those,then this looks like a mental event of a different 
order from the general intention to murder, merely because 
the content of whatever we define this event as (intention, or 
choice) has altered. The point seems to be that Barnes defines 
the final step as one of choice because he employs the 'drama' 
model, because he does not see the various steps in the 
working out of the motive - or alternatively the forming of the 
real intention - as isolated events, to be treated as such in 
ordinary life. That he is using the drama model in this way 
is indica;ked by his use of the phrase 'real intention' (which, 
incidentally, is italicised, presumably for the sake of 
emphasis, in the article itself). The implication is quite 
clearly that Hamlet's original intention was in some sense 
unreal, in need of modification, or further delineation. Now of 
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course there is a sense in which an intention may be in need 
of modification or further delineation, a sense in which it 
has tobßrought to a state susceptible of formulation, and this 
sense is one on which I want to elaborate in the following 
pages; but the account which is sketched by Barnes does not 
seem to me to approach it. His account begins at the point 
where Hamlet intends (decides) that his uncle shall be 
murdered. This at least - the intention to murder his father - 
is something which Shakespeare makes clear in the scene in 
which the short play is enacted before Hamlet's uncle. It is 
important to stress this because it indicates the existence at 
a particular point in the play of a fully -fledged intention. 
This it is which underlies the subsequent activities of 
Hamlet, the activities which Barnes describes as the working 
out of the motive. 
But it seems to be false to regard these activities as the 
gradual modification or delineation of the intention. They 
should rather be regarded as separate, clearly distinguishable 
steps connected by the original goal. These steps themselves 
will be preceded by intentions. If one imagines a modern 
Hamlet who has decided to dispose of someone, it will be 
reasonable to assume that he will, for example, make enquiries 
about an effective brand of poison, that he will visit a 
chemist, that he will at some time or other deposit the fluid in 
a cup of tea, etc., - and one might go on imagining a whole 
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series of actions og this nature, directed towards a single 
goal. These activities are admittedly given coherence by the 
desire to murder, and this desire in turn by a motive of rëvenge 
or jealousy, or the like; but there is no change in the 
original intention. The end or goal of all these activities 
remains constant. No amount of planning or scheming can alter 
or make clearer what is intended. These activities are 
understandable only in the light of this intention, which 
implies that the intention must be fairly clearly formed in 
the agent's mind in order that the subsequent actions may be 
described as intelligent. The things which the agent does 
towards the achievement of his goal are intended, and so of 
course is each action, so far as it is a conscious action at 
all. These are further intentions which follow logically from, 
are in some important sense dependent upon, what is initially 
intended; but we do not regard them as forming a part of the 
original. If this be true, it will be agreed that there is no 
justification for a distinctioj between a 'real' intention and 
some earlier one only half formed. It will also be seen that 
he final, 'primary', choice, so- called, if it is not merely 
a confirmation of the original intention, is really just 
another intention - to murder by poison, for example, rather 
than with a gun. It is one of the features of a conscious, 
rational, being that he is continually forming and discarding 
intentions in the light of the circumstances in which he finds 
himself. That he should be able to state his intention either 
with respect to what he is now doing or with respect to what he 
will be doing at some future date is indeed the criterion for 
saying that he knows what he is doing. There is no harm in . 
linking intentions by reference, in a particular context, to 
one which may be regarded as central or fundamental; but this 
is no ground for the use of the terms 'real' and 'unreal', 
'perfect' and 'imperfect', etc. The periphery of motive and 
intention is to be located in other conditions. 
Francois Mauriac, in his account of the predicament of 
7 
his character Therese, well illustrates these conditions. The 
latter is accused and acquitted of the attempted murder of her 
husband Bernard. On the long return -journey from the court -room 
to her home, Therese has time in which to recount and reflect 
upon the events preceding her arrest. In particular, she is 
concerned to reconstruct, as honestly as possible, these events 
in preparation for the explanation which she feels her 
husband will expect. But in fact it turns out to be something 
more than this. It is not only to Bernard that she must explain, 
but also to herself. There are times, during this intense 
period of recollection, when she wonders how she came to do 
what she did, when she wonders whether she really wanted or 
intended to do it - and if she really did intend it, how could 
this intention have come about? "'I shall have to begin again 
from the beginning t", she says, "'But what is the beginning 
7. 
In the novel of the same name. 
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where our actions are concerned? Our destiny, once we begin 
to try to isolate it, is like those plants which we can never 
dig up with all their roots intact.' ". Nevertheless, the drama 
of her childhood and adolescence gradually unfolds itself, the 
smoothness and continuity of the account being interrupted 
only by the regular attempts to remember why this happened, 
how she was responsible for that. She says "'I married him 
because.... ", but there is no answer, nor can she supply 
one. Yet she maintains that she knew what she was doing; she 
wanted to marry him.... Gradually, she is able to extract 
from the context of her marriage, and the shared activities of 
a newly- married couple, the sense of boredom, ,imprisonment, 
and frustration underlying it all. And there was, too, the 
vague desire to escape, to be free. Perhaps all this was her 
motive for the crime she was later to commit. Yet she liked 
Bernard; she bore no grudge against him. 
The day came when Bernard unwittingly took an overdose of 
i 
his 'Fowler' drops, the medicine which contained arsenic and 
which had been prescribed for his previous illness. Thérése 
witnessed the event, and yet said nothing. Her action - her 
failure to act - is justified by the thought that she was 
probably too lazy to speak, and no doubt she was tired. But 
"for what was she hoping at that moment ? ", asks Mauriac. And 
"'I can't believe that I deliberately planned to say nothing", 
says Therese to herself. Here, then, is an account of the 
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half -formed, the ill- defined, intention. In one important 
sense she knew what she was doing; or alternatively, she 
knew that she did not do something which it was in her power 
to do; and she knew also that the prevention, the 
prohibition, came from within herself. Her present disbelief 
stems not from the perception of some discrepancy in the facts 
as they present themselves to her, but rather from her very 
acceptance that the facts were as they were. Her disbelief is 
not really disbelief at all, but a child -like refusal or 
repudiation. Her disbelief takes the form of expressing 
surprise that the facts should be as they are, surprise that 
she, as a rational being, rational even at the moment of her 
weakness, should have been capable of remaining silent. But the 
vague, ill -formed intention to murder was there, and it gradually 
becomes plainer, more distinct. 
I have recounted in detail these passages from Mauriac's 
novel first because they represent more vividly, more 
explicitly, what is described in Barnes' article as the 
'working out of the motive'; secondly because they illustrate 
an importantly different interpretation of this expression; 
and thirdly because this is precisely the type of case which 
we regard as being on the borderline of intention and not, as 
Barnes seems to believe, the standard model. There is, I 
believe, an important difference between the man who forms an 
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intention and plans his subsequent activities in the light of 
this and, on the other hand, the man who stumbles vaguely 
and uneasily, in a Thérésian fashion, towards a goal he but 
dimly perceives. It would be misleading to speak of unconscious 
motivation here. Thérése was not a candidate for the psycho- 
analyst: the sign -posts of her journey were clearly marked, 
from a retrospective point of view. She represents the 
majority of rational beings, for whom opportunities, chance 
situations, can suggest ends of goals previously unformulated, 
provided the motive, considered as a potential explanatory 
concept, is present. For Thérése, as we have seen, there was 
no original and deliberate intention to murder her husband. But 
the groundsheet of motivation was perceptible: the boredom, 
the sense of ;imprisonment, the detestation of her husband's 
activities. From this alone nothing might have ensued had it 
not been for the chance illness of Bernard, the Fowler drops 
prescribed by the doctor, and her witnessing of Bernard's 
accidental consumption of the overdose. This latter event is 
what Thérése herself later describes as the 'first step', so 
far as one could speak of a definite beginning at all. But this 
first step was by no means comparable with that of Hamlet. It 
was nothing more than a suggdstion of what might be possible. 
Nor was the second step - also deliberate, also rational - the 
full acknowledgement of an intention. She deposited the drops in 
Bernard's glass not in fulfilment of a pre- conceived desire to 
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murder, but in order to be really sure that it was the 
Fowler drops which had been responsible for Bernard's 
vomitations - "'It was simply that I was curious... ' ", she 
says. But as Mauriac, relating the explanation she gave to 
Bernard, says, "she could only have acted in that half - 
mechanical, that somnambulistic fashion, because for months 
past she had not attempted to resist, had, indeed, been 
encouraging, criminal thoughts." 
These passages bring out what I hope is now evident, 
namely that there is an important difference between 
Shakespeare's case and that of Mauriac. It looks very much as 
if Barnes had, in this article, fallen prey to the sometimes 
useful but often, I think, pernicious device of philosophical 
regimentation, finding its expression in this case in the 
attempt to embrace the whole concept of intention (and perhaps 
motive also) under a single model. It is one of the prime aims 
of this thesis to show that this cannot be done. 
By way of a speculative digression from what has already 
been said, it is interesting to compare, very briefly, Mauriac's 
description of the situation of Thérése with the dispositional 
account of motives which we examined in Chapter II. It will be 
remembered that Ryle classes motives as dispositions 
(inclinations, tendencies, etc.) - dispositions being always 
translatable into 'Whenever.. ' or 'If... then' propositions. 
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Now there is a sense in which Thérése's motives may be 
regarded as dispositional. Ond might formulate them in the 
following way: "Since this woman feels a sense of boredom 
and emprisonment; since she feels that life without her husband 
would be a happier one; then, given the right sort of situation, 
combined with the right sort of opportunity, she may attempt 
to murder him." But there are one or two important differences 
which ought to be emphasised. We may say that Ryle's man who 
boasted from vanity satisfies the "law -like proposition that 
whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration and envy 
of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce this 
admiration and envy" primarily because one can assume prior 
knowledge of the agent's vanity on previous occasions. (We saw 
in Chapter II that this need not always be the case, that Ryle's 
thesis may be said to rest upon a natural tendency which human 
beings have to perpetuate motives in others, having no reference 
to the past record of those who possess them. However, if one 
disregards this tendency - or alternatively if one holds that 
Ryle's case must in fact be based upon acquaintance with an 
existing character- record - then the Thérése situation may be 
seen as an interesting counter -example here). If the boredom of 
Thérése was to constitute a law -like proposition of the kind 
which we have mentioned, one would require precisely the same 
grounds for assumption, that is, in this casg, infuvmation 
concerning recurrent boredom, sense of emprisonment, and the like. 
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This information is absent in Mauriac's account, and of course 
intentionally so. Thérése was not meant to be a woman of this 
nature. Her physical environment, her sexual relations with 
Bernard, the general sense of captivity by a family obsessed 
with its inherited traditions combined to produce, to create, 
a temperament the description of which would not previously have 
been applicable to her. In the light of these circumstances, 
it is difficult to see how one could formulate a law -like 
proposition. One could, of course, formulate a very general 
kind of proposition which would have to include detailed 
refernce to the circumstances in which Therese happens to find 
A 
herself at this stage of her life; and one could go on to state 
the general possibility of attempted murder under these conditions 
on the basis of parallel situations in the life of others. But 
it is extremely doubtful whether this can be termed a 
dispositional account at all; and even if it were such, it is 
clearly not what Ryle had in mind. Ryle's interpretation of the 
statement 'He boasted from vanity' - notwithstanding what was 
said in Chapter II - very strongly suggests that the person who 
is described as vain is one who is habitually so. Thérése did not 
habitually have a sense of emprisonment and boredom in the sense 
in which this belonged to her nature. 
VII. THE ROT,F; OF WANTING AND DESIRING IN THE EXPLANATION 
OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR: EMOTION VERSUS REASON AS 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS. 
I want to turn, finally, to the concept of wanting and 
desiring as a means of explaining human behaviour. This is of 
considerable importance within the general group of topics 
discussed in this thesis if only because, ultimately, as we 
saw in Chapter I, all actions are to be explained by reference 
to wants or desires, no matter how we may care to characterise 
them. One of the central themes in this chapter, therefore, 
will be the discussion of what kind of explanation wanting 
provides, and this will very naturally lead into the reason - 
sentiment issue in Hume. I shall first of all try to show, by 
hinging the discussion upon a particular, but representative, 
criticism of Hume's thesis, that capitulation to his position 
is inevitable if the discussion is conducted purely on his own 
terms. I shall then turn to a consideration of some of the 
presuppositions underlying Hume's account of human motivation, 
and try to show how they fail to fit the facts of human 
experience. 
I 
Hume's general position on the reason -sentiment issue is 
well. enough known. He holds that reason can never be a motive to 
action. This is justified on the general ground that everything 
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we do is the result of some desire or inclination, that the 
reasons for doing what we do can always be traced back until 
ultimately we arrive at a point at which the only answer is 
'I just waned to'. If one asks a person why he does 
exercide, he may reply that it is because he desires health; 
if one asks him why he desires health, he may give the further 
answer that it ensures against pain; but if one presses him 
on this matter, he will finally answer that he does not want 
or does not like pain. The ultimate cause of any action, he 
argues, can always be traced back to a desire, or an inclination, 
or, more generally, a passion or sentiment. Thus anger, fear, 
and jealousy, can also be motives to action, and these are 
perhaps more favourable to Hume's thesis, for they are more 
clearly opposed to the function of reason, and illustrate more 
accurately how, in the face of them, reason remains perfectly 
inert. Hume sees reason primarily as a means of indicating how 
we may best obtain the ends which have been previously willed 
by desire, or inclination, or passion. It functions, as it 
were, only at the behest of desire. And thus Hume is led to say 
that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the 
passions.' 
Now the opposite point of view is held, perhaps 
pre- eminently, by Plato. Reason is, for him, supremely practical. 
That is to say, it can and does have an influence upon conduct; 
and in fact he argues that the human soul - which he sees as 
being composed of three parts - functions properly only when 
reason is predominant. One of the ways in which Plat& seeks 
to demonstrate that reason can have a practical influence 
upon conduct is by reference to the example of a man who is 
thirsty, and who sees a pool of water, but who nevertheless 
refuses to partake of it because he is informed that the 
water is poisoned. Since it is only his reason or his 
understanding which can inform him of this fact, then it is 
clearly this faculty which is in opposition with his desire 
for drink; and it is therefore this faculty which has won 
the day. 
Hume would interpret this situation by saying that while 
it is certainly reason which points out that the water would 
poison me if I drank it, it is nevertheless my infinitely 
stronger desire not to be poisoned which has really won the 
day. That is to say, properly speaking, it is a conflict 
between two desires, the one a desire for water, the other 
a desire not to be poisoned; and the stronger one wins. It is 
not a conflict between reason and desire: reason alone is 
powerless to move rte to action. 
J.D.Yabbott points out, in an article entitled 'Reason 
and Desire',i that the function of reason in Plato's example 
is not that of pointing out the means to ends which have 
been previously desired. What it does is to show us that a 
. 
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certain action will lead to, or deprive us of, another end 
which, when we notice it, we will feel to be an object of 
aversion or desire. That is to say, in the poisoned water 
example, it is only after reason has shown me the nature of 
the water which I propose to drink that I come to dislike it. 
Hume, Mabbott admits, does take account of this function of 
reason. In Book III of the Treatise, he points out that reason 
can influence our conduct in two ways, "either when it excites 
a passion by informing us of the existence of something which 
is a proper object of it - (this covers the poisoned water case) - 
or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects so as 
to afford us means of exerting any passion." (This latter covers 
the ordinary case where we are initially moved to action by a 
passion). It may be said that the second of these two cases, 
nemely where an action is initially sparked off by a desire, fits 
Hume's statement that reason is the slave of the passions. It is, 
however, as Mabbott points e* out, much more debatable as to 
whether Plato's case fits this description. As Mabbott says, "it 
is an odd slave who can 'excite' or generate his own masters, 
or prompt them and make them work when they would otherwise 
be fast asleep. In the Platonic example, but for the activity 
of reason, we should not have shunned the drink. Reason here 
is like a boxing promoter. Without his efforts, there would 
have been no contest; he produces one of the combatants, who 





Nevertheless, one might argue that the position is really 
in Hume's favour, for though reason is certainly responsible 
for bringing the second desire into play, it does not actually 
constitute the moving force behind the action; and Hume would 
argue that unless the second desire had in fact been brought 
into operation in this way, reason in itself could have done 
nothing. 
Mabbott realises the strength of Hume's position with 
regard to such cases, and he therefore goes on to consider 
other cases which he thinks directly contradict Hume's position. 
"Let us start with a simple example ", he says, "I hear one o' 
clock strike. I feel hungry. What can reason do? It can tell me 
how to satisfy my hunger, by going home to lunch. What else? 
It may remind me that if I want a book which I can borrow from 
a eelleatige colleague, I must catch him now; and I do want the 
book. Here, according to Hume, the work of reason is ended. The 
rest is a straight fight between my desire for food and my 
desire for the book, and the stronger will win. What in fact is 
likely to hap ?yen? I say to myself, 'Lunch can wait five 
minutes'. And I should probably say this even if hunger were 
the stronger desire of the two; that is, if the circumstances 
were such that I could not get the book without foregoing my 
lunch, and if in that case I should let the book go. The 
ordinary picture (Hume's picture) of a conflict of desires is 
like a boxing match in which both sides cannot win. What reason 
does here is to ensure that both sides do win." 
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On the face of it, this seems to be a more convincing 
example than Plato's; but in fact it might well be just as 
susceptible to Hume's analysis as Plato's was. What Mabbott 'is 
suggesting is that this is a case in which desire, namely the 
desire for food, is made to wait upon reason, or in which 
reason makes the desire wait. Yet surely this is possible only 
because the desire for the book is really very much stronger 
than the desire for food. Mabbott seems to be suggesting that 
the two desires are on a par, such that there is nothing to 
choose between them. Admittedly, he has inserted the clause 
that I can only get the book if I go now, as though to imply 
that it is really a rational consideration which makes me come 
down in favour of the book as opposed to the food; but in 
fact we might ewtaIly equally go along with Hume here and say 
merely that such a rational consideration has the effect of 
stimulating or emphasising my desire for the book. That I can 
only get it by going now makes the book more attractive to me 
than it would otherwise have been, makes me want it all the 
more; and thus I am prepared to postpone the satisfying of 
my hunger. It is surely evident that if I had been really 
hungry - if I had been suffering from the kind of hunger which 
results from going for days without food - the desire for the 
book would have exercised very 14 little influence upon me, 
and similarly the realisation that I uan get the book only if 
3°Op.cit.,p.I14 
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I go now would have been equally as ineffective. 
We have seen that Mabbott says dt the end of this particular 
passage: "The ordinary picture (Hume's picture) of a conflict 
of desires is like a boxing match in which both sides cannot 
win. What reason does here (meaning in his own case) is to 
ensure that both sides do win." But if he means tm suggest 
that reason has an influence upon conduct in any way different 
from the way in which it has this influence in Plato's 
example, then this appears to be false. Reason merely has the 
function of telling me what I must do if I want the book; but 
the 'if' clause here makes it perfectly clear that the whole 
action is dependent upon whether I really want it or not. 
Reason does no less than this in the Platonic example, when 
it points out that the water is poisoned. As for Mabbott's 
statement that in the case he mentions the agent contrives to 
satisfy both desires, there would appear to be nothing in 
particular to distinguish this from the way in which we 
normally go about things. It is true that in submitting to his 
desire for the book, the agent is temporarily suppressing his 
desire for the food, but this is the case in all examples of 
conflict of desire: if we satisfy one, we cannot at the same 
time satisfy the ether. Nevertheless, the other desire, 
especially if it is of the kind of which hunger is 
representative, will recur, and we cannot claim to have any 
significant control over this. It is in this respect 
misleading to suggest, as Mabbott does, that reason is somehow 
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responsible for postponing this desire. There are, of course, 
ways and means of 'suppressing' our desires, and as far as this 
goes it may be supposed that Nabbott's example is a good one. 
But it is still perhaps more accurate to say that the desires 
are suppressed, using this word in an objective fashion, than 
to say that we actually suppress them. There is no inner mental 
entity which, as it were, tells me not to satidfy my hunger 
immediately, in the example we were considering. This is 
suppressed for me by the existence of the other desire, whose 
strength is greater. It would be misleading, not to say false, 
to suppose that there was something over and above these desires, 
considered in themselves, which does the work of sorting them 
out, and informs me that it is right or convenient to fulfil 
one and not the other. 
However, Mabbott extends his case even further. He says: 
"In the simple case I have considered, the two desires remain 
unaffected by the planning. I go to see my colleague and get 
the book. Meantime my hunger remains unabated (or increased) 
until in its turn it, too, is satisfied. But there are many 
ways in which planning results in altering the desires 
themselves, and the possibility of satisfying them. The desire 
whose satisfaction is postponed may diminish or diappear; and 
when this is known a time -plan may be used to weaken or 
destroy it. 'Count ten when you are angry'.... " 
Op.cit.,p.I15 
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This suggestion, it seems to me, involves the same kind 
of mistake. If the statement 'Count ten when you are angry' is 
intended to act as a paradigm here, then it merely serves to 
illustrate that on those occasions when I am angry and am 
persuaded to count ten, I am really more concermed , not to 
appear angry, or not to appear angry and thereby offend a 
person whom, under normal circumstances, I very much like. One 
might give such conduct a rational air by saying that I adopt 
the general principle never again to display my anger in 
public; but of course the extent to which this principle is 
successful will depend very much upon how deeply I feel about 
it. Adopting the principle at all presupposes, if I adopt it 
honestly, that I have at least some desire to carry it out. But 
in fact there are circumstances in which I may be even more 
strongly committed to it - as a result, perhaps, of strong 
feelings of shame ih the past for having become angry in 
public and having made a fool of myself. Thus all principles of 
this sort presuppose feelings of pne sort or another, and it is 
these feelings, Hume maintains, which move me to action, or 
to refrain from action. 
Mabbott makes a s} Ielt-fie la* further point of a more or 
less similar nature: a time -plan "can eliminate the actual 
occurrence of a desire by the paradoxical nature of anticipating 
it. Civilized people in easy circumstances are seldom very 
hungry or thirsty; they do not eat and drink because they are 
hungry or thirsty but because their time -plan prescribes it. 
6. 
Their regular meals stave off these desires.' But this is 
rather a peculiar way of arguing that reason is really in 
control of our desires. To anticipate desires in this way - and 
not only to anticipate them but also to cater for them by 
arranging meals at prescribed times - would seem to be the 
absolute paradigm of servility. This is precisely what a man 
would expect of his butler, or his valet, or his cook, namely, 
to anticipate his coming and to be prepared with his whisky, or 
his clothes, or his meal. Surely, in one all -important sense, 
the act of anticipating, together with the concept of 'catering 
for', is something which pre -eminently characterises the 
position of the servant; and this would apply as much to reason, 
considered as one of our mental capacities, as it would to 
people in themselves. If Mabbott insists on using 
metaphorical language, then this is the logical outcome. 
There is one final point which we may briefly consider. A 
time -plan, Mabbott argues, "can check the operation of a desire 
by ensuring that, when the time comes for it to arise, it will 
not be possible or easy to satisfy it. If I want to reduce my 
smoking I put only a few cigarettes in my case before leaving 
home and keep none where I work; if I am suicidally inclined 
I give my gun to a friend to keep for me; if I go burgling I 




pursuer I shall not be able to do it." 
This point can again be met, so long as we confine 
ourselves to the Humean model. This is not simply a case 
in which I recognise that when under the influence of 
particular desires I am unable to control myself, and in which 
I make a rational decision to prevent the fulfilment of them, 
for example by leaving my gun behind, etc. - though no doubt 
this is how Mabbott would like us to see the situation. What it 
amounts to is that my desire not to bring about any harmful 
consequences either to myself (in the suicide case) or to 
others (in the burglar case) is much stronger than my desire 
for these other more dangerous ends. In fact, it is not even 
necessary to assume a conflict of desires here. The only desire 
at work is that for the prevention of harmful consequences; and 
the desire for these harmful consequences themselves arises 
only when I actually find myself in the relevant situations. 
Perhaps these are not called desires at all, but passions or 
impulses; but whatever the case, such situations are 
comfortably assimilated under the Humean model. 
The proper conclusion at this point, therefore, should be 
that Mabbott's argument is unconvincing if it is conducted 
purely on Hume's terms. I shall now go on to consider the 
wider implications and presuppositions of Hume's position. 
e' 
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There has always been some tendency - and this was 
reinforced and perhaps perpetuated by Hume - to draw too rigid 
a dichotomy between what may be termed reasoned action and 
that kind of action which proceeds from wants, desires, and 
impylses. It is normally acknowledged that actions which 
emanate simply from wanting fall into two classes. Ross appears 
to have this in mind when he says: "It is sometimes said that 
I cannot act contrary to inclination, that I always do what I 
most want to do, even when the act seems contrary to 
inclination.... In this sense I always act from inclination. But 
the more usual meaning of 'acting from inclination' is doing 
what I enjoy doing, or else doing what I expect to produce 
enjoyment later; and it seems clear that we do not always do 
this." What is not acknowledged, it would seem, is that there 
exists a kind of action which is not comfortably assimilated by 
either of these classes, and would perhaps be but grudgingly 
admitted to the class of purely rational actions. We might say 
co,nß,r/Arronl 
that it stems from a of wanting, in a purely 
dispositional sense, with some rational consideration of a 
fairly specific nature. It is well illustrated by the man who, 
not having any particular intention or desire to travel abroad, 
is suddenly confronted with a Travel Agency, in the window of 
which is displayed an advertisement for continental holidays 
arranged under an easy -payment scheme; and who, in consequence, 
178. 
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decides to make use of the opportunity. It would be false to 
say of this man that he originally wanted (in any ordinary 
sense of wanting) to gp abroad, just as it would be false to 
suppose, if he were musically- minded, that he was wanting to 
listen to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, even though 4k he would, 
no doubt, readily accept an invitation to do so if it were 
offered to him. The kind of wanting involved in both these 
situations is evidently not of a positive kind. It is not as 
though the first man would have taken active steps towards 
arranging a trip abroad prior to notilcing the advertisement; 
but it is true of him that he wanted this end in the sense that 
he would have given an affirmative answer to a question 
concerning his readiness to accept such an opportunity. Even 
this has to be qualified to some extent for if one asked him 
under normal circumstances whether or not he wanted to travel 
abroad, he might well deny that he wanted to on the ground 
that only under certain conditions would he be able to do so. 
The kind of reservations he will have in mind may be of a 
financial nature (which, of course, the knowledge of an easy - 
payment scheme may help to mitigate); they may be concerned 
with domestic considerations; or with anxiety about his job, 
and so on. In short, it is the kind of wanting which one 
would expect to be present in most men, at least with respect 
to certain fairly standardised ends, and despite the fact that 
the conditions attached to accepting opportunity for the 
180. 
fulfilment of these ends will vary. There will, of course, be 
other ends which may be peculiar only to certain men, the 
desiring of which may be of the same negative, dispositional, 
nature. This is no more than to say that we are not all alike, 
that we must always allow for individual inclinations and 
preferences. 
It would be wrong to equate wanting with wishing here. It is 
true that the kind of ends or goals involved are those towards 
which the agent, under normal conditions, takes no active steps, 
and it is true that we tend to distinguish the concept of 
wishing from that of wanting by saying that the former does not 
entail any action on the part of the agent, whereas the latter 
does. But if we assume, not without some justification, that 
wishing takes the form of idle day -dreaming, there is indeed little 
to suppose that what has been described as a dispositional sense 
of wanting can always be analysed along these lines. It may be 
true that the man who is persuaded into a course of action by 
the sight of the holiday advertisement had, in the past, often 
visualised such a holiday; but we do not necessarily have to 
suppose this in order to give sense to this sort of wanting. The 
only fundamental assumption involved would be that the agent 
was the type of man who would or does, as a matter of fact, 
enjoy continental holidays. Similarly, the man who would seize 
any opportunity of listening to a Beethoven symphony must be the 
sort of person who likes music, or the sort of person who likes 
181. 
music by Beethoven in particular; but again we do not 
necessarily envisage him as a person who is periodically 
overcome by a burning desire or wish to listen to such music. To 
be precise about the point, we should say that neither 
wishing nor wanting are appropriate descriptions of this state 
of mind, since they both presuppose some kind of activity, 
whether this be mental or overt, on the part of the agent; 
whereas the mental state being considered is peculiar in 
presupposing neither. 
Miss Anscombe appears - if I understand her correctly - to 
have isolated what approximates to a dispositional sense of 
2, 
wanting. Having made a detailed reference to Aristotle's 
Practical Syllogism, she considers one or two candidates which 
might conceivably fall under the concept of wanting. Wishing, it 
would seem, is the weakest of these. There is also a wanting 
which is normally applied to the prick of desire at the thought 
or sight of an object, and, further, a kind of wanting which 
we would more usually call hoping. All these, she maintains, 
differ from the strong sense of wanting which "cannot be said 
to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he 
wants." The important thing to note is that this passage is 
intended to be a fairly exhaustive analysis. She has eliminated 
certain senses of wanting which she proposes to ignore as 
falling short of the paradigm in various ways. This being the 
3, 
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case, the interpretation we should put upon her treatment of 
the practical syllogism will be significantly different from 
that put upon it by D.P.Gauthier. Miss Anscombe attempts to 
persuade us that Aristotle's starting -point for the practical 
syllogism is the thing wanted. I take her to mean here that 
any practical syllogism presupposes a wanting in order for it 
to be a practical syllogism at all. What she denies, however, 
is that it presupposes it as a major premise. Wanting is 
indispensible in that "whatever is described in the proposition 
that is the starting -point of the argument must be wanted in 
order for the reasoning to lead to any action." Thus, she argues 
that the form 'I want a Jersey cow, they have good ones in the 
Hereford market, so I'll go there' is misconceived, and that 
it ought to be rendered They have Jersey cows in the Hereford 
market, so I'll go there'. Now it may well be false that all 
practical syllogisms can be rendered in this way. Gauthier 
seems to have seized upon just this point when he remarks that 
the above second rendering does not in fact specify the reason 
which links there being Jerseys in the Hereford market with my 
S. 
going there; and, as he points out, "a piece of practical 
reasoning provides an explanation and justification of an 
action, by setting out the agent's reason for acting." But it 
does seem as though Gauthier has missed the point of Miss 
G. 
Anscombe's earlier remarks. 'I want this, so I'll do it', she 





thinks, is formally not a piece of practical reasoning at all. 
It is like 'I admire him so much, I shall sign the petition he 
is sponsoring', and this is obviously not a valid piece of 
reasoning, for there is no calculation involved. The second 
half of both statements is merely the expression, and not the 
acknowledgement of, the wanting and the admiring, respectively. 
One might, perhaps, put Miss Anscombe's point more succinctly 
by saying that since wanting is presupposed in order for 
practical reasoning to take place at all, it cannot therefore 
have a place in that reasoning. If I start with the statement 
'I admire him' (the man whose petition I am eligible to sign), 
my reasoning will take the form '.... and the best way to 
express this will be to sign, so I shall sign... '. Thus Miss 
Anscombe is led to say: "We must always remember that an object 
is not what what is aimed at is; the description under which it 
is aimed at is that under which it is called the object." 
Consequently, my aim would not be to sign the petition but 
rather to sign the petition as being the best way of 
expressing my admiration. 
Now it is clear from these remarks that the type of wanting 
being discussed is that which most nearly corresponds to a 
dispositional analysis and which, as I have already hinted, 
requires a rational consideration for for fulfilment. Thus my 
liking for Jersey cows (my more or less permanent tendency to 
say 'yes' to anyone who offers me some, granted certain other 
184. 
conditions) is not something I am likely to act upon in the 
normal course of events; but my realisation that there are some 
for sale in the Hereford market may lead me to travel there, 
just as my noticing the advertisement in the travel -agency 
window leads me to take steps towards a continental holiday. 
Gauthier is certainly right in thinking that these cases do 
not represent the way in which wants are normally fulfilled, 
but he is wrong to suppose that the very presence of a gap 
(constituted for him by the absence of the initial statement 
of a want which would have comprised the major premise) "is 
conclusive ground to object that the argument is not properly 
set out." For these are cases in which the argument cannot 
get going, as it were, until some reflection has taken place. 
It is precisely this feature of dispositional wanting which 
Miss .A.nsc Abe has isolated. She has done so inadvertently, of 
course, for, as we have seen, she was primarily concerned with 
a strong sense of wanting; and I would agree with Gauthier 
that where it is true to say that a person has, for dome time - 
to take the paradigm case of wanting - had a burning desire for 
some object, it would be odd to deny that this forms part of 
the practical reasoning involved. If we say of someone that 
he wants, in a positive sense, to buy a Jersey cow, then to 
summarise the practical reasoning involved in his achieving this 
goal as 'There are Jersey cows in the Hereford market; I'll go 
there' does indeed seem to leave a gap. It is rather as though 
7,Practical Reasoning, p.29 
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one overhears only the tail -end of a piece of conversation. 
Miss Anscombe has clearly failed to distinguish between these 
two kinds of wanting. Her argument applies, if we confine it 
in its relation to the practical syllogism, only to the 
dispositional kind. 
Yet her contention is not wholly misguided with respect to 
the stronger sense. One might maintain that all desires remain 
dormant until the incidence of an appropriate occasion for 
fulfilment, and that in this sense they are dependent upon a 
realisation which, put formally, is the proposition that this 
is an appropriate occasion. That signing the petition which 
this man has sponsored is an appropriate expression of my 
admiration for him would be some such proposition. It might then 
be argued that since the wanting in itself was not sufficient to 
bring about the action, and that since it required a synthesis 
of this plus the realisation that signing the petition was an 
appropriate means of doing it, we cannot therefore insert the 
wanting alone as a premise ih the practical syllogism. This is 
what Miss Anscombe has in mind when she says that 'I admire... 
and the best way to express this will be to sign, so I shall sign' 
is a piece of reasoning or calculating, while 'I admire... so I 
shall sign' is not. 
But what Miss Anscombe does not appear to realise is that 
the wanting involved in this case represents a definitive 
mental step, as it were, a state of mind which finds expression 
186. 
in a number of ways. The situation is not now adequately 
represented by the person who would give an affirmative answer 
to a question concerning his desire to go abroad. If this 
represents a state of mind at all, it is an entirely negative 
one. He is now the sort of person who will tend to make his 
desire known, and whose desire may constitute the subject of 
another's conversation. He will visit travel -agencies 
purposefully; he will inspect his bank account, or borrow 
money; he will talk about various possibilities, and so on. It is 
in this sense that his wanting signifies an event in the world, 
something to which we should afford ontological status; and it 
is for this reason, if for no other, that this event deserves 
a place in the practical syllogism. It is because a 
dispositional kind of wanting does not share these properties 
that it deserves to be excluded. 
I am not, however, primarily concerned with the form of 
the practical syllogism, as such, but rather with the general 
implications of admitting that there èxists a species of 
wanting which is not characterizable in terms of emotion, 
feeling, and positive expression. For this is the admission 
which may well entail the revision of the Humean conception 
which we considered in Part I of the present chapter - the 
conception of the underlying motivating factor for all action 
as being essentially emotional. That Hume clearly held this 
187. 
view is obvious from his remarks in the section of the 
Treatise entitled 'Of the Influencing Motives of the Will'. 
Such motives he terms 'passions'. What he is normally taken to 
have in mind under this description are feelings such as hope, 
fear, grief, joy, despair, etc; but the class of desires falls 
under this head as well. Thus he says, speaking of the supposed 
opposition between passion and reason: "The moment we perceive 
the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any 
means, our passions yield to our reason without any 
opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; 
8. 
but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases." 
It is also clear from the same quotation that he thinks of a desire 
as being an internal mental occurrence. As A.I.Melden points out, 
a desire for Hume "functions as a cause, usually sparking in 
9, 
some way an item of co- called overt behaviour." He maintains 
further that "since a desire is a desire for something, this 
occurrence is held to be directed in some way at an object or 
event, the obtainment of which is the 'satisfaction' of the 
desire... " Whether this latter póint is strictly true with 
respect to Hume in particular, even though Melden claims to be 
using Hume's terminology, is more questionable; for Hume does 
make an explicit distinction, within the same section, between 
the passions proper and certain "calm desires and tendencies" 
which, though he admits to be 'real passions', nevertheless 
Treatise, Bk.II,Part III,Section III 
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produce "little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their 
effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation." As examples 
of these calmer desires, he mentions benevolence and resentment, 
the love of life, and kindness to children, in addition to`the 
general appetite to good and aversion to evil. His 
acknowledgement of this distinction, and the examples he chooses 
to illustrate it, would seem to indicate also his 
acknowledgement that not all desires are directed in any 
positive sense to some object or event. Love of life in 
particular does not have any obvious directional character. But 
it is perhaps more plausible to support Helden's second remark 
by pointing out that Hume may well be thinking in terms of the 
episodic occurrence of these emotions. It is an argument 
against this interpretation that such occurrences would, by 
virtue of being episodic, tend to be of a more violent nature 
than Hume could have intended, but there is no reason to 
suppose that Hume actually foresaw such a possibility; and, 
episodic ok not, it is certainly true that he saw no 
incompatibility between their being calm and their being active. 
Despite their eI calmness, he maintains that they are 'real 
passions'; and it is not the case that they produce no emotion, 
'o. 
but that they produce 'little emotion'. The important thing, 
then, is that the existence of desires does represent a mental 
occurrence of some sort for Hume, whether it be of an episodic 
to, 
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nature or not: they are longings, feelings, or emotions. 
But granted that passions such as hope, fear, grief, and 
joy, in addition to desires in general, exhaust the possible 
candidates for human motivation - and certainly Hume seems' to 
assume this - then we are still faced with the problem of 
accounting for the rile of practical reasoning when it is 
conjoined with nothing more than a dispositional wanting. 
(Let it be admitted that 'wanting' is perhaps not the right 
word to describe what is essentially a tendency to make an 
affirmative response to appropriate opportunities for the 
fulfilment of certain ends not previously desired. This would 
follow upon the traditional definition of wanting as a primitive 
U. 
'trying to get', as Miss Anscombe terms it. Nevertheless, there 
remains this fact, a facet of human nature sufficiently 
universal to warrant careful treatment; and a facet which 
differs from Hume's calm passions precisely in its being devoid 
of emotional content, precisely because the phrases 'mental 
occurrence' and'mental activity' are inapplicable to it.) 
One could make out a case for saying that Hume was vaguely 
aware of the difficulty which the conception of rational or 
reflective motivation presented for his official view - though 
this would have to be regarded as little more than a hypothesis, 
largely ungrounded. Thus in the section on'Justice, Whether a 




find some motives to acts of justice and honesty, distinct 
from our regard to the honesty; and in this lies the great 
difficulty." Now admittedly, the difficulty he mentions is not 
genuinely his own difficulty. He means to imply, no doubt,` that 
the difficulty of providing motives to acts of justice supports 
his own general thesis at this point, namely that we have no 
natural tendency to be just. (In the Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, the non -natural aspect of just acts is 
emphasised by contrasting it with our natural - in the sense of 
'immediate' - tendency to be benevolent). 
Nevertheless, we know that Hume had already committed 
himself to the view that motivation is essentially an activity, 
an occurrence, which he describes as a passion, whether this be 
violent or calm. It denotes the presence of a mental something 
to spark off action. Now if one cared to emphasise this 
conception of motives, the notion of just acts (as being 
pre -eminently representative of the class of reflective or 
rational motives) would now seem to constitute a genuine 
difficulty. It is true that this and subsequent sections 
provide a tentative solution to the problem; but what one needs 
to ask, on the present hypothesis, is why Hume thought that the 
class of just acts in particular required separate treatment. 
May it not have been that he saw them as a challenge to his 
official view of motivation? 
At one point, Hume asks, rhetorically, whether the sense 
191. 
of morality or duty may not produce an action, without any 
'2. 
other motive. He admits that it may, but maintains that this 
is no objection to his position because it nevertheless 
presupposes some principle or motive common to human nature 
apart from this. But we may care to ask why it should have been 
considered a possible difficulty ih the first place. Could it 
have been because it represented a non- emotional spring to 
action, when he has already given an account of motivating 
factors as being predominantly passion -like; 
His positive account of just acts takes the form of a 
quasi- historical aeeea.a4 explanation, namely that "tis only 
from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with 
the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that 
0, 
justice derives its origin." But it is hard to see what 
function he sees this explanation as performing. It may well 
constitute a very general explanation of just acts considered as 
a class, or of the system of justice considered in its entirety. 
But it does not explain - in the sense of providing the 
particular motivating factor for - actions in the concrete, and 
it was surely these actions to which he was referring in the 
section on 'The Influencing Motives of the Will', considered 
earlier. 
The fact seems to be that having given an exhaustive 
account of motives in terms of emotional factors, he is now 
12" 
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blind to the possibility of there being motives non - 
characterizable in these terms, and thus the peculiar search 
for a causal explanation of a generic nature but with strong 
emotional content, viz selfishness. He might have a+giied 
resorted to an explanation in terms of simple desires, to be 
analysed in this context as sentiments of approval for just 
acts. That he does not do so is perhaps indicative of his 
awareness that they do not sufficiently simulate passions in 
either of the senses he mentions. The desire to be just is 
not, after all, something which greatly disturbs one's 
emotional set -up: it is just not that kind of desire, and this 
was perhaps the beginning of Hume's difficulty. 
Furthermore, having stated that justice has its origin in 
the selfishness and confined generosity og men, he draws as one 
of his conclusions that the sense of justice id not founded 
upon reason; yet this is in no way entailed - as he seems to 
think it is - by the previous statement. The origin of a 
system, of a way of living, or of a framework of attitudes, 
need have no bearing whatsoever upon the subsequent 
motivational pattern of those who conform to it. If Hume's 
sections on Justice are intended to accommodate just acts 
within his official view of motivation - and this in itself 
would tend to suggest 414.64 his suspicion that they are not 
readily accommodated - then they fail to do so. His conclusion 
is to some extent forestalled in Section I, where he admits that 
"we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of 
equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance." The 
truth is that there is no real motive because there is no 
universal motive; for 'universal' in this context means fór 
Hume what is part of human nature as such, a natural propensity 
like benevolence; above all, something which can be regarded as 
a passion, and thus as constituting a potential mental 
occurrence. 
However, whether these passages are evidence for the view 
that Hume found some difficulty in the ;Aew notion of rational 
or reflective motivation is not of IM great importance. What 
is important is that he sees wants or desires as impulsions to 
action, hunger, thirst, sexual desire, pain, anger, etc. falling 
neatly into this category. His thesis is stretched to accommodate 
wants which are conscious and reflective. As Gauthier says: "If 
I want to make a tour of Cornwall, then I consider when I may 
be able to make it, when it may fit into my other activities, 
and how I might be able to afford it, how it might fit into 
my other expenses. If I am able to make it fit without 
interfering with the fulfilment.. of greater wants, I plan to 
make the tour." He goes on to say: "I am not now impelled to 
set out for Cornwall; but 1 include the want in determining what 
I shall do." It is in this kind of situation that the notion of 
Practical Reasoning, pp.38 -39 
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'passions', and even 'calm passions', comes to seem 
inappropriate. The inappropriateness is accentuated when one 
considers the notion of dispositional wanting with which this 
chapter has been primarily concerned. Gauthier makes allowance 
for wants which closely resemble this, though he describes them 
as 'future wants'. "To determine what one ought to do ", he says, 
"one must consider all relevant factors, and not just those 
relevant at or to a given moment. Thus it is necessary to 
employ premises concerning what is desirable to the agent, 
without regard for time, and the practical basis must consist, 
not only of present, occurrent wants, but also of wants which 
I.S. 
may be occurrent at some future time." He continues: "I 
cannot, obviously, allow for all possible future wants in 
determining what I should do; but I can make limited provision 
for them. I can know some of the activities in which I may 
likely want to engage at some future time, and hence endeavour 
not to make it impossible for me to engage in them. I can keep 
in touch with professors of other universities, in case I 
should require employment.... " It is of course tempting to 
suppose that if one is going to make allowances for future 
wants in this way, this presupposes a certain degree of 
occurrent wanting. Perhaps it often does; but it may equally 
stem from a prediction based upon an unbiased act of self - 




want to make use of an opportunity of this kind in years to 
come, though, of course, I have no inclination to do so now'. 
Admittedly, Gauthier's account of future wants differs in 
one important respect from that which has been advanced in the 
present chapter. He seems to envisage the kind of wanting which 
simply occurs and is not dependent upon a 'rationalization' 
concerning some state of affairs. Nevertheless, they both have 
this in common, namely, that the actualization of the want is 
preceded by a state of dormant or dispositional acquiescence 
-4Iae- seeeta4 -ease conditional upon outward circumstances in 
the second case, and inward in the first. 
The broader implications of admitting the existence of 
such passive wants are only too obvious. It will necessarily have 
some bearing upon the traditional distinction between reason 
and sentiment, as applied to action. The traditional view, 
stemming from Aristotle, and more positively confirmed by 
Hume, is that 'Intellect itself.... moves nothing'. Reason is 
conceived as that which contemplates or discovers matters of 
fact or the relations of ideas; something which is, by 
definition, inert and powerless in the face of certain causal 
factors, like desires, whose fulfilment it may direct but not 
dictate. It is this sterile conception of reason which, 
16 
according to Melden, is responsible for the idea that desires 
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are internal mental occurrences which produce movements. 
Perhaps this is true if one can assume that those who embrace 
this view begin from such a definition. Ostensibly, Humes 
treatment of the topic is not quite as naive. Though the 
function of reason is similarly defined, it is at least 
intended to be the end- product of an empirical analysis into the 
motives of both moral judgements in particular and actions in 
general. In the light of the remarks already made upon this, it 
might be more accurate to point out that this conception of 
reason really stems from an analysis which fails by virtue of 
its inadequacy. It might be said that it is not sufficiently 
empirical to take account of the complexity of human wanting. 
But it might also be argued that, since he implicitly 
acknowledged the difficulty of accommodating calm passions - 
and more particularly absentee passions - under his official 
view of motivation, it was more properly a case of fitting his 
analysis to a pre- conceived notion of the function of reason. 
But it is the conclusion itself and not - except 
indirectly - the arguments leading up to it which is being 
called in question. One has to endorse Mabbott's comment here - 
though giving it a different reference - and point out that it 
is misleading, to say the least, to regard reason as a mere 
observer of happenings in cases where only by its operation 
can action ensue. These are not cases where, with a pre- 
conceived desire for some end, one employs (to put it naively) 
one's reason in order to secure the end in question. Even 
here it would perhaps be false to deny some practical content 
to reason; but one would have to agree with Hume in asserting 
that the end and thus the action which is a means to it is 
in one important sense determined independently of reason. 
Rather, it is false to speak of pre- conceived desires at all, 
and we have already observed that the notion of wanting itself 
is misleading if this is meant to refer to inner mental 
feelings, and the like. The agent is not on the look -out for 
oppo4tunities for getting what he wants, simply because his 
wanting is not of this kind: it is more properly expressed as 
a sort of character- judgement in terms of likes and dislikes. 
Given the right opportunity in the right circumstances we want 
to say of him that he will most probably do so- and -so. Mrs 
7 
Rachael Kydd, though she refers to a stronger sense of 
wanting, puts a similar point by saying that these are cases 
where a synthesis of two kinds of judgement is necessary for 
the execution of the action. Thus, using her/ suggestion, we 
might say that the Land Surveyor in Kafka's 'The Castle' has 
a positive desire - backed up by a good reason - to enter the 
Castle by the bureaucracy of which he is officially employed. 
But entry to the Castle is effected only by intricate and 
devious methods, and he is thus obliged to wait upon an 
appropriate opportunity. It is his recognition that the minor 
bureaucrat, Klamm, constitutes such, together with his 
I 7, 
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acknowledgement of his own desire to effect entry, which 
ultimately brings about action on his part. This is 
presumably the kind of synthesis which Mrs Kydd has in mind. 
But of course such synthesis can obviously take place lower 
on the scale of wanting. We might suppose, for example, that 
Kafka's Land Surveyor is the kind of person who would want to 
get married, that he is the type of person who would, all 
other conditions being equal, appreciate the attentions of a 
woman. Now granted this supposition, we need only a rational 
consideration of the kind which kafka at one point suggests, 
namely, that Pieria Frieda, by virtue of her acquaintance with 
Klamm, might well constitute the bridge which would afford 
access to the latter, and thus to the Castle. It is his 
appreciation of the circumstances, his seeing them not simply 
as a neutral set of circumstances but as an appropriate means 
of justifying an end to which he was previously disposed by 
nature, that is primarily responsible for any action he may take. 
It might be supposed that the process of coming to want 
something as a result of a rational consideration is in most 
important respects a similar one, and yet, so it may be argued, 
we have no tendency to give reason any ascendency here. Why, 
therefore, think that the previous case is any different? The 
difference is, however, greater than might be supposed. If, by 
the use of my reason, I judge a certain course of action to be 
both attractive and within my power and that it happens to fit 
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in with any other intentions I may have, etc., this may well 
set up in me a positive desire to act. But then this is 
clearly a case in which the functioning of reason and the 
existence of a desire are temporally distinguishable. The 
desire is consequent upon the reasoning, and indeed might not 
have occurred at all. It is in this sense that we want to say 
that any action which might conceivably follow must be 
depend tht upon the desiring: it is in this sense that reason 
is essentially inert. But the kind of case which I have been 
concerned to discuss is that which involves a simultaneous 
awareness of one's wanting, on the one hand, and of this being 
a means of fulfilling it on the other. Reason is not 
succeeded by, nor indeed, as i have tried to argue, preceded 
by, desire. Only if it were, would it seem plausible to 
maintain that our actions are determined by our desires. 
But this is only one version - and perhaps a crude 
version - of the notion of synthesis. It also has a far more 
general application which brings out more clearly the 
inadequacies of the Humean position. This is a synthesis which 
philosophers either ignore or fail to see. Wanting or desiring 
is not naturally divorced from rational activity, as Hume would 
have us think, except in certain special cases. These special 
cases are those in which desires or wants are essentially non- 
rational. Hunger, thirst, sexual desire, pain, anger, etc. are 
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of this kind. They tend to impel,% us to action, to act as a 
determining influence independently of rational considerations; 
and we normally distinguish them from reflective wanting by 
calling them impulses. We look upon them as having little or 
no relation to the desirability of the object at which they are 
directed, and indeed this very fact constitutes a potential 
exculpating factor in certain situations. Gauthier's example is 
instructive here: "We are standing near the edge of a cliff; 
on a sudden impulse I endeavour to push you over. Isere, I try 
to do something, to bring about a certain e44t,t4a &em situation, 
but, if I succeed, need I achieve what I want? Surely if I 
state that I wanted to push you over the cliff, and even more 
if I state that I pushed you over because I wanted to, I belie 
the claim that I acted upon impulse. To have acted upon impulse, 
although quite unjustifiable in this instance, is at least a 
partial defense against the accusations that are sure to be 
levelled against me, but to have acted because I wanted to 
It 
provides no defense at all." The thing about impulses of this 
kind is that reflection upon them may often result in their 
rejection as being distinctly undesirable. For this reason, we 
are led to say that we did not really want to do what in fact 
we did, that had we considered, we would not have done it. This 
is undoubtedly what has caused many philosophers to argue that 
wanting, in a human context, involves knowing what one wants. 
g, 
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Now if we exclude such impulsions, we are left with wahts 
which are reflective in character. But to say this is above all 
to say that wanting is itself a rational activity. To be aware 
of one's desires is to know how to characterise them. The bonds 
between desires and the ends to which they are directed is not a 
causal one but a logical one. If one dwells upon the reflective 
aspect of wanting, this is surely a conclusion which one must 
necessarily draw. If desires were isolated mental entities 
having some kind of causal power to bring actions into being, 
then there would no reason to suppose that we could be in a 
position to determine the end from a mere consideration of the 
desire itself. Yet in fact we do claim to be able to do this. 
It is of the nature of desire that it is a desire to do something. 
There may be doubt about the appropriate description of the end 
envisaged; there may be difficulty in stating it; but it must 
be in principle describable, in principle statable. But the 
capacity to describe the end is something peculiar to rational 
agents, as such. It involves a conception of the end, very much 
in the way that acting morally for Kant entails being aware of 
the principle for the sake of which one acts. To act merely in 
accordance with a principle is something of which animals and 
non- rational or sub -rational creatures are capable. This is to 
admit no more than that the conduct involved is subject to, or 
governed by, certain rules which have a function similar to 
that of laws of nature. Such conduct corresponds to those human 
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actions which stem from impulses and where, for the most part, 
there is no conception of the end. It is for this reason that 
the word 'desire' does not adequately describe the state of 
mind preceding the action; for it is false to suppose that any 
particular state of affairs was envisaged as being the result 
of the action. It is perhaps more accurate to say in these 
cases that a certain state of mind is satiated in the way in 
which the natural requirements of the body may be satiated. 
But under normal circumstances, the fulfilment of wants or 
desires entails the handling of objects which are already 
familiar to us. We operate with objects whose description has 
been previously determined, and whose plage in our environment 
A 
we know if only by their relation to other objects similarly 
defined and similarly located. And in many cases, the means to 
desired ends are also familiar, again by their being located in 
relation to these ends, and also by their having been potential 
ends themselves. Of course, it is true that we cannot always 
know what the means are, and, on the face of it, this looks like 
a case in which an existing desire has to wait upon the 
operation of reason as its tool before it can be fulfilled. This 
in turn seems to square with the traditional view of desires as 
being the ultimate cause and determinant of action, and of the 
use of reason as being an operation temporally succeeding it. 
rme 
But it has to be remembered that ̂wanting originally coincides 
with a conception of the end, a potential description of it. It 
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is not as though we are continuously moving around in a world 
the constituents of which are alien to us, and whose properties 
and relations we have to learn. This is surely what would be 
involved in becoming rational beings, in becoming adult; and 
if our experience were always of this sort, if objects were 
constantly alien to our perception, the very notion of 
rationality would come to lose its meaning. Moreover, only 
under such conditions could we plausibly imagine reason as being 
solely engaged in contemplating objects preparatory to 
recognising or picking out truths about them, the whole process 
succeeding the initial wanting. In fact, our experience is not of 
this sort. It has to be stressed that, as sophisticated human 
beings, we are familiar with our surroundings, with objects and 
the PaI4 er relation between them, with people and the relations 
between them. There is a constant synthesis between this 
knowing (this possession of concepts) and our wanting. In one 
all -important sense, we cannot want anything at all - where 
this means reflective wanting - unless we are able to conceive 
of the ends which would fulfil them. "Thus ", says Miss Anscombe, 
"it is not mere movement or stretching out towards something, 
but this on the part of a creature that can be said to know the 
it. 
thing." She supports her statement with an analogy which 
illustrates its converse, namely, that knowledge itself cannot 
be described independently of volition. She points out that one 




to know the meaning of colour -words 'pis only a matter of 
picking out and naming certain perceived differences and 
similarities between objects." She continues: "But e.g. the 
identification served by colour -names is in fact not primarily 
that of colours, but of objects by means of colours; and thus, 
too, the prime mark of colour -discrimination is doing things 
with objects - fetching them, carrying them, placing them - 
according to their colours. Thus the possession of sensible 
discrimination and that of volition are inseparable; one cannot 
describe a creature as having the power of sensation without 
also describing it as doing things in accordance with perceived 
?o. 
sensible differences." This last is perhaps not the legitimate 
inference she takes it to be, but her analogy does indicate 
fairly well the kind of synthesis which has been mentioned in 
the forgoing pages. ìMtelden puts the same point more clearly: "It 
is not.... that an agent experiences one event - the itch or 
twitch of desire - and another- the experience of objects whose 
qualities or relations he contemplates What we need to do, 
therefore, is to recover our sense of the character of our 
experience of and our thinking about the things we want, 
because we want them. But here the 'because' marks not the 
occurrence of an event that produces such experiences and 
?f. 
thinking, but rather their character." 
Thus again we might place our own interpretation upon 
2t. 2s.Op.cit.,p.67 
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the activities of Kafka's Land Surveyor, and suppose that he 
sees his prospective wife as a means of reaching Klamm, and 
thence as a means of entry to the Castle. There are many other 
descriptions which would have applied equally to Frieda. She 
is, first and foremost, a woman; but she is also a barmaid 
whose position is influential; she is also a protegee of the 
Castle official, Klamm; and she is, finally, a suitable 
potential wife. Above all, however, the Land Surveyor sees her 
as an influential barmaid. What he wants, namely entry to the 
Castle, colours his thinking about the things immediately 
related to it, determines the kind of description he will be 
disposed to give of the means to the desired end. Wanting 
permeates our thinking, and reason permeates our wanting, in a 
way which altogether excludes the traditional notion of desires 
as causal passions, as mehtal occurrences. Reverting to Miss 
Anscombe's remark, "we must always remember that an object is 
not what what is aimed at is; the description under which it is 
at. 
aimed at is that under which it is called the object." 
It will be noted that Miss Anscombe seems to presuppose 
that there will always be some description which allows us to 
say what the object 'is', and in a sense this is correctly 
presupposed. That is to say, certain descriptions have to be 
agreed upon, originally, in order for a language to get going. 





establishment, a library a place where books may be stored, 
borrowed, or read. These are the meanings we are taught during 
the course of learning a language; they have to be 
presupposed if communication is to be possible at all. But 
over and above such definitions, we may come, for various 
reasons, to impose further descriptive content, usually of a 
'personal' nature. Thus a university may be primarily the place 
where one met one's wife, a library the place where one takes 
one's midday nap, and so on. Superimposed descriptions of this 
sort indicate a sophistication in the activity of rational 
beings; but the underlying condition of such activity is the 
existence of standard descriptions which themselves have to 
be learned. It is in the learning of then that we become 
rational agents having the capacity to conceptualise. This 
capacity in its turn is the precondition of all wanting, in 
the strong sense. Not e4 to be able to describe what one wants - 
where this excludes contingent difficulties of expression of 
formulation - indicates a purely animal impulsion to action 
where the notion of intention in particular becomes 
inapplicable. A fully rational being, then, is a being who has 
mastered a language and who knows how to communicate; and he 
thus operates with objects which have a certain description. It 
is not as though all his dealings are with objects in 
themselves, as it were, upon which he employs his reason to fit 
the appropriate description when the occasion arises. One 
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identifies an object as a so- and -so, and if it were not 
identifiable in this way, if it were not possible to 
characterise it with at least some descriptive term, it would 
be very hard to see how one could ever come to want it. One 
cannot want what is in principle indescribable. There must 
always be some kind of answer to the question 'What do you 
want ?', given that the person wants something. Robin Savage, 
in John piasters' novel 'The Lotus and the Wind', is portrayed 
as seeking something which is said to be indescribable. 
Admittedly, he is constantly in the position of not knowing 
what answer to give to the above question. The goals which he 
does in fact achieve are merely stepping stones to something 
over and beyond them; but it would be false to suppose that 
the final goal remains completely unconceptualised; for he is 
able to recognise the things which the obtainment of this 
goal would effectively eliminate, namely, his introvertive 
tendencies, his isolationism - these being the things which 
now stand in the way of a congenial relationship with his wife. 
Similarly, one makes a further identification of an object 
in the light of eme what one wants at any given time. A 
mountaineer sees Cader Idris not simply as a mountain whose 
designation is such by virtue of its fulfilling certain 
requirements, but rather as a challenge to his own climbing 
ability. A Lincolnshire farmer sees the Hereford market not 
simply as a place where cattle are bought and sold, but as a 
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place from which he canfpurchase Jersey cows. In all these 
cases, wanting enters in to the way in which we think about 
the ends. It determines the kind of description we would 
give, if asked at the time of our wanting. In one important 
sense, wanting is transparently obvious from the very description 
we give of an object. The description constitutes one aspect 
of the doing, the 'trying to get', which is logically tied to 
wanting. King Charles sees the oak -tree as a temporary refuge 
from the Parliamentary forces. His seeing as such itself 
indicates his wanting to conceal his whereabouts. The 
mountaineer sees the peak not simply as a peak, but as a challenge 
to his prowess - because he wants to climb it. The ability to 
giey give a description in terms of one's wanting is of course 
a fairly sophisticated performance, but it nevertheless reflects 
what happens at the basic, unsophisticated level of animals 
and young children where, as Melden says, a cat "sees a bird 
as something to be eaten ", where a beast "understands a trap 
only as something which prevents it from doing what it wants to 
do's, and where an infant sees a rattle, "not as a plastic toy... 
Z 3, 
but as a shiny thing to be put in its mouth." (The notion of 
'seeing as' perhaps sounds a little inappropriate here, but it 
is nevertheless an effective means of shedding light upon these 
cases). In animals, this is the natural expression of an 
intention, of a desire. The act of withholding, of abstaining, 
23. 
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of changing one's mind, is something which characterises 
more rational beings; but nevertheless the doing, or the first 
steps towards it, are already expressed in the description I 
tend to give of the end, or of the means to it. 
There is one further point which will be of relevance to 
the present chapter. I have so far been talking firstly about 
that kind of wanting which is devoid of emotional content and 
whose fulfilment requires a rational consideration; and 
secondly about a stronger sense of wanting which falls into 
Hume's conception of desires as internal passions. Of the 
first I argued that it would be misleading, to say the least, 
to regard the wanting involved as the prime motivating factor, 
and indeed that it would be no motivating factor at all if 
motives were regarded as 'driving forces'. It was further 
argued that a synthesis of my disposition to acquiesce,with 
the realisation that a certain situation constituted a unique 
opportunity of fulfilling my want, was necessary in order for 
action to ensue. I then went oh to consider the stronger 
sense of wanting in which the agent is actively seeking a means 
of fulfilment. I argued that, even here, the model of a want as 
an internal mental occurrence, and of reason as an inert 
spectator supervising or directing, but not dictating, was 
thoroughly misleading; that, on the contrary, wanting is 
logically dependent upon reason in the very ability to 
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conceptualise. 
Now there are certain situation in which the wants of 
others enter into our practical reasoning, and it is 
normally assumed that here too the motivating factor must be 
of an emotional kind. Hume himself explains actions resulting 
from such reasoning as being due to a natural sentiment of 
benevolence (if we confine ourselves to the Enquiry), this in 
its turn being one of the passions which alone make action 
possible. It is not, however, entirely clear that such an 
explanation withstands a close analysis of the practical 
reasoning involved. A farmer, for example, might be asked why 
he has decided to plough the fields on the west side of his 
land instead of those on the east, as he is accustomed to do, 
and he might justify his action by referring to the fact that 
the lands on the eastern side happen to adjoin the estate of 
a local magnate whose house overlooks the relevant fields and 
who happens at the moment to be seriously ill: the continued 
noise of a tractor might impede his recovery. Thus it might be 
said that the justification takes the form of a referñce to 
another's want. 
Now it would admittedly be possible to ptess the farmer 
upon this point and stress that the likes and dislikes of the 
neighbour and his family really have no bearing upon what 
fields he ought and what fields he ought not to plough. The 
farmer may retort that if the man and his family are to be 
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disquieted by his continued ploughing, then he ought not to 
do so. He might well appeal to the commonly acknowledged fact 
that one ought not to contribute unnecessarily to existing 
suffering. His position can be legitimately summarised as 'He 
does not want to cause unnecessary hardship'. The real point at 
issue is that such a summary amounts to no more than a denial 
that he wants to cause such hardship: it does not, as Hume 
z4. 
would presumably think, assert that he wants not to do this. 
It is true that, usually, when we say that we do not want to 
do something, we mean that we have a positive desire not to do 
it; but clearly this is not always the case. It may be and 
the present case is intended to indicate just this - that all 
one is concerned to do is to deny that one has any positive 
desire to do the action in question; that what one wants to 
convey is that one has no feelings either way. The correct 
answer to the question 'Do you want to read Gitanjali, by 
Rabindranath Tagore?' would, in a relatively uncultured 
context, be fairly obviously in the negative for any given 
person, but it might be false to suppose that he wanted not 
to read it. He is merely denying that he had any specific 
intention of doing this, denying perhaps that he had 
considered the matter. It may be that he had been aware of the 
possibility of doing so at some gime or other, just as in our 
first example the man was alive till the general possibility of 
a continental häliday, given the existence of favourable 
4. 
I owe this general point to Gauthier. See 
Practical Reasoning, Chapter VI. 
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conditions; but, as we have already observed, it would perhaps 
be misleading to regard this as wanting - except for the 
purpose of illustrating certain philosophical points. Without 
the relevant conditions, he does nothing towards the 
obtainment of his goal. But it would be false, for the same 
reasons, to assert that he did not want to go abroad; and if 
one asked him if he wanted to, making it clear to him that one 
means dies he have any intention of, or any anxiety about, going, 
he would obviously give a negative answer without also wishing 
to assert that he did not want to go - without, that is, 
wishing to indicate that he had closed his mind to the possibility. 
Yet, even if óne excludes this case on the ground that 
dispositional acquiescence sometimes, for some purposes, counts 
as wanting, there still remain those many cases where complete 
absence of consideration for the end ensures the absence of any 
kind of wanting on the part of the agent. And here we still 
wish to say that his denial was not based upon a desire not to 
do the thing in question. It is indeed a well -known fact that 
a person is often induced to pursue a certain end merely by 
having been provoked into denying that he was positively 
interested. The denial in itself brings the matter before his 
mind. 
Of course, es -e one may counter the examples which have so 
far been considered by setting particular acquiescence against 
a more general tendency to do things of a certain class. Thus 
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one may say that the person who denies that he wants to read 
Tagore is nevertheless the kind of person who is disposed to 
increase his knowledge or to broaden his cultural outlook. The 
explanation would therefore be that he denies that he also' 
wants not to read Tagore on the ground that to do so would be 
part of what is meant by broadening one's cultural outlook, 
and this is certainly something he does want. Therefore, it is 
not true after all to say that the agent has no feelings 
either way. 
25. 
This would be a tenuous line of argument. It is one thing 
to list the kind of tendencies, inclinations, likes, dislikes, 
etc. which a person has. It is quite another to assert the 
agent's awareness of these in his actions and abstentions from 
action. Of course it is true that a person may set out to 
broaden his cultural outlook as from a given time, and it will 
then be natural for him to see certain actions as falling 
under this general intention. He may explicitly acknowlddge the 
fact, and act upon this acknowledgement. But again, it is not 
necessary that he should consciously have set himself this 
objective. And if he has not done so, then we should want to say 
that it was merely accidental that the activities in which he 
happens to engage have the effect of advancing his cultural 
knowledge. He happens to enjoy doing these things, or, more 
accurately, has no particular objections either way. In such 
?5. 
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circumstances, one cannot rightly infer that he has any desire 
to read Tagore, if only because there is no acknowledged 
intention to esaI enlarge his cultural position, and therefore 
he does not and cannot see the present activity as being a 
means to that end. 
But the more imn@rtant consideration in this matter is 
not whether certain feelings are entailed by an analysis of the 
situation, but rather the fact that the agent repudiates any 
positive desire not to do what he says he de will not do. The 
agent himself makes it clear that this is not the usual 
situation in which one says that one does not want, meaning 
that one has a reason for not wanting: his explanation is 
designed to show that there are no feelings involved either way. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I remarked that the 
traditional dichotomy between reason and sentiment was too 
rigid. What followed was an attempt to bear out the truth of 
this statement. It is hoped that in isolating two senses of 
wanting which are not satisfactorily assimilated under the 
Humean model of the motive as a causal passion, and by applying 
a more realistic analysis of the function of wanting and 




There is nothing which can be regarded as the conclusion 
of a work of this kind, especially if this word refers to some 
one 'positive' result. But it is hoped that a certain purpose has 
been achieved. This is the purpose which was stated in the 
Introduction, and which consists in the attempt to emphasise 
the complexity of the concept of motivation in its widest sense. 
In its turn, this should serve to inhibit the philosopher's 
natural tendency to assimilate the concept under a single model. 
Conceptual regimentation perhaps constitutes both the 
merit and the handicap of a linguistic philosopher. It is a merit 
in that, if we take it for granted that conceptual clarification 
is a good thing, such activity is particularly conducive to that 
end: it is a handicap in that the desire to clarify often so 
dominates the procedure as to render the philosopher blind to 
what may be fine, but nevertheless important, linguistic 
distinctions. 
T am perhaps being deceived in claiming to have disengaged 
myself from both these pursuits; but then, in one important sense, 
the work would lose much of its meaning if such a claim were not 
recorded. It may be justified on two general grounds. These are, 
firstly, that philosophical regimentation is the one thing 
against which each chapter has explicitly argued; and, secondly, 
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that far from being blind to certain distinctions, linguistic 
or otherwise, the revelation of them has, I hope, been rife. It 
may be argued that the activity to which this was an 
alternative is therefore preferable, for the present pursuit 
merely serves to accentuate an already existing confusion. But 
then to express confusion is often to express an inability to 
control or understand the facts; and this, it seems to me, is 
not a good reason for concealing some of them. The present 
treatment of the forces governing human behaviour does indeed 
render the facts more complex, and perhaps more complicated, 
merely by virtue of increasing their number; but it has also, 
one may hope, contributed something to our knowledge in this 
field. Any confusion to which it may give rise cannot properly 
be regarded as my concern. 
It hardly needs saying that the discussion could have 
branched out into many more fields, that there are many more 
concepts which would have been relevant, and that many more 
points could have been made about the concepts which were 
considered; but the important thing about philosophical 
pursuits of this kind is, I am inclined to think, to know when 
to stop; and, as Peter Geach says in another context, "although 
there is much more to say on the problems raised in this work, 
I am going to stop here." 
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